Showing posts with label News. Show all posts
Showing posts with label News. Show all posts

Thursday, June 16, 2022

Unamendability Preserved in Slovakia, but only as a Last Resort

On January 30, 2019, the Slovak Constitutional Court invalidated a constitutional amendment for breaking the implicit material core of the Constitution. It was a historic first not only for Slovakia but also for the broader region because no other European court had previously founded the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment without textual support in the constitution. This is a critical distinction, because the stickiness of the unamendability doctrine, or any new doctrinal development, depends on domestic normative sources justifying such a development as well as the power of the court, its popular support and the acquiescence of the losing party (often the legislature or executive).

The amending actors in Slovakia did not acquiesce, however, nor did they hesitate to adopt a new constitutional amendment rejecting judicial review of constitutional change in retaliation. The opposition challenged this action arguing that a judicially enforced doctrine of unamendability is a necessary component of a modern-day liberal democracy.

Then at the end of May 2022, the Constitutional Court finally had its say. The Court opted for a passive-aggressive approach, issuing what is colloquially known as a quasi-meritorious judgment. The court rejected the petition in a procedural ruling but supplied it with the reasoning that would fit better with a meritorious decision. A quasi-meritorious decision indicates that the Court wants to speak on the subject but for whatever reason cannot. In this case, the Court rejected the petition because the amendment it was supposed to review, prevented it from reviewing constitutional amendments.

In the decision, the Courts confirmed its previous position that the Constitution, or at least its core, is unamendable and those core principles may in the extreme require judicial protection. The Court continues to maintain that the amending actors are not the absolute sovereign and are in fact limited in the exercise of great power by the basic constitutional framework delimited by The People at the moment of founding.

In the view of the Court, the Constitution is not value-neutral: "Although every legal norm is fundamentally changeable and revocable, from the point of view of the Constitution adopted in 1992, the basic principles of a democratic and rule of law (even without such explicit wording) are immutable." These values express the essence of the constitutional law posited by the sovereign (but identified by the Court through its case law), which can be further articulated by the amending actors to the extent the values are not broken.

The Court held that with the adoption of the constitution, the "unlimited sovereignty of the citizens was transformed into the sovereignty of the state on its territory, exercised by a system of the delegated powers." The three delegated powers are limited in competence and ought to be exercised to, among other things, protect democracy retrogressions. So the amending actors can do wrong, but the Court will generally exercise restraint when it comes to constitutional change. The Court accepted that the Court itself is too a limited power, which means that it cannot, in the time of ordinary politics review a constitutional amendment.

The Court essentially found that absent extraordinary circumstances, functional judicial review of constitutional change is not part of the material core. In extreme cases, however, of a core violation that has the intensity to change the character of the Slovak Republic as a democratic state based on the principle of the rule of law, the Court must intervene as the "constitutional guardian." If the amending actors were to overreach, the interpretation of the Constitutional Court's own competences would have to be extensively adapted to it to ensure the integrity of the founding document.

Friday, December 3, 2021

Softlocking Slovakia: New Pandemic Lockdown and State of Emergency

The Slovak government declared a new state of emergency at the end of November 2021, combined with a two-week soft lockdown.[1] The state of emergency has been declared for 90 days, starting on November 25, on the whole territory of the republic. The lockdown should last until December 9. Both measures can be potentially extended if the pandemic situation so requires, although the government has signalled a preference for not keeping restrictive measures in place.

The Slovak constitutional framework[2] for crisis management newly permits the government to extend the duration of a pandemic emergency by 40 days, even repeatedly.[3] It is, therefore, possible that the state of emergency will be extended next year. The state of emergency adopted this time last year was extended twice.[4] Every extension of a pandemic emergency necessitates a subsequent parliamentary approval within 20 days. Without approval, the state of emergency expires by default.

