Thursday, June 16, 2022

Unamendability Preserved in Slovakia, but only as a Last Resort

On January 30, 2019, the Slovak Constitutional Court invalidated a constitutional amendment for breaking the implicit material core of the Constitution. It was a historic first not only for Slovakia but also for the broader region because no other European court had previously founded the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment without textual support in the constitution. This is a critical distinction, because the stickiness of the unamendability doctrine, or any new doctrinal development, depends on domestic normative sources justifying such a development as well as the power of the court, its popular support and the acquiescence of the losing party (often the legislature or executive).

The amending actors in Slovakia did not acquiesce, however, nor did they hesitate to adopt a new constitutional amendment rejecting judicial review of constitutional change in retaliation. The opposition challenged this action arguing that a judicially enforced doctrine of unamendability is a necessary component of a modern-day liberal democracy.

Then at the end of May 2022, the Constitutional Court finally had its say. The Court opted for a passive-aggressive approach, issuing what is colloquially known as a quasi-meritorious judgment. The court rejected the petition in a procedural ruling but supplied it with the reasoning that would fit better with a meritorious decision. A quasi-meritorious decision indicates that the Court wants to speak on the subject but for whatever reason cannot. In this case, the Court rejected the petition because the amendment it was supposed to review, prevented it from reviewing constitutional amendments.

In the decision, the Courts confirmed its previous position that the Constitution, or at least its core, is unamendable and those core principles may in the extreme require judicial protection. The Court continues to maintain that the amending actors are not the absolute sovereign and are in fact limited in the exercise of great power by the basic constitutional framework delimited by The People at the moment of founding.

In the view of the Court, the Constitution is not value-neutral: "Although every legal norm is fundamentally changeable and revocable, from the point of view of the Constitution adopted in 1992, the basic principles of a democratic and rule of law (even without such explicit wording) are immutable." These values express the essence of the constitutional law posited by the sovereign (but identified by the Court through its case law), which can be further articulated by the amending actors to the extent the values are not broken.

The Court held that with the adoption of the constitution, the "unlimited sovereignty of the citizens was transformed into the sovereignty of the state on its territory, exercised by a system of the delegated powers." The three delegated powers are limited in competence and ought to be exercised to, among other things, protect democracy retrogressions. So the amending actors can do wrong, but the Court will generally exercise restraint when it comes to constitutional change. The Court accepted that the Court itself is too a limited power, which means that it cannot, in the time of ordinary politics review a constitutional amendment.

The Court essentially found that absent extraordinary circumstances, functional judicial review of constitutional change is not part of the material core. In extreme cases, however, of a core violation that has the intensity to change the character of the Slovak Republic as a democratic state based on the principle of the rule of law, the Court must intervene as the "constitutional guardian." If the amending actors were to overreach, the interpretation of the Constitutional Court's own competences would have to be extensively adapted to it to ensure the integrity of the founding document.

Tuesday, May 3, 2022

Three-times Slovak PM Charged in a Criminal Case

It has been more than three years since former PM Robert Fico tried to get appointed to the Constitutional Court,[1] thinking he would be able to either bargain[2] or force his way onto the CC.[3] At the time, he did not seek just to become a rank-and-file constitutional judge. Instead, Fico wanted to be the Court President because he believed that his experience and political capital as a former three-time PM qualified him for the position of leadership in his next career.[4] 

Fico was ultimately forced to withdraw his application[5] due to a controversy over his CV and broad political opposition to his nomination.[6] However, if he did not, we could have been in a situation where the CC President faced criminal prosecution.[7] That is because Robert Fico and his close colleague, former Minister of Interior Robert Kalíňak, were charged last week, and the latter was also detained, for leading an organised crime gang. The police claim that Fico and his co-defendants used their power to discredit opponents, illegally accessing private police and tax records.[8]

Fico has not been yet arrested because he is an MP. Members of Parliament enjoy robust protections and privileges to ensure the free exercise of the political office. For example, MPs cannot be prosecuted for voting on drafts, bills, motions, or any act or speech uttered in Parliament. Moreover, according to Article 78(2) of the Constitution, MPs cannot be taken into custody without the consent of the Parliament. The only exception is if an MP has been caught redhanded while committing a crime. Historically, the Parliament needed to consent also the prosecution of an MP, but a constitutional amendment in 2012[9] changed this only to necessitate parliamentary approval for criminal detention.[10]

 

Consequently, the Parliament should soon vote to either allow Fico's criminal detention or deny the motion, in which case he will be prosecuted without being taken into custody. The parliamentary Mandate and Immunity committee has recommended that MPs approve the prosecution's application for consent with the detention of an MP. However, the committee's opinions are not binding on the Parliament.[11] Even if the MPs vote to approve the application, a court will have finally to determine if the detention of an MP is justified. Whatever the outcome, the criminal prosecution of the former three-times PM will be one of the defining legal cases in the history of the Slovak republic.[12] 


