Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts

Saturday, May 3, 2025

Chart of the Day: Changes in the Population Size of Slovak Judges over a Decade

I recently thought about how much of constitutional law is ebb and flow, action and reaction. Which is why today I decided to analyse a graph that I have had in my desk drawer for a while. See the waterfall graph of the Slovak judges’ population size between 2011 and 2025 (Figure 1). The graph visually shows staffing shifts in the court system as increases and decreases from the original value. The initial value in the graph is 0, based on the fact that I could not get the exact number of judges in January 2011, but it could be any value. What is important is the pattern created by adding and subtracting from judges’ population over time, and as you can see ebbs and flows. 

The number of judges in Slovakia is affected yearly by four specific events: the appointment of new judges (which adds to the pool), the resignation of retiring judges, their removal, and death (all of which reduce the population). The Ministry of Justice reports each of these events under the “Change Notices” section on its webpage, and it has done so since 2011. 

I had initially collected the data from the notice section of the MOJ website to create a small dataset to see if I could learn something about the population size of Slovak judges. I was hoping to see if we could, for example, observe growing interest in the judicial office, which would be observable by a gradual, steady increase in judges’ population (subject to the court system’s capacity). Alternatively, I was interested in whether the politicisation of the judiciary resulted in the decline of interest in the job. Finally, I wanted to see if we could see large fluctuations in the size of the population around important parliamentary elections that could spell uncertainty for the judiciary because of new policies aimed at regulating the court system (think background checks for judges, asset declaration, etc). 

What I found after collecting the data was interesting. I then switched to analysing the data inductively (from the data to a hypothesis), although my general understanding of judicial studies and Slovak constitutional politics informed the process.


According to the Ministry, there were 1415 active judges in Slovakia at the time of writing this blog, just 23 more judges than in 2011. The data from the notice registry shows that this population has been remarkably stable, with the largest negative deviation from the mean of over 80 in late 2020 to early 2021 and the largest positive deviation of 60 in early 2019. Over the last 14 years, there has been only a modest net growth. We can observe that the judges’ population experienced two major declines in 2015-2016 and 2020-2021 (highlighted in light red), followed by a gradual return to levels of court staffing matching or exceeding values before the dip. These episodes of decline were rapid and indicate some coordinated behaviour of judges leaving or an external shock. 

Initially, I thought the first episode could have been a delayed response to the implementation of the background checks for judges in October 2015.[1] Adopted in 2014, the background checks were also meant to cover sitting judges. The new screening mechanism could have caused uncertainty, which resulted in some judges deciding to step down to avoid the unnecessary burden of the office. However, the implementation of the background checks for sitting judges was suspended pending the Constitutional Court’s review of the mechanism, so I decided to check for alternative explanations.

Elections could be an alternative explanation and potentially explain the second episode of deep population decline in 2020-2021 as well. General elections were held in Slovakia in 2016 and 2020, which, at least in the latter case, resulted in the most significant government shift in a decade.[2] Not to mention the largest anti-corruption police operations targeting judges that followed shortly.[3] This was a change that could bring about peak uncertainty and result in large population shifts.

To check the validity of this explanation, or the validity of the initial assumption about the cause of population decline being the fear of background checks, I tried to assess what portion of the decline could be attributed to resignations (indicating a choice by the judges) instead of removals from office. Looking at the data more granularly, it became clear that I was wrong.  Most judges in both decline episodes did not leave of their own volition, but were removed from office due to old age. This was still an interesting finding because, assuming a random distribution of retiring judges, there should not be large clusters of retirees concentrated in such short time frames. What happened is that politics did play a role, but it was the internal judicial politics.

In both episodes of decline, the President at the time removed a large number of judges from office due to old age.[4] Prior to a constitutional change in 2021, judges in Slovakia did not leave office automatically upon reaching retirement age; they had to be removed by the head of state based on the proposal by the Judicial Council. In constitutional law, however, there has been disagreement on whether the Council and the President must or can remove judges following their retirement age. The Constitution currently provides in Article 146(2) that a judge’s office ceases on the last day of the month when the judge reaches the age of 67. Before the constitutional reform in 2021, Article 147(2)b set the age at which the President “may” dismiss a judge at 65. This led to irregular removal and claims of discrimination or selective enforcement of judges’ retirement.