The government declared the emergency after intense criticism from its expert advisory body and the head of state. President Čaputová urged the PM and his cabinet to act on the pandemic to avoid the loss of life the country had experienced last year after the holiday season.[5] Slovakia thus follows Austria as the second country in Europe to reintroduce state lockdown before holidays. That is due to a critical increase in the number of new Covid19 cases and hospitalisations –currently over 3000 patients.[6]

The emergency declaration provides for a two-week lockdown, consisting of a curfew between 5AM to 1AM on the following day (until December 9) and restrictions on the freedom of assembly (maximum of six people). The government also requests citizens to limit contact with others, keep contact primarily within a single household and prioritise online communication to keep in contact with close relatives. Finally, employers are requested to enable their employees to work from home, if possible.

The curfew order has been criticised for the numerous exceptions it permits. People are, of course, allowed to leave their homes for work (with proof of vaccination or a test), to shop for essentials, visit their doctor, go to the hospital or take the vaccination, but also for worship services, church or state weddings, funeral ceremonies and baptism without restriction on the number of churchgoers. Likewise, people can still attend mass sporting events, such as football, hockey, and basketball. The exemptions for worship services and sporting events contradict the limitations imposed on the freedom of assembly.

Executive Underreach?

Although the government’s response to the first pandemic wave in early 2020 was successful, its more recent attempts to tackle the subsequent waves mostly failed due to indecisiveness, coalition in-fighting, and preference for populist measures over science-based policy. Take, for example, the vaccination lottery that was supposed to incentivise senior citizens. The government spent 27mil EUR to increase the low vaccination rate, especially among vulnerable groups, but with little to no effect.[7] Instead, more than half of the population remains unvaccinated, despite the lottery or proposed financial incentives.[8]

Why has been the government failing? The conventional understanding in the field is that the executive might use the uncertainty and moral panic conditioned by emergencies to overreach – e.g. unduly limit the citizens’ rights, curb checking institutions and stack the deck against their political opponent. However, in a select few cases, we can observe the opposite tendency. David Pozen and Kim Lane Scheppelle term this behaviour an “underreach,” which they define as the “executive’s willful failure to address a significant public problem that the executive is legally and functionally equipped (though not necessarily legally required) to address.”[9] More specifically, they argue that the concept best describes situations where the political actors “sees a significant threat coming, has access to information about what might mitigate or avert the threat along with the power to set a potentially effective plan in motion,” but does not act.[10]

Slovakia arguably fits the description of an executive underreach. Political actors had access to information about the pandemic and a recent experience with the negative effects of slow response to the onset of the pandemic.[11] Yet, despite this, the government again shows passivity and unwillingness to introduce restrictive measures due to a fear of alienating their constituencies. The risk is that if the situation does not improve, the public health sector might collapse due to a shortage of hospital beds and ventilators.[12] The government’s failure to adequately respond to the crisis in 2020 ultimately led to the resignation of the PM and a cabinet reshuffle.[13] It remains to be seen if the current government survives its lacklustre response to the pandemic.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, Softlocking Slovakia: New Pandemic Lockdown and State of Emergency (slovakconlaw, 4 December 2021) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2021/12/softlocking-slovakia-new-lockdown.html>

[1] Government Resolution no. 695, on the Declaration of the State of Emergency no. 428/2021 Coll. <https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2021/428/20211125>

[2] Constitutional Act on State Security in the Time of War, State of War, State of Emergency, and Crisis No. 227/2002 Coll. <https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2002/227/20201229>

[3] The option to extend the state of emergency applies only to pandemic emergencies to the exclusion of all other emergencies caused by natural disasters, catastrophes, industrial or nuclear accidents, which is a peculiar choice. The amendment to the CA on the state of emergency and other crises, adopted in late December 2020, was supposed to bring the legal framework in line with expert knowledge on the nature of emergencies, which can take longer than the constitutionally permitted maximum of 90 days. The response to the nuclear disaster in Japan, for example, took the better part of a year, during which the state of emergency remained in place in the prefecture. Sarah Fecht, “1 Year Later: A Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Timeline” (Scientific American, 8 March 2012) <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/one-year-later-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/>