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “ Three-times Slovak PM Charged in a Criminal Case” (slovakconlaw, 3 May 2022) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2022/05/three-times-slovak-prime-m-charged.html>



[1] "Ex-PM Fico wants to be a Constitutional Court judge" (The Slovak Spectator, 7 January 2019) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22023186/ex-pm-fico-wants-to-be-a-constitutional-court-judge.html>; and

[2] "Constitutional Court hearings: The vote is a political affair, Fico says" (The Slovak Spectator, 23 January 2019) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22036335/constitutional-court-hearings-the-vote-is-a-political-affair-fico-says.html>

[3] "President Kiska: Fico wanted to blackmail me" (The Slovak Spectator, 25 February 2019) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22061262/president-kiska-fico-wanted-to-blackmail-me.html>

[4] TA3, "Ako prebiehalo vypočúvania Fica - kandidáta na ústavného sudcu" (Televízia TA3 YouTube, 12 February 2019) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpGOwjptkUA&ab_channel=TelevíziaTA3>

[5] "Slovakia: Robert Fico renounces bid for Constitutional Court job" (Kafkadesk, 13 February 2019) <https://kafkadesk.org/2019/02/13/slovakia-robert-fico-renounces-bid-for-constitutional-court-job/>

[6] Constitutional Committee, "Živé vysielanie TV NR SR - Vypočutie kandidátov na sudcov Ústavného súdu Slovenskej republiky" (TV NR SR - press live YouTube, 7 February 2019) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fpb1POX_t8w&ab_channel=TVNRSR-presslive>

[7] Two other candidates for CC judges from 2019 have already been prosecuted for corruption. Retrospectively, it seems that the position attracted some in bad faith.

[8] William Nattrass, "Is Slovakia a mafia state?" (The Spectator, 26 April 2022) <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/is-slovakia-a-mafia-state->

[9] Constitutional Act No 232/2012 Coll. Accessible at: <https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2012/232/20120901.html>

[10] Beata Balogová, "Parties agree to end MPs' immunity" (21 May 2012) (The Slovak Spectator, 21 May 2012) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20043457/parties-agree-to-end-mps-immunity.html>

[11] Nina Hrabovská Francelová, "Even with Fico in custody, Smer may retain popular support" (The Slovak Spectator, 28 April 2022) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22896574/parliament-debates-whether-to-allow-ficos-arrest.html>

[12] There is a precedent for the vote of the Parlaiemnt to allow the criminal, at the time, prosecution of an MP. In 1998, the Parliament consented to the prosecution of Ivan Lexa, who was implicated in the abduction of Michal Kováč Jr., the son of the former Slovak President. For context, see Ľuba Lesná, "Lexa wins case in Human Rights Court" (The Slovak Spectator, 29 September 2009) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20030535/lexa-wins-case-in-human-rights-court.html>

Tuesday, March 29, 2022

Ghostwriters of the Slovak Constitution’s Material Core: Summary of Findings

On January 30, 2019, the Slovak Constitutional Court struck down a constitutional amendment for breaking the implicit material core of the Constitution.[1] This was a historic first not only for Slovakia but also for the broader region because no other European court had previously founded the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment without textual support in the constitution.[2] However, three years after the decision, there remains normative disagreement about the legitimacy and implications of the judge-made doctrine of unamendability in Slovakia.

In this blog post, I present a new finding that a significant portion of the decision in the case PL. ÚS 21/2014 exhibits lexical similarity to the academic source material without proper attribution. This finding raises serious questions about the ethics of opinion writing at the Slovak Constitutional Court and the capacity of the Court to deliver high-quality decisions in difficult cases under time- and resource constraints. But this post is just a summary of the main findings. If you want to know more, you have to wait for the paper I am writing!

Main Finding

After examining the opinion in the case PL. ÚS 21/2014 for similarity with external sources, I found that there is a significant overlap between the opinion and at least seven academic sources that are accessible online. The matched source material was all published before the resolution of the case in January 2019. The observed similarity pertains exclusively to the part of the opinion on the material core of the Constitution, which is approximately 66 pages long (roughly 21,000 words). My estimate is that 40 percent of the text exhibit close lexical similarity with the source material.

The two sources with the most overlap are the only book published on unamendability in Slovakia The Material Core of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (2014) and an article from a special symposium on Security Clearances of Judges (2018). Both of these publications have been authored by one of the clerks working on the case, and neither is cited or referred to in the opinion. This has been noted at least by two other authors, Neuman and Káčer, who in their shared text wrote (in a footnote) that they found an unattributed use of academic text in the opinion.[3] Neuman and Káčer suggested that the Court either plagiarised the source material or outsourced the production of the opinion to an external academic advisor (who self-plagiarised). Either of the two options are plausible and we will not know, which one is true without an official communication from the Court.

