Showing posts with label Slovakia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Slovakia. Show all posts

Thursday, June 19, 2025

Banking on Integrity: Should Slovakia’s Central Bank Governor Stay in Office?

At the end of May, the Special Criminal Court in Slovakia found Peter Kažimír, the current governor of the Slovak National Bank (NBS), guilty of bribery committed during his tenure as Minister of Finance. Kažimír allegedly bribed František Imrecze, then head of the Financial Administration, to expedite tax proceedings concerning VAT refunds for a group of companies. Kažimír was fined 200,000 EUR. The court ruled that he would face a one-year prison sentence should he fail to pay the fine, but the conviction is not yet final.[1]

This decision marks a significant moment in Slovakia’s ongoing struggle with corruption and its institutional implications. Based on Transparency International data, Slovakia is at the tail of the perception of corruption, and the situation has deteriorated since the government of PM Fico returned to power. [2] 

Figure 1: 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for all EU countries, ranked from worst to best. The red dashed line indicates the EU average score of 64.

Figure 2: Slovakia’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores from 2012 to 2024. The graph shows a slight improvement in the early 2020s, followed by a decline in 2024. The higher the score, the better.

Aside from the larger societal importance of the case, legally, there are two interesting aspects to it. The first concerns the (re)classification of the crime with which Kažimír was charged, and the second, his potential reappointment bid. Let us look at both.

Bribery, Legal Reform, and EU Financial Interests

The governor was initially charged with bribery, but was convicted under Section 334(3) of the Slovak Criminal Code for bribery that caused or may cause damage to the financial interests of the EU.[3] That is because, on the request of the prosecutor, the judge reclassified the crime with which Kažimír was charged, following the recent amendment to the Criminal Code to avoid the statute of limitations running out.

In early 2024, the government enacted a controversial amendment to the Criminal Code that significantly reduced penalties and statutes of limitations for various crimes, including corruption and fraud, and abolished the Special Prosecutor’s Office responsible for high-level corruption cases. These changes were fast-tracked through Parliament, sparking widespread domestic protests and sharp criticism from the European Union. Fico has tried to justify the changes by arguing that the government was merely rectifying injustices committed by the former government between 2020 and 2023. During that time, the police prosecuted a record number of bribery and corruption charges against government officials, civil servants and judges, following a regime change.[4]

Following the pressure from the EU, which was concerned inter alia about the reforms undermining its financial interests,[5] the government introduced revisions to the Code in July 2024, reinstating stricter penalties for crimes involving EU funds and extending the statute of limitations for such offences. This change has now saved the case against the governor, which would otherwise have been dismissed due to the statute of limitations for bribery expiring.

The alleged bribe was intended to expedite processing VAT refunds for select companies. Since VAT is a harmonised tax across EU member states and constitutes a significant source of revenue for the EU budget, any manipulation or fraudulent activity related to VAT refunds directly affects the EU’s financial interests. The prosecution, therefore, argued that the bribery offence harmed the financial interests of the EU, allowing the case to proceed despite legal reforms that might have otherwise impeded it.

Reappointment, Reputation, and the Evolving Standards for Public Office

The second interesting question in this case is the eligibility of Kažimír for reappointment. Considering that he intends to appeal the conviction to the Supreme Court, Kažimír remains innocent until found guilty (in the last instance) or until the case is pending. Can he then be reappointed as the governor of NBS?[6]

Under Slovak law, the governor of the National Bank of Slovakia is appointed through a multi-step process involving the executive and legislative branches. Specifically, the governor is nominated by the government, approved by the Parliament, and formally appointed by the President of the Slovak Republic. The legal framework governing the appointment and qualifications of the NBS governor is outlined in the Act on the National Bank of Slovakia No. 566/1992 Coll. Article 7(4) of the NBS Act provides that one may be appointed as the governor for a maximum of two terms of office and that they should have the requisite “professional knowledge and experience in the monetary or financial field,” and be of “good repute” to serve as governor.[7]

But what does it mean to be of “good repute?” In the context of the appointment of the governor of the NBS, a person either has or does not have a good reputation –it is a binary, based on whether they have been legally convicted of an intentional crime. This is demonstrated by the extract from the candidate’s criminal record. Under this narrow reading, Kažimír qualifies for reappointment as he has not yet been finally convicted of bribery in the last instance.

Yet, in the last two decades, there has been a sea change in assessing the candidates’ qualifications for high constitutional office. The assessment has changed from a binary to a graded view. Candidates can thus be more or less qualified, which in some cases resulted, for example, in the President refusing to appoint them and even led to a conflict between the bodies with shared selection and appointment powers.[8] On this subject, the Constitutional Court ruled in PL. ÚS 4/2012 that the President can refuse to appoint a constitutional officeholder if they either fail to meet the legal conditions for appointment, or if there is a serious circumstance concerning the candidate’s person that gives rise to legitimate doubt about their ability to carry out the function in a way that preserves the dignity of the constitutional office and the institution it represents, or the “fundamental purpose of that institution.”