[4] “State of Emergency in Slovakia to Be Extended by Another 40 Days” (TASR, 5 February 2021) <https://newsnow.tasr.sk/policy/state-of-emergency-in-slovakia-to-be-extended-by-another-40-days/>

[5] Michal Hudec, “Lockdown on the horizon for Slovakia after president’s emotional appeal” (Euractive, 24 November 2021) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/lockdown-on-the-horizon-for-slovakia-after-presidents-emotional-appeal/>

[6] “Slovakia becomes the second European country to go into lockdown as COVID cases surge” (Euronews, 24 November 2021) <https://www.euronews.com/2021/11/24/slovakia-becomes-the-second-european-country-to-go-into-lockdown-as-covid-cases-surge>

[7] Michal Katuška, “Lottery worth €27 million did not help. It should have persuaded the elderly but lured the youth” (The Slovak Spectator, 3 November 2021) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22776193/lottery-worth-27-million-did-not-help-it-should-have-persuaded-the-elderly-but-lured-the-youth.html>

[8] “Coronavirus in Slovakia: 15,278 new cases confirmed (graphs)” (The Slovak Spectator, 3 December 2021) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22365153/coronavirus-in-slovakia-statistics-and-graphs.html>

[9] David E. Pozen and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Executive Underreach, in Pandemics and Otherwise” (2020) 114 American Journal of International Law 4, 609

[10] Ibid., 10

[11] Keno Verseck, “COVID-19: Slovakia mired in chaos” (Deutsche Welle, 1 March 2021) <https://www.dw.com/en/covid-19-slovakia-mired-in-chaos/a-56740390>

[12] Michal Hudec, “Slovak government finally takes action as hospitals verging on collapse” (Euractive, 17 November 2021) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/slovak-government-finally-takes-action-as-hospitals-verging-on-collapse/>

[13] Matthew Holroyd, “Slovakia’s prime minister steps down amid Sputnik V vaccine scandal” (Euronews, 30 March 2021) <https://www.euronews.com/2021/03/28/slovakia-s-prime-minister-to-step-down-amid-sputnik-v-vaccine-scandal>

Friday, October 30, 2020

Extended Curfew and Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia

After a successful pilot in four hotspots in the North of the country, the Slovak government greenlighted plans for the nationwide Covid-19 testing. The pilot took place on October 23-26, with a total turnout of nearly 141000 people, which represents roughly 91 percent of the expected participation estimated by the Ministry of Defense. According to the official data, 5500 people tested positive. 

The testing was conducted using antigen test kits administered by health professionals, military and volunteers. Antigen tests are faster but ostensibly less reliable than alternative means. Citizens also had the option to purchase testing in a private clinic at their own costs. Private clinics and testing labs usually use PCR tests, which are more reliable but are not free, unlike the government-administered tests.

The nationwide testing was confirmed for the weekend of October 31-November 1. It will be carried out with the assistance of the military under the code name "Shared Responsibility." On October 28, the government modified the curfew order so that citizens in the whole country are generally required to stay at home until November 8.[1] A negative result from the nationwide testing, however, will enable citizens to enjoy their freedom of movement without restrictions. Although, they still must wear a facemask when travelling in public transport, in the interior and even outside if they find themselves close to other people (5m), and most public events, cultural institutions, and other establishments continue to be closed. Those who test positive will be required to isolate for 10 days and inform their contacts of the test result.

If one refuses or is unable to take part in the nationwide testing, there are few other exceptions: travel to shop for basic necessities; to get a medical examination; attend a funeral, marriage or baptism; care for a dependent; take a pet out for a daily walk or care of livestock; take children to and from school. In addition to these activities, select groups of citizens are also exempt from the curfew without the need to have proof of a negative test: children under 10 years of age; severely sick (such as cancer patients) and mentally challenged individuals; and people who recovered from Covid-19 within three months before the testing. Citizens who refuse testing will be, therefore, unable to travel to work and have to either work in the home office regime or take sick leave. In addition, employers have the authority to require their employees to document that they had been tested negative.