The Constitutional Court confirmed, in a response to my FOI request, that the clerk had worked on the case in the year 2018. This is a critical piece of information because the clerk’s contract was not recorded in the central registry of government contracts at the time.[4] 

Other Unattributed Source Use

Additionally, there is a strong correlation between the text of the decision and several academic articles, which were coincidentally authored by another external advisor, and a former Slovak Constitutional Court judge hired to work on the case as well as the academic work of a former head of the Czech Constitutional Court. Both of these individuals qualify as what I call "superclerks." Superclerks are former constitutional judges, who upon retirement take on the position of an external advisor to another judge of the Court. Superclerks conduct their work on vastly different terms from other clerks, because of their reputational capital and the knowledge they had acquired previously in the position they once held, but are now to serve.

The first judge-turned clerk has worked on the case from early 2014 until 2016 when his last contract expired. The contract of this advisor is unique because it is only one of the two external-adviser contracts in the government database that specifies the case file. The contract expressly states that the advisor was hired to work on the case PL. ÚS 21/2014. The second superclerk (former head of the Czech CC) wrote an expert opinion on the subject for the court just one month before the announcement of the final judgment in the case.

The full list of academic literature used in the opinion without attribution is as follows: 

  • Boris Balog, Materiálne jadro Ústavy Slovenskej republiky (Eurokódex 2014)
  • Boris Balog, "Bezpečnostné previerky sudcov," in Jozef Andraško, JUDr. Juraj Hamuľák (eds), Ústavodarná moc verzus kontrola ústavnosti (Comenius University in Bratislava 2018)
  • Ján Drgonec, "Základné práva a slobody a vyvodená pôsobnosť Ústavného súdu SR," in Ladislav Orosz, Tomáš Majerčák (eds), Ochrana ľudských práv a základných slobôd ústavnými súdmi a medzinárodnými súdnymi orgánmi – III. ústavné dni (Pavol Jozef Šafárik University 2014)
  • Ján Drgonec, "Neústavnosť ústavných zákonov v podmienkach Slovenskej republiky," (2015) 154 Právnik 8
  • Ján Drgonec, "Implikované právne normy v ústavnom poriadku Slovenskej republiky," (2017) Zo súdnej praxe 1
  • Pavel Holländer, "Materiální ohnisko ústavy a diskrece ústavodárce," (2005) 144 Právník 4
  • Pavel Holländer, "Sean Connery, nominalistická revoluce a koncept moderní demokracie," (2015) 154 Právník 1

Method

The method used to identify the similarity with the text of the opinion was relatively crude because the available English plagiarism checkers do not link to databases and repositories of Slovak academic texts. I had therefore manually checked each paragraph in the opinion for matches through a web search engine for matches with available online sources. The analysis was limited to accessible content, however, which means that the real overlap can be higher.

In this paper, I am primarily interested in the lexical similarity between the court decision and academic sources in the Slovak language, but I also find similarities with two texts published in Czech. Lexical similarity measures the correspondence of texts as the "intersection of word sets of the same or different language." It is possible that a comparison of the court decision to the source material in English or German might discover additional overlap, but such analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper. The Court referred to multiple sources in the field of comparative constitutional change.

After identifying a match, I downloaded the source material to an open similarity analysis software that matched the overlapping text pattern between two texts. The software was imprecise because of the limited functionality of comparing text documents. To match the required format, I converted pdf into text files. Formatting issues due to conversion might have resulted in undetected overlap, which again means that the real similarity can be significantly higher.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “Ghostwriters of the Slovak Constitution’s Material Core: Summary of Findings” (slovakconlaw, 29 March 2022) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2022/03/ghostwriters-material-core.html>


[1] PL. ÚS 21/2014 <https://www.ustavnysud.sk/ussr-intranet-portlet/docDownload/718890c1-f3f4-43d8-9b76-36332dbd9b96/Rozhodnutie%20-%20N%C3%A1lez.pdf>           

[2] See Michel Hein, ‘The Least Dangerous Branch? Constitutional Review of Constitutional Amendments in Europe’ in Martin Belov (ed), Court, Politics and Constitutional Law: Judicialization of Politics and the Judiciary (2019) 195; also Yaniv Roznai and ‘Lech Garlicki, Introduction: Constitutional Unamendability in Europe’ (2019) 21 European Journal of Law Reform 3, 218

[3] Marek Káčer, Jakub Neumann, MATERIÁLNE JADRO V SLOVENSKOM ÚSTAVNOM PRÁVE Doktrinálny disent proti zrušeniu sudcovských previerok (Leges 2019) 60 (n98)

[4] An alternative explanation is that the clerks or external advisors hired by the Court had access to the draft opinion and used it in their academic work before the final judgment in the case. The publication date of the source material, however, mostly precedes the controversy. This indicates that the alterantive explanation, although theoretically possible does not seem true. 