In 2016, mid-term, President Kiska expressed his intention to begin actively retiring judges as a part of a push for a generational change in the judiciary. At the time, there was a backlog of over a hundred judges who remained in office despite being over 65.[5] Kiska criticised the other political actors for not addressing the issue of ageing judges, effectively allowing them to remain in office indefinitely, which some viewed as contributing to stagnation and a lack of reform in the judiciary. After the backlog was cleared, President Kiska continued to appoint over a hundred judges over the next two years, pushing their population size to its peak in mid-2019.[6]

Fast-forward four years, the then-head of the Judicial Council, Ján Mazák, criticised again the selective nature of past decisions regarding the dismissal of judges who had reached retirement age and the backlog of judges who had been in office past their retirement age. He argued that failing to propose the dismissal of some judges while not others amounted to discrimination. The Judicial Council adopted the view that it was obligated to submit all cases of judges past their retirement who were overstaying in office to the President, who then could decide whether to dismiss them or not, depending on the circumstances of individual courts (to avoid staff shortage).[7] In the Council’s view, this was the proper constitutional process to ensure regular renewal of the judiciary.

President-elect Čaputová, like President Kiska before her, exercised the power to remove judges actively, bringing the judges’ population size from its peak to its macro low in early 2021. And then, like her predecessor, President Čaputová appointed over a hundred judges in the next three years of her office to return the population to the level before the dip.

Now, coming back to my initial interest in this chart, the data does not suggest the idea that politicisation has driven lawyers away from judicial office, since the fluctuations were not primarily due to a drop in interest or voluntary resignations. While sharp declines in the judge population did coincide with election years, closer examination shows that if politics affected judges’ population size, it was the internal judicial corps politics of irregularly extending the office of judges post-retirement. And the two big declines were caused by coordinated efforts to enforce age-based retirements in response to the backlog of overdue dismissals. The key drivers of change, then, were not bottom-up shifts in interest or top-down political interference, but the constitutional and administrative practices surrounding judicial retirement. 

What will likely happen now is that the Slovak judges’ population size will either trend to the original value in 2011, which seems to be the equilibrium point, or if there are some changes in the organisation of the judiciary, such as the creation of new courts that need staffing, it should find a new equilibrium. Since the new retirement mechanism does not require the President and the Judicial Council to act, there should be no more backlogs and thus dramatic dips in the number of judges. Instead, the population will gradually renew as some judges retire and new ones are hired.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “Chart of the Day: Changes in the Population Size of Slovak Judges over a Decade” (slovakconlaw, 3 May 2025) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2025/05/httpsslovakconlaw.blogspot.com202505changes-in-population-size-of-slovakjudges.html.html>

[1] “New security clearances for judges implemented” (The Slovak Spectator, 2 October 2015) <https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/new-security-clearances-for-judges-implemented>; and Simon Drugda, “Slovak Constitutional Court Strikes Down a Constitutional Amendment—But the Amendment Remains Valid” (I·CONnect, 25 April 2019) <https://www.iconnectblog.com/slovak-constitutional-court-strikes-down-a-constitutional-amendment-but-the-amendment-remains-valid/>

[2] Miroslava German Sirotnikova and Marc Santora, “Governing Party in Slovakia Suffers Decisive Election Defeat” (The New York Times, 1 March 2020) <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/world/europe/slovakia-election.html>

[3] “Miroslava German Sirotnikova, Democracy Digest: Slovakia’s Political and Judicial ‘Storm’” (Balkan Insight – Reporting Democracy, 13 March 2020) <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/13/democracy-digest-slovakias-political-and-judicial-storm/>