Even though the government seems to be dead set on the nationwide testing, there remain questions if the country has the collective capacity to successfully carry out the exercise. The President has asked the PM to reconsider strict curfew for people who do not test it risks further dividing society. 



[1] The curfew applies during the daytime, so citizens are technically free to leave their residence between 1-5 AM. Because these are early morning hours, however, the ability of citizens to enjoy their freedom of movement outside of curfew is severely limited.


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Extended Curfew and Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia" (slovakconlaw, 30 October 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/10/extended-curfew-and-nationwide-covid-19.html> 

Monday, October 26, 2020

Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia: Government Response to the 2nd Wave of the Pandemic

The PM of Slovakia last week floated the idea of nationwide testing for the coronavirus over two weekends in November. The testing should be voluntary and carried out with the assistance of the military because few municipalities have the capacity to organise the testing on their own. The Government has acquired three million antigen-testing kits in preparation for the testing and requested the Ministry of Defence to supply as many as 8000 soldiers so that the exercise runs smoothly. A pilot testing will take place in four regions in the North of the country, which are virus hotspots, on October 23-25, before it is extended to the whole of the country. The success of the project will ultimately depend on the turnout for the pilot.

In his latest public appearance, however, the PM also spoke about the possibility of a forced stay of 10 days for citizens who refuse to test. There are at least two problems with the suggestion. First, the testing cannot be meaningfully described as “voluntary” if it is backed with a sanction. The introduction of a sanction to the equation means, to quote HLA Hart, “that certain kinds of human conduct are no longer optional, but in some sense obligatory” [emphasis in the original]. Understandably, the government wishes for a high turnout because the utility of the exercise would decrease if a critical number of citizens refused to test. Forcing people to participate, however, runs the risk of a further decrease in the trust of the government, which is a crucial determinant in the management of the Covid-19 crisis response. Researchers have found that “high-trust regions decrease their mobility-related to non-necessary activities significantly more than low-trust regions,” based on comparing location data and surveys on trust in politicians in the country.[1] A high trust may reduce the monitoring costs of a government and the necessity for sanctions. Whereas low trust in government is likely to contribute to the opposite. 

The Slovak government had shortly benefited from the high trust on the back of a landslide in general elections in March 2020. Most recent opinion polls, however, show that the PM and key representatives of the government are rapidly losing trust due to personal scandals. Diminishing trust in the government will undermine its effectivity, and lead to non-compliance with its measures. A similar intuition was voiced by the Ombudswoman, who noted that “if we resort to sanctions, aversion to measures increases.”

Second, there is a consensus among lawyers that the government lacks powers to sanction citizens who refuse to test with a forced stay. The Government declared a state of emergency on October 1, 2020, for the second time this year. The state of emergency is to last for 45 days,[2] based on the Constitutional Act No. 227/2002 Coll., on State Security at the Time of War, State of War, State of Emergency and State of Crisis (Act on State Security), which regulates state response these four types of extraordinary situations. Thus, for the next month and a half, the government received access to extensive powers unavailable under conditions of normal politics. But even in an emergency, there are restrictions on the government exercise of power. 

Thes framework for crisis management allows the government to respond to emergencies through means proportional to the perceived level of threat. The permissible level of government restriction on human rights increases in proportion to the gravity of the situation. This is also the case of a curfew or a forced stay.

Under the declaration of emergency, the government may prohibit entry to an area or limit freedom of movement and residence through a curfew order, but the curfew must have limited duration and location (Article 5.3g of the Constitutional Act on State Security). Consider the following example. A permissible limitation on the right of freedom of movement would be a curfew between 4pm in the afternoon and 7am on the morning of the next day. Such a tailored restriction enables citizens, who work alone, so the risk of them spreading the infection is low, to travel to their place of work or go shopping for essentials during the daytime. The restriction, however, decreases the circulation of citizens in the city during the nighttime and effectively results in the closure of cafes and social establishments during curfew hours.