Friday, December 3, 2021

Softlocking Slovakia: New Pandemic Lockdown and State of Emergency

The Slovak government declared a new state of emergency at the end of November 2021, combined with a two-week soft lockdown.[1] The state of emergency has been declared for 90 days, starting on November 25, on the whole territory of the republic. The lockdown should last until December 9. Both measures can be potentially extended if the pandemic situation so requires, although the government has signalled a preference for not keeping restrictive measures in place.

The Slovak constitutional framework[2] for crisis management newly permits the government to extend the duration of a pandemic emergency by 40 days, even repeatedly.[3] It is, therefore, possible that the state of emergency will be extended next year. The state of emergency adopted this time last year was extended twice.[4] Every extension of a pandemic emergency necessitates a subsequent parliamentary approval within 20 days. Without approval, the state of emergency expires by default.

The government declared the emergency after intense criticism from its expert advisory body and the head of state. President Čaputová urged the PM and his cabinet to act on the pandemic to avoid the loss of life the country had experienced last year after the holiday season.[5] Slovakia thus follows Austria as the second country in Europe to reintroduce state lockdown before holidays. That is due to a critical increase in the number of new Covid19 cases and hospitalisations –currently over 3000 patients.[6]

The emergency declaration provides for a two-week lockdown, consisting of a curfew between 5AM to 1AM on the following day (until December 9) and restrictions on the freedom of assembly (maximum of six people). The government also requests citizens to limit contact with others, keep contact primarily within a single household and prioritise online communication to keep in contact with close relatives. Finally, employers are requested to enable their employees to work from home, if possible.

The curfew order has been criticised for the numerous exceptions it permits. People are, of course, allowed to leave their homes for work (with proof of vaccination or a test), to shop for essentials, visit their doctor, go to the hospital or take the vaccination, but also for worship services, church or state weddings, funeral ceremonies and baptism without restriction on the number of churchgoers. Likewise, people can still attend mass sporting events, such as football, hockey, and basketball. The exemptions for worship services and sporting events contradict the limitations imposed on the freedom of assembly.

Executive Underreach?

Although the government’s response to the first pandemic wave in early 2020 was successful, its more recent attempts to tackle the subsequent waves mostly failed due to indecisiveness, coalition in-fighting, and preference for populist measures over science-based policy. Take, for example, the vaccination lottery that was supposed to incentivise senior citizens. The government spent 27mil EUR to increase the low vaccination rate, especially among vulnerable groups, but with little to no effect.[7] Instead, more than half of the population remains unvaccinated, despite the lottery or proposed financial incentives.[8]

Why has been the government failing? The conventional understanding in the field is that the executive might use the uncertainty and moral panic conditioned by emergencies to overreach – e.g. unduly limit the citizens’ rights, curb checking institutions and stack the deck against their political opponent. However, in a select few cases, we can observe the opposite tendency. David Pozen and Kim Lane Scheppelle term this behaviour an “underreach,” which they define as the “executive’s willful failure to address a significant public problem that the executive is legally and functionally equipped (though not necessarily legally required) to address.”[9] More specifically, they argue that the concept best describes situations where the political actors “sees a significant threat coming, has access to information about what might mitigate or avert the threat along with the power to set a potentially effective plan in motion,” but does not act.[10]

Slovakia arguably fits the description of an executive underreach. Political actors had access to information about the pandemic and a recent experience with the negative effects of slow response to the onset of the pandemic.[11] Yet, despite this, the government again shows passivity and unwillingness to introduce restrictive measures due to a fear of alienating their constituencies. The risk is that if the situation does not improve, the public health sector might collapse due to a shortage of hospital beds and ventilators.[12] The government’s failure to adequately respond to the crisis in 2020 ultimately led to the resignation of the PM and a cabinet reshuffle.[13] It remains to be seen if the current government survives its lacklustre response to the pandemic.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, Softlocking Slovakia: New Pandemic Lockdown and State of Emergency (slovakconlaw, 4 December 2021) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2021/12/softlocking-slovakia-new-lockdown.html>

[1] Government Resolution no. 695, on the Declaration of the State of Emergency no. 428/2021 Coll. <https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2021/428/20211125>

[2] Constitutional Act on State Security in the Time of War, State of War, State of Emergency, and Crisis No. 227/2002 Coll. <https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2002/227/20201229>

[3] The option to extend the state of emergency applies only to pandemic emergencies to the exclusion of all other emergencies caused by natural disasters, catastrophes, industrial or nuclear accidents, which is a peculiar choice. The amendment to the CA on the state of emergency and other crises, adopted in late December 2020, was supposed to bring the legal framework in line with expert knowledge on the nature of emergencies, which can take longer than the constitutionally permitted maximum of 90 days. The response to the nuclear disaster in Japan, for example, took the better part of a year, during which the state of emergency remained in place in the prefecture. Sarah Fecht, “1 Year Later: A Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Timeline” (Scientific American, 8 March 2012) <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/one-year-later-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/>

[4] “State of Emergency in Slovakia to Be Extended by Another 40 Days” (TASR, 5 February 2021) <https://newsnow.tasr.sk/policy/state-of-emergency-in-slovakia-to-be-extended-by-another-40-days/>