[4] “Prezident odvolal ďalších sudcov” (najprávo.sk, 23 March 2016) <https://www.najpravo.sk/clanky/prezident-odvolal-dalsich-sudcov.html>; “Kiska odvolal 47 sudcov, dosiahli vek 65 rokov” (SME, 13 May 2016) <https://domov.sme.sk/c/20162680/kiska-odvolal-47-sudcov-dosiahli-vek-65-rokov.html>; and “Prezidentka odvolá z funkcie zatiaľ 63 sudcov nad 65 rokov” (aktuality.sk, 30 March 2021) <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/827919/prezidentka-odvola-z-funkcie-zatial-63-sudcov-nad-65-rokov/#google_vignette>

[5] “Prezident SR zaslal odvolací dekrét 14 sudcom” (najprávo.sk, 10 January 2016) <https://www.najpravo.sk/clanky/prezident-sr-zaslal-odvolaci-dekret-14-sudcom.html>

[6] “Prezident Kiska počas svojho mandátu vymenoval stovky sudcov, povýšil tiež desiatky vojakov” (SITA, 14 June 2019) <https://sita.sk/prezident-kiska-pocas-svojho-mandatu-vymenoval-stovky-sudcov-povysil-tiez-desiatky-vojakov/>

[7] “Súdna rada žiada odvolanie všetkých sudcov v dôchodkovom veku” (SME, 22 September 2020) <https://domov.sme.sk/c/22493644/sudna-rada-navrhuje-prezidentke-odvolat-z-funkcie-sudcov-v-dochodkovom-veku.html>

Tuesday, May 3, 2022

Three-times Slovak PM Charged in a Criminal Case

It has been more than three years since former PM Robert Fico tried to get appointed to the Constitutional Court,[1] thinking he would be able to either bargain[2] or force his way onto the CC.[3] At the time, he did not seek just to become a rank-and-file constitutional judge. Instead, Fico wanted to be the Court President because he believed that his experience and political capital as a former three-time PM qualified him for the position of leadership in his next career.[4] 

Fico was ultimately forced to withdraw his application[5] due to a controversy over his CV and broad political opposition to his nomination.[6] However, if he did not, we could have been in a situation where the CC President faced criminal prosecution.[7] That is because Robert Fico and his close colleague, former Minister of Interior Robert Kalíňak, were charged last week, and the latter was also detained, for leading an organised crime gang. The police claim that Fico and his co-defendants used their power to discredit opponents, illegally accessing private police and tax records.[8]

Fico has not been yet arrested because he is an MP. Members of Parliament enjoy robust protections and privileges to ensure the free exercise of the political office. For example, MPs cannot be prosecuted for voting on drafts, bills, motions, or any act or speech uttered in Parliament. Moreover, according to Article 78(2) of the Constitution, MPs cannot be taken into custody without the consent of the Parliament. The only exception is if an MP has been caught redhanded while committing a crime. Historically, the Parliament needed to consent also the prosecution of an MP, but a constitutional amendment in 2012[9] changed this only to necessitate parliamentary approval for criminal detention.[10]

 

Consequently, the Parliament should soon vote to either allow Fico's criminal detention or deny the motion, in which case he will be prosecuted without being taken into custody. The parliamentary Mandate and Immunity committee has recommended that MPs approve the prosecution's application for consent with the detention of an MP. However, the committee's opinions are not binding on the Parliament.[11] Even if the MPs vote to approve the application, a court will have finally to determine if the detention of an MP is justified. Whatever the outcome, the criminal prosecution of the former three-times PM will be one of the defining legal cases in the history of the Slovak republic.[12] 


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “ Three-times Slovak PM Charged in a Criminal Case” (slovakconlaw, 3 May 2022) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2022/05/three-times-slovak-prime-m-charged.html>



[1] "Ex-PM Fico wants to be a Constitutional Court judge" (The Slovak Spectator, 7 January 2019) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22023186/ex-pm-fico-wants-to-be-a-constitutional-court-judge.html>; and

[2] "Constitutional Court hearings: The vote is a political affair, Fico says" (The Slovak Spectator, 23 January 2019) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22036335/constitutional-court-hearings-the-vote-is-a-political-affair-fico-says.html>