Unlike curfew, which is limited in duration, a forced stay order applies generally. Citizens are expected to stay at the place of their residence and may not leave unless exceptional circumstance occurs. Only in a state of crisis can the government limit the freedom of movement through a forced stay (Article 4.4a of the Constitutional Act on State Security). A ten-day continuous prohibition to leave one’s residence, as suggested by the PM, amounts to a forced stay. Such a measure is not available to the government during the state of emergency.

Suppose the government decides to impose forced stay against a portion of the population that does not wish to participate in nationwide testing. In that case, it is highly probable that the measure will be challenged in the Constitutional Court. The Court had already an opportunity to review the state of emergency declaration in a first-of-its-kind decision on the constitutionality of state of emergency. However, the proposed sanctions against individuals who refuse to participate in the nationwide testing are a significant change in the facts of the case.


[1] Olivier Bargain and Ulugbek Aminjonov, Trust and Compliance to Public Health Policies in Times of Covid-19, Bordeaux Economics Working Papers, 3-5

[2] The Constitutional Act on State Security limits the duration of the state of emergency to a maximum of 90 days, without the possibility of extension. Unlike in response to the first domestic outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in Slovakia, this time, the government declared the emergency for a limited duration, seemingly learning from the previous experience. For an account of the government response to the first wave of the pandemic see, Slavomíra Henčeková and Šimon Drugda, Slovakia: Change of Government under COVID-19 Emergency, VerfassungsBlog


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia: Government Response to the 2nd Wave of the Pandemic" (slovakconlaw, 26 October 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/10/nationwide-covid-19-testing-in-slovakia.html>

Sunday, July 26, 2020

Draft Constitutional Amendment on Slovak Judiciary Made Public

On July 13, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) of the Slovak Republic submitted a draft constitutional amendment on judicial reform into the interdepartmental review. The bill is an attempt at a comprehensive reform of the general and constitutional judiciary that implements the main theses of the 2020-24 govt proclamation programme. 

The interdepartmental review restricts pathways to legislative and constitutional change by the executive. Unlike MPs, who are legally exempt from the prepublication, the Cabinet and Ministries must first submit every proposed change of the law on the books into the interdepartmental process (under Act No. 400/2015 Coll. on Lawmaking and the Collection of Laws). The process allows the general and professional public, as well as anyone interested, to comment on the bill before it is presented to Parliament. The prepublication of a piece of legislation allows the public to control the exercise of lawmaking and even constitution-making powers. The author of the bill ought to consider the comments and either agree or disagree with the changes or make alternative proposals.

The MoJ seemingly consulted the constitutional amendment bill on judicial reform widely, including the Judicial Council, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic and other stakeholders. It remains to be seen if the proposed reforms will be received well by the general and constitutional judiciary. The bill focuses on these critical items:

  • reform of the composition of the Judicial Council;
  • review of the property and declared assets of judges;
  • reform of the Constitutional Court;
  • constitutional review of legislation in complaint proceedings;
  • introduction of retirement age for lower court and Constitutional Court judges; and
  • the establishment of the Supreme Administrative Court.

According to the explanatory note to the bill, the MoJ has the following opinion of a constitutional amendment: 

A sensible and prudent constitution-maker implements more extensive changes to the text of the Constitution either (i) due to "tectonic" societal change and the consequent need to adapt the text of the Constitution to the new social contract (in which case the amendment is remaking the Constitution to reflect the new identity of the community), or (ii) due to a change of paradigm of understanding and out views on the optimal design of a specific constitutional mechanism, design of govt power or the function of a constitutional body (in which case the amendment corrects specific elements of the constitutional identity of the community). From this point of view, the proposed constitutional amendment falls within the second category of changes to the master-text Constitution [...] 

Let us return to this reform after some time and judge whether the proposed reforms better specific points of constitutional design or instead negatively impact the document's identity.