[5] Michal Hudec, “Lockdown on the horizon for Slovakia after president’s emotional appeal” (Euractive, 24 November 2021) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/lockdown-on-the-horizon-for-slovakia-after-presidents-emotional-appeal/>

[6] “Slovakia becomes the second European country to go into lockdown as COVID cases surge” (Euronews, 24 November 2021) <https://www.euronews.com/2021/11/24/slovakia-becomes-the-second-european-country-to-go-into-lockdown-as-covid-cases-surge>

[7] Michal Katuška, “Lottery worth €27 million did not help. It should have persuaded the elderly but lured the youth” (The Slovak Spectator, 3 November 2021) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22776193/lottery-worth-27-million-did-not-help-it-should-have-persuaded-the-elderly-but-lured-the-youth.html>

[8] “Coronavirus in Slovakia: 15,278 new cases confirmed (graphs)” (The Slovak Spectator, 3 December 2021) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22365153/coronavirus-in-slovakia-statistics-and-graphs.html>

[9] David E. Pozen and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Executive Underreach, in Pandemics and Otherwise” (2020) 114 American Journal of International Law 4, 609

[10] Ibid., 10

[11] Keno Verseck, “COVID-19: Slovakia mired in chaos” (Deutsche Welle, 1 March 2021) <https://www.dw.com/en/covid-19-slovakia-mired-in-chaos/a-56740390>

[12] Michal Hudec, “Slovak government finally takes action as hospitals verging on collapse” (Euractive, 17 November 2021) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/slovak-government-finally-takes-action-as-hospitals-verging-on-collapse/>

[13] Matthew Holroyd, “Slovakia’s prime minister steps down amid Sputnik V vaccine scandal” (Euronews, 30 March 2021) <https://www.euronews.com/2021/03/28/slovakia-s-prime-minister-to-step-down-amid-sputnik-v-vaccine-scandal>

Wednesday, November 3, 2021

Dataset on the use of presidential pardon and amnesty powers in Slovakia 1993-2021

This dataset compiles the statistic recording pardon applications, granted pardons, amnesty-pardons, and amnesties issued by presidents and acting heads of state in Slovakia between 1993-2021. The dataset includes a codebook and individual tab with a presentation of the data for each president.

This data shows a gradual decline in the use of the presidential pardon and amnesty power in Slovakia. This fascinating discovery served as an inspiration for the paper that I am currently writing under the provisional title "No Mercy: Disuetude of Presidential Pardon and Amnesty Power in Slovakia."




Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Use of presidential pardon and amnesty powers in Slovakia 1993-2021" (slovakconlaw, 3 November 2021) <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1OOQotAu7ySN0LwjimMOU8UWZz6pR2cgpNRuIyxJR5p8/edit?usp=sharing>

Thursday, October 28, 2021

Dataset on constitutional change in Slovakia 1993-2020

This dataset is the first comprehensive resource in English and one of the first two resources on constitutional change in Slovakia in any language. The dataset records all successful changes to the Slovak constitutional system (n=42) adopted in the period 1993-2020. Feel free to use this resource with proper citation (also accessible under 

The dataset contains information about the duration of the amendment process for each amendment, support/opposition to the amendment, sponsor of the bill and other data. Indirect constitutional amendments contain code labels indicating their subject matter. The dataset also includes a codebook, explanatory sheet and links to the source material. The dataset will be updated over time. 

The constitutional system of the Slovak Republic is polytextual because it consists of direct and indirect amendments. Direct amendments change the master-text Constitution. There have been 19 direct amendments to the master-text Constitution in total. Indirect amendments are all other stand-alone constitutional acts. There have been 23 indirect constitutional amendments adopted since the founding of the independent Slovakia in 1993.


The other dataset on constitutional change was created at the same time by a team of academics under the leadership of Prof Orosz. We have been in contact about potential collaboration since our initiatives overlap. 

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Constitutional change in Slovakia 1993-2020 (n=42)" (slovakconlaw, 28 October 2021) <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1SE65B1Mo_DzCYfax2RKzidhHPIK1-yQtnrE2ydwTWF8/edit#gid=2114259969>

Friday, October 22, 2021

Presidential Incapacity in Slovakia

While the political reaction to the hospitalisation[1] of the Czech head of state reaches a dramatic crescendo, observers at home might wonder, what happens in case of presidential incapacity in Slovakia? Who acts instead of the president if she is unable to assume duties of her office.

The Slovak Constitution codifies a relatively comprehensive set of rules governing presidential incapacity and the interim presidency. Likely because of the overreach by former acting president Vladimír Mečiar, who almost singlehandedly appointed the whole Constitutional Court in 1993, despite protest from the opposition and later abused the pardon and amnesty powers to protect his cronies from prosecution for the forceful disappearance of Michal Kováč Jr in 1998.