A shift took place, from a purely legalistic understanding of qualification to one that includes broader normative and reputational considerations. The actual reputation of a candidate, as perceived by the various audiences they have interacted with (the public, peers, and by other branches of government) has come to matter alongside formal eligibility. One could therefore argue that even without a final conviction, a credible accusation or a first-instance guilty verdict should be considered in judging the suitability of a candidate, as such credible concerns may erode public trust, legitimacy, and the moral authority of the officeholder. The fact that the governor of the National Bank has been facing allegations of corruption is significant for the determination of the appointing bodies.

Moreover, Kažimír’s potential reappointment raises not only legal but also reputational concerns (both domestic and international). As a member of the ECB Governing Council, the governor represents Slovakia in shaping eurozone monetary policy, where credibility and trust among peers are essential. A bribery conviction undermines his influence and diminishes his reputational capital. As the public face of the central bank in dealings with financial markets, the governor’s integrity directly affects investor confidence and perceptions of regulatory fairness.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, it should also be noted that while Prime Minister Fico publicly criticised the judiciary for Kažimír’s case, suggesting that the ruling was politically motivated and accusing the presiding judge of potential criminal misconduct,[9] he has also expressed opposition to Kažimír’s reappointment.[10] This stance has caused friction within the governing coalition, as Hlas-SD, formerly led by President Peter Pellegrini, retains the right to nominate the next central bank governor, and has indicated support for Kažimír’s continuation in the role. His term concluded on June 1, but he will remain in office until a new governor is selected. So the fate of Kažimír, and by extension the National Bank, remains undecided. 

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “Banking on Integrity: Should Slovakia’s Central Bank Governor Stay in Office?” (slovakconlaw, 19 June 2025) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2025/06/banking-on-integrity.html>

[1] Geoffrey Smith, “Slovakian Governor Kažimír convicted of bribery in fresh embarrassment for ECB” (Politico, 29 May 2025) <https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakian-bank-governor-kazimir-convicted-bribery-embarrassment-ecb/> accessed 3 June 2025; Veronika Prušová, Guvernér národnej banky je vinný, dostal peňažný trest. Kažimír podľa sudcu podplatil prezidenta finančnej správy (Denník N, 29 May 2025) <https://e.dennikn.sk/4663838/guverner-narodnej-banky-je-vinny-kazimir-podla-sudcu-podplatil-prezidenta-financnej-spravy/?ref=mwai>

[2] “Corruption Perceptions Index 2024: Slovakia” (Transparency International, February 2025) <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024/index/svk> accessed 3 June 2025

[3] The sentencing range for this crime is between 1 and 5 years, in cases where justice cannot be better served by imposing a fine.

[4] “Slovakia election: seismic shift as public anger ousts dominant Smer-SD party” (The Guardian, 1 March 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/01/slovakia-election-centre-right-olano-wins-poll-on-anti-graft-platform>; and Miroslava German Sirotnikova and Marc Santora; ‘Slovakia Has Woken Up’: Governing Party Suffers Decisive Election Defeat” (The New York Times, 1 March 2020) <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/world/europe/slovakia-election.html>

[5] The Commission has also warned the government of potential consequences, such as the suspension of EU funds to Slovakia. Tim Gosling, “Slovakia seemingly unfazed by EU threat to withhold funding” (Deutsche Welle, 19 February 2024) <https://www.dw.com/en/slovakia-seemingly-unfazed-by-eu-threat-to-withhold-funding/a-70277869

[6] Natália Silenská, “Top ECB official from Slovakia convicted of bribery refuses to resign” (Euractiv, 2 June 2025) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/top-ecb-official-from-slovakia-convicted-of-bribery-refuses-to-resign/>

[7] Appropriate professional knowledge and experience under the law simply means a complete university education and at least “five years of experience in a managerial, scientific or pedagogical position in the monetary or financial field.” Political actors, of course, may consider one candidate more qualified or experienced in the selection process. Still, legally this is a threshold eligibility requirement (which can, nevertheless, be used as a graded attribute by the appointing actors).

[8] On this, see generally the whole constitutional court appointment saga, or the case of the appointment of the General Prosecutor. “Kiska again rejects Constitutional Court candidates” (The Slovak Spectator, 7 July 2016) <https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/kiska-again-refuses-constitutional-court-candidates>; and Beata Balogová “Gašparovič violated Čentéš’s rights when he refused to appoint him” (The Slovak Spectator, 4 December 2014) <https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/gasparovic-violated-centess-rights-when-he-refused-to-appoint-him>

[9] Jan Lopatka, “Slovakia’s Fico excoriates judge over central banker bribery conviction” (Reuters, 30 May 2025) <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovakias-fico-excoriates-judge-over-central-banker-bribery-conviction-2025-05-30/>

[10] Hlas uviedol, že pri nominácii guvernéra NBS platí koaličná zmluva, a vyzval na jej rešpektovanie (Denník N, 1 June 2025) <https://e.dennikn.sk/minuta/4669813/