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Draft Constitutional Amendment on Slovak Judiciary Made Public" (slovakconlaw, 26 July 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/07/draft-constitutional-amendment-on.html> 

Thursday, July 9, 2020

Key judicial reform policies from Slovak govt manifesto 2020-24

The general election in Slovakia took place on February 29, 2020, just before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The election resulted in the most significant change in the executive in the last decade when the party of the three-time PM Robert Fico (SMER-SD) lost to the opposition party OĽANO. After the election, the President, based on a constitutional convention, entrusted the leader of the political party that won the election with the task of forming the government. 

A new government has to draft and submit its Programme Proclamation for a vote in the Parliament (within 30 days of receiving the mandate from the President). The Programme Proclamation is a crucial document for govt coalitions, which delimits the policy agenda of the new govt for the next four years and points of shared interest. Contentious issues and campaign promises are often omitted from the Proclamation in favour of building consensus.

If the majority of the MPs vote in support of the Programme Proclamation, the govt has received the confidence of the Parliament. However, the initial vote of confidence is often a mere formality since the executive and legislature in Slovakia are intimately suffused.

This short post highlights salient constitutional questions in the 2020-24 govt Programme Proclamation, mainly related to the reorganisation of the Constitutional Court and the reintroduction of vetting of lower court judges.

The government will initiate a constitutional and legislative change of the organisation of the judiciary, namely:

Judicial Council

  • A reform of the composition of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic to provide for regional representation of judges on the Council. The Slovak Judicial Council consists of non-judges appointed by the executive and the legislature, and members elected by judges from their ranks. This latter group of councillors has been perceived as geographically unrepresentative because most elected judges come from two or three high-profile courts.
  • A new practice that the legislative and executive power should always nominate non-judges to the Judicial Council. This proposal sought to balance non-judicial and judicial representation on the Council. However, the govt immediately went against its own proposal when a junior member of the govt coalition nominated a judge for the position on the Council against the opposition of the Minister of Justice.
  • A proposal that the legislature will appoint members of the Judicial Council through a transparent selection process.
  • Govt response to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic in matters of dismissal of members of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic, which has been perceived as ultra vires. This controversial decision of the ConCourt denied the executive and legislature the ability to remove their appointments to the Judicial Council before the expiry of their terms of office. The decision effectively erased the provision in the Constitution, which explicit grants the removal power to the legislate and executive in respect of their appointees to the Council.

Vetting of Lower Court Judges

  • Reintroduction of judicial vetting by the Judicial Council of lower court judges. The government proposed to reintroduce, in some form, the constitutional amendment on background checks for judges, which had been invalidated by the Constitutional Court in 2019. 

The specific design of the vetting scheme has not been made public yet. However, it seems that the Council will first conduct a thorough review of the financial declarations of all lower court judges, including the property of close family members. The Council holds an annual review of financial statements of judges, but the reliability of the review has been questioned, based on recent revelations after Operation Storm. If the Council finds discrepancies in a judge's declared income and expenses, the judge may need to be vetted.

Constitutional Court 

  • A reform of the composition of the Constitutional Court that would prevent delays in the appointment of judges and introduce a staggered term of office to avoid the concentration power due to selection of a majority of judges by one party of govt coalition.
  • Abolition of the practice of secret ballot for the appointment of ConCourt judges.
  • To curb the power of the Constitutional Court to deny/approve detention of a judge and a prosecutor general. The govt also proposes to remove the decision-making immunity of judges.
  • The introduction of age limit for the office of lower court (65 years) and constitutional (70 years) court judges. There are currently three judges of the Constitutional Court who will serve beyond their age cap.
  • Additionally, the govt stated that it would examine the possibility of an extension to the power of the ConCourt to review the constitutionality of statutes in constitutional complaint cases as well as ex-ante.

New Supreme Administrative Court

  • The establishment of the Supreme Administrative Court, which will also function as a disciplinary court for judges, prosecutors, executors, notaries, administrators and, where appropriate, for other legal professions. The introduction of another specialised court should also ease the workload of the ConCourt.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Key judicial reform policies from Slovak govt manifesto 2020-24" (slovakconlaw, July 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/07/key-policies-from-slovak-govt-manifesto.html>