A prime minister acting as an interim president today would not be able to do either of those things. The pardon and amnesty power became non-transferable in 2001, even in the case of presidential incapacity or death, and the power to appoint constitutional court judges would pass to the speaker of the parliament instead of the prime minister. Slovak constitutional law has often developed in response to a transgression or breach of political morality. To paraphrase the American judge Oliver Wendel Holmes, the life of the law is experience, bad or good.

Divided Powers

Be that as it may, Article 105 of the Constitution provides, among other things, that if the office of the president is vacant, or the president is unable to discharge her office for serious reasons (chiefly illness), the whole of presidential powers is divided and passed temporarily to the government and the speaker of the parliament.

Under the terms of the Constitution, whenever the president is incapacitated, the government assumes representative powers and the authority to negotiate, ratify, and litigate international treaties, the power to appoint and recall diplomats, call a referendum, and veto legislation. The government can exercise all or some of these powers collectively or delegate their exercise to the prime minister. The prime minister, however, assumes the sole command of armed forces.

The speaker of the parliament, on the other hand, assumes the power to convene the opening session of the parliament, appoint and remove members of the cabinet, other officials, and senior judges, the power to declare war and mobilise the military. This division operates a delicate balance. It will perform best under the conditions of a coalition or minority government when the PM and the parliament speaker can meaningfully check one another. But if both of these actors belong to a single-party government, the division largely loses its meaning.

Aside from these powers, a portion of presidential powers remains with the head of state, even if she is unable to discharge them in the interim. These powers are colloquially known as non-transferable powers and include, for example, the power to dissolve the parliament, award state honours, pardon and amnesty powers. Even if the head of state dies, these powers remain unattended until the president-elect assumes office.

Seamless Transfer of Power?

For how long will these important powers remain unattended (discounting death)? That depends on the condition of the head of state. For example, suppose the president comes down with a severe case of Covid-19, has to be intubated and potentially induced into a coma. In this scenario, the president cannot discharge her powers "due to serious reasons" under Article 105 of the Constitution, at least while in a coma, potentially longer. Her powers consequently pass down to the government and speaker of the parliament by default.  

That is the theory. In practice, the transfer of powers does not have to be quite so seamless. Presidential incapacity involves legal as well as ethical considerations. As Zuzana Vikárska observed in the case of Czechia, when the health and life of the head of state are at stake, "everyone seems to be very respectful of this delicate situation."[2] The designated actors may hesitate to assume presidential powers in order not to appear too forceful. The relative support of the president vis-a-vis the government and the speaker of the house might also play a role.

Thus, when President Schuster was in critical condition after surgery and had to be put into an induced coma in 2000, the government hesitated and did not assume presidential powers until three weeks after Schuster first fell ill. The government's slow response received criticism from domestic observers and led to delays in the legislative process.[3] One reason for the delayed response might have been the fact that there was no formal procedure for the transfer of powers from the president in the event of incapacity. As a result, the prime minister and the house speaker improvised an act to signify the transfer of presidential powers into their hands, opting for a co-signed emergency declaration.[4]

Removal from Office

While the initial transfer of presidential powers relies on the government's initiative, the Constitution sets a clear time limit to the president's incapacity. Originally, the Constitution provided that the incapacity of the head of state cannot last more than a year. An amendment to the Constitution in 1999 reduced this time limit to a maximum of six months. Therefore, if the head of state cannot assume the powers of her office within six months of first falling ill, the Constitutional Court has the power to "declare that the post of president has become vacant."

It is unclear how would be this limit calculated if the president had short lucid moments during a prolonged incapacity or if the president was incapacitated for six months but regained total capacity during the case for her removal from office. Either way, if the Court finds grounds for removal, the president's office is terminated, and a new election is called shortly (within 67 days at the latest).

The proceedings to remove the president are based on medical records and require non-judicial expertise. Some comparative constitutions, like the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda (Article 105), require that the decision to remove the head of state be certified by a panel of medical experts rather than judges. Even if that is not the case of the Slovak Constitution, the Court could ask doctors for their opinion through the vehicle of an amicus curiae brief if such a case ever makes it into its docket.



[1] Robert Tait, "Czech hospital angered by unauthorised visit to see ailing president" (The Guardian, 15 October 2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/15/czech-hospital-unauthorised-visit-see-ailing-president-milos-zeman>

[2] Vikarská, Zuzana, "Post-Electoral Changes in Czechia with a Hospitalised Head of State" (VerfBlog, 11 October 2021) <https://verfassungsblog.de/post-electoral-changes-in-czechia-with-a-hospitalised-head-of-state/>

[3] Daniel Domanovský, "Minister quits after Schuster fiasco" (The Slovak Spectator, 10 July 2000) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20008398/minister-quits-after-schuster-fiasco.html>

[4] See generally, A Political Chronology of Europe (Routledge 2003) 233


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Presidential Incapacity in Slovakia" (slovakconlaw, 22 October 2021) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/07/key-policies-from-slovak-govt-manifesto.html>

Friday, October 30, 2020

Extended Curfew and Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia

After a successful pilot in four hotspots in the North of the country, the Slovak government greenlighted plans for the nationwide Covid-19 testing. The pilot took place on October 23-26, with a total turnout of nearly 141000 people, which represents roughly 91 percent of the expected participation estimated by the Ministry of Defense. According to the official data, 5500 people tested positive. 

