Updating the Dataset on Presidential Pardon (working paper No Mercy)

I have updated the data on presidential pardons and amnesty decisions in Slovakia, which now covers the entire period from 1993 to 2025. This dataset compiles statistics on pardon applications, granted pardons, amnesty pardons, and amnesties issued by presidents and acting heads of state. It includes a codebook and an individual tab with a presentation of the data for each president. The data is compiled based on reporting by the Office of the President, accessible at: <https://www.prezident.sk/page/milosti-a-amnestie/>.

Constitutionally, the president has the power to grant mercy in Slovakia through individual pardons or amnesties. Both mechanisms serve as discretionary tools for mitigating the legal consequences of a criminal conviction; the harshness of the law. The pardoning power includes the ability to remit or reduce a final sentence, expunge a conviction, or conditionally suspend the execution of punishment, including the temporary deferral or interruption of a sentence during the clemency process. Pardoning is based on a request for pardon and supporting documents prepared by the Minister of Justice. In the event of presidential incapacity, the acting president (PM) may exercise the pardon power.

Amnesties, by contrast, involve a broader political act of collective clemency, typically concerning a defined category of offences. Unlike individual pardons, amnesties require a countersignature, either from the Prime Minister or a delegated minister, to take legal effect, reflecting their hybrid constitutional nature that implicates both the executive and political branches.

Since 2017, the Parliament has had the power to annul presidential grants of amnesty or individual pardons if they are deemed to violate the principles of a democratic and rule-of-law-based state. In such a case, the Constitutional Court reviews the annulment within 60 days, and if it does not strike it down (or decide), the amnesty or pardon is abolished. This framework is an expression of a system of checks and balances designed to prevent the misuse of clemency powers for undemocratic or arbitrary purposes.

The dataset is accessible at: <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1_D9n80uR0juyJi-zeK_35rmxnufkX_5tmZm6u_K-z9s/edit?usp=sharing>

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The data shows two distinct periods with an increased number of applications for pardons: the years immediately following Slovak independence from 1993 to 2000, and the term of President Zuzana Čaputová. Why these two periods is an interesting question, which I attempt to answer in the article I am writing. 

The numbers in the early 1990s can likely be explained by the zeitgeist of the time: a society emerging from the collapse of communism in 1989 and navigating the early years of democratic statehood. In this period, the exercise of mercy may have carried symbolic and reconciliatory weight, amplified by the novelty of the presidential office and the broad expectations attached to it.

By contrast, the recent rise in applications during Čaputová’s presidency appears to be more closely tied to the individual than the institutional role. As a highly trusted and publicly empathetic figure (and the first woman in the office), Čaputová may have inspired greater public engagement with the clemency process, even as she remained measured in her exercise of it.

Even more interesting, however, is the steady decline in granted pardons and the complete disappearance of amnesties, irrespective of demand. This long-term shift reflects deeper institutional changes in how mercy is viewed and practised in Slovakia due to the unique history with Meciar's Amnesties. It is no longer a routine tool of governance, but a rare and scrutinised exception. 

If you are interested in this subject, I welcome your thoughts at simondrugda@gmail.com. You can also look out for my forthcoming article (if I finish it), “No Mercy,” which will critically examine the disuse of presidential clemency in Slovakia and what it reveals about constitutional culture.