The testing was conducted using antigen test kits administered by health professionals, military and volunteers. Antigen tests are faster but ostensibly less reliable than alternative means. Citizens also had the option to purchase testing in a private clinic at their own costs. Private clinics and testing labs usually use PCR tests, which are more reliable but are not free, unlike the government-administered tests.

The nationwide testing was confirmed for the weekend of October 31-November 1. It will be carried out with the assistance of the military under the code name "Shared Responsibility." On October 28, the government modified the curfew order so that citizens in the whole country are generally required to stay at home until November 8.[1] A negative result from the nationwide testing, however, will enable citizens to enjoy their freedom of movement without restrictions. Although, they still must wear a facemask when travelling in public transport, in the interior and even outside if they find themselves close to other people (5m), and most public events, cultural institutions, and other establishments continue to be closed. Those who test positive will be required to isolate for 10 days and inform their contacts of the test result.

If one refuses or is unable to take part in the nationwide testing, there are few other exceptions: travel to shop for basic necessities; to get a medical examination; attend a funeral, marriage or baptism; care for a dependent; take a pet out for a daily walk or care of livestock; take children to and from school. In addition to these activities, select groups of citizens are also exempt from the curfew without the need to have proof of a negative test: children under 10 years of age; severely sick (such as cancer patients) and mentally challenged individuals; and people who recovered from Covid-19 within three months before the testing. Citizens who refuse testing will be, therefore, unable to travel to work and have to either work in the home office regime or take sick leave. In addition, employers have the authority to require their employees to document that they had been tested negative.

Even though the government seems to be dead set on the nationwide testing, there remain questions if the country has the collective capacity to successfully carry out the exercise. The President has asked the PM to reconsider strict curfew for people who do not test it risks further dividing society. 



[1] The curfew applies during the daytime, so citizens are technically free to leave their residence between 1-5 AM. Because these are early morning hours, however, the ability of citizens to enjoy their freedom of movement outside of curfew is severely limited.


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Extended Curfew and Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia" (slovakconlaw, 30 October 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/10/extended-curfew-and-nationwide-covid-19.html> 

Monday, October 26, 2020

Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia: Government Response to the 2nd Wave of the Pandemic

The PM of Slovakia last week floated the idea of nationwide testing for the coronavirus over two weekends in November. The testing should be voluntary and carried out with the assistance of the military because few municipalities have the capacity to organise the testing on their own. The Government has acquired three million antigen-testing kits in preparation for the testing and requested the Ministry of Defence to supply as many as 8000 soldiers so that the exercise runs smoothly. A pilot testing will take place in four regions in the North of the country, which are virus hotspots, on October 23-25, before it is extended to the whole of the country. The success of the project will ultimately depend on the turnout for the pilot.

In his latest public appearance, however, the PM also spoke about the possibility of a forced stay of 10 days for citizens who refuse to test. There are at least two problems with the suggestion. First, the testing cannot be meaningfully described as “voluntary” if it is backed with a sanction. The introduction of a sanction to the equation means, to quote HLA Hart, “that certain kinds of human conduct are no longer optional, but in some sense obligatory” [emphasis in the original]. Understandably, the government wishes for a high turnout because the utility of the exercise would decrease if a critical number of citizens refused to test. Forcing people to participate, however, runs the risk of a further decrease in the trust of the government, which is a crucial determinant in the management of the Covid-19 crisis response. Researchers have found that “high-trust regions decrease their mobility-related to non-necessary activities significantly more than low-trust regions,” based on comparing location data and surveys on trust in politicians in the country.[1] A high trust may reduce the monitoring costs of a government and the necessity for sanctions. Whereas low trust in government is likely to contribute to the opposite. 

The Slovak government had shortly benefited from the high trust on the back of a landslide in general elections in March 2020. Most recent opinion polls, however, show that the PM and key representatives of the government are rapidly losing trust due to personal scandals. Diminishing trust in the government will undermine its effectivity, and lead to non-compliance with its measures. A similar intuition was voiced by the Ombudswoman, who noted that “if we resort to sanctions, aversion to measures increases.”

Second, there is a consensus among lawyers that the government lacks powers to sanction citizens who refuse to test with a forced stay. The Government declared a state of emergency on October 1, 2020, for the second time this year. The state of emergency is to last for 45 days,[2] based on the Constitutional Act No. 227/2002 Coll., on State Security at the Time of War, State of War, State of Emergency and State of Crisis (Act on State Security), which regulates state response these four types of extraordinary situations. Thus, for the next month and a half, the government received access to extensive powers unavailable under conditions of normal politics. But even in an emergency, there are restrictions on the government exercise of power. 

Thes framework for crisis management allows the government to respond to emergencies through means proportional to the perceived level of threat. The permissible level of government restriction on human rights increases in proportion to the gravity of the situation. This is also the case of a curfew or a forced stay.

Under the declaration of emergency, the government may prohibit entry to an area or limit freedom of movement and residence through a curfew order, but the curfew must have limited duration and location (Article 5.3g of the Constitutional Act on State Security). Consider the following example. A permissible limitation on the right of freedom of movement would be a curfew between 4pm in the afternoon and 7am on the morning of the next day. Such a tailored restriction enables citizens, who work alone, so the risk of them spreading the infection is low, to travel to their place of work or go shopping for essentials during the daytime. The restriction, however, decreases the circulation of citizens in the city during the nighttime and effectively results in the closure of cafes and social establishments during curfew hours.

Unlike curfew, which is limited in duration, a forced stay order applies generally. Citizens are expected to stay at the place of their residence and may not leave unless exceptional circumstance occurs. Only in a state of crisis can the government limit the freedom of movement through a forced stay (Article 4.4a of the Constitutional Act on State Security). A ten-day continuous prohibition to leave one’s residence, as suggested by the PM, amounts to a forced stay. Such a measure is not available to the government during the state of emergency.

Suppose the government decides to impose forced stay against a portion of the population that does not wish to participate in nationwide testing. In that case, it is highly probable that the measure will be challenged in the Constitutional Court. The Court had already an opportunity to review the state of emergency declaration in a first-of-its-kind decision on the constitutionality of state of emergency. However, the proposed sanctions against individuals who refuse to participate in the nationwide testing are a significant change in the facts of the case.


[1] Olivier Bargain and Ulugbek Aminjonov, Trust and Compliance to Public Health Policies in Times of Covid-19, Bordeaux Economics Working Papers, 3-5

[2] The Constitutional Act on State Security limits the duration of the state of emergency to a maximum of 90 days, without the possibility of extension. Unlike in response to the first domestic outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in Slovakia, this time, the government declared the emergency for a limited duration, seemingly learning from the previous experience. For an account of the government response to the first wave of the pandemic see, Slavomíra Henčeková and Šimon Drugda, Slovakia: Change of Government under COVID-19 Emergency, VerfassungsBlog


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia: Government Response to the 2nd Wave of the Pandemic" (slovakconlaw, 26 October 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/10/nationwide-covid-19-testing-in-slovakia.html>

Sunday, July 26, 2020

Draft Constitutional Amendment on Slovak Judiciary Made Public

On July 13, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) of the Slovak Republic submitted a draft constitutional amendment on judicial reform into the interdepartmental review. The bill is an attempt at a comprehensive reform of the general and constitutional judiciary that implements the main theses of the 2020-24 govt proclamation programme. 

The interdepartmental review restricts pathways to legislative and constitutional change by the executive. Unlike MPs, who are legally exempt from the prepublication, the Cabinet and Ministries must first submit every proposed change of the law on the books into the interdepartmental process (under Act No. 400/2015 Coll. on Lawmaking and the Collection of Laws). The process allows the general and professional public, as well as anyone interested, to comment on the bill before it is presented to Parliament. The prepublication of a piece of legislation allows the public to control the exercise of lawmaking and even constitution-making powers. The author of the bill ought to consider the comments and either agree or disagree with the changes or make alternative proposals.

The MoJ seemingly consulted the constitutional amendment bill on judicial reform widely, including the Judicial Council, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic and other stakeholders. It remains to be seen if the proposed reforms will be received well by the general and constitutional judiciary. The bill focuses on these critical items:

  • reform of the composition of the Judicial Council;
  • review of the property and declared assets of judges;
  • reform of the Constitutional Court;
  • constitutional review of legislation in complaint proceedings;
  • introduction of retirement age for lower court and Constitutional Court judges; and
  • the establishment of the Supreme Administrative Court.

According to the explanatory note to the bill, the MoJ has the following opinion of a constitutional amendment: 

A sensible and prudent constitution-maker implements more extensive changes to the text of the Constitution either (i) due to "tectonic" societal change and the consequent need to adapt the text of the Constitution to the new social contract (in which case the amendment is remaking the Constitution to reflect the new identity of the community), or (ii) due to a change of paradigm of understanding and out views on the optimal design of a specific constitutional mechanism, design of govt power or the function of a constitutional body (in which case the amendment corrects specific elements of the constitutional identity of the community). From this point of view, the proposed constitutional amendment falls within the second category of changes to the master-text Constitution [...] 

Let us return to this reform after some time and judge whether the proposed reforms better specific points of constitutional design or instead negatively impact the document's identity.


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Draft Constitutional Amendment on Slovak Judiciary Made Public" (slovakconlaw, 26 July 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/07/draft-constitutional-amendment-on.html>