[3] "President Kiska: Fico wanted to blackmail me" (The Slovak Spectator, 25 February 2019) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22061262/president-kiska-fico-wanted-to-blackmail-me.html>

[4] TA3, "Ako prebiehalo vypočúvania Fica - kandidáta na ústavného sudcu" (Televízia TA3 YouTube, 12 February 2019) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpGOwjptkUA&ab_channel=TelevíziaTA3>

[5] "Slovakia: Robert Fico renounces bid for Constitutional Court job" (Kafkadesk, 13 February 2019) <https://kafkadesk.org/2019/02/13/slovakia-robert-fico-renounces-bid-for-constitutional-court-job/>

[6] Constitutional Committee, "Živé vysielanie TV NR SR - Vypočutie kandidátov na sudcov Ústavného súdu Slovenskej republiky" (TV NR SR - press live YouTube, 7 February 2019) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fpb1POX_t8w&ab_channel=TVNRSR-presslive>

[7] Two other candidates for CC judges from 2019 have already been prosecuted for corruption. Retrospectively, it seems that the position attracted some in bad faith.

[8] William Nattrass, "Is Slovakia a mafia state?" (The Spectator, 26 April 2022) <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/is-slovakia-a-mafia-state->

[9] Constitutional Act No 232/2012 Coll. Accessible at: <https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2012/232/20120901.html>

[10] Beata Balogová, "Parties agree to end MPs' immunity" (21 May 2012) (The Slovak Spectator, 21 May 2012) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20043457/parties-agree-to-end-mps-immunity.html>

[11] Nina Hrabovská Francelová, "Even with Fico in custody, Smer may retain popular support" (The Slovak Spectator, 28 April 2022) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22896574/parliament-debates-whether-to-allow-ficos-arrest.html>

[12] There is a precedent for the vote of the Parlaiemnt to allow the criminal, at the time, prosecution of an MP. In 1998, the Parliament consented to the prosecution of Ivan Lexa, who was implicated in the abduction of Michal Kováč Jr., the son of the former Slovak President. For context, see Ľuba Lesná, "Lexa wins case in Human Rights Court" (The Slovak Spectator, 29 September 2009) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20030535/lexa-wins-case-in-human-rights-court.html>

Friday, December 3, 2021

Softlocking Slovakia: New Pandemic Lockdown and State of Emergency

The Slovak government declared a new state of emergency at the end of November 2021, combined with a two-week soft lockdown.[1] The state of emergency has been declared for 90 days, starting on November 25, on the whole territory of the republic. The lockdown should last until December 9. Both measures can be potentially extended if the pandemic situation so requires, although the government has signalled a preference for not keeping restrictive measures in place.

The Slovak constitutional framework[2] for crisis management newly permits the government to extend the duration of a pandemic emergency by 40 days, even repeatedly.[3] It is, therefore, possible that the state of emergency will be extended next year. The state of emergency adopted this time last year was extended twice.[4] Every extension of a pandemic emergency necessitates a subsequent parliamentary approval within 20 days. Without approval, the state of emergency expires by default.

The government declared the emergency after intense criticism from its expert advisory body and the head of state. President Čaputová urged the PM and his cabinet to act on the pandemic to avoid the loss of life the country had experienced last year after the holiday season.[5] Slovakia thus follows Austria as the second country in Europe to reintroduce state lockdown before holidays. That is due to a critical increase in the number of new Covid19 cases and hospitalisations –currently over 3000 patients.[6]

The emergency declaration provides for a two-week lockdown, consisting of a curfew between 5AM to 1AM on the following day (until December 9) and restrictions on the freedom of assembly (maximum of six people). The government also requests citizens to limit contact with others, keep contact primarily within a single household and prioritise online communication to keep in contact with close relatives. Finally, employers are requested to enable their employees to work from home, if possible.

The curfew order has been criticised for the numerous exceptions it permits. People are, of course, allowed to leave their homes for work (with proof of vaccination or a test), to shop for essentials, visit their doctor, go to the hospital or take the vaccination, but also for worship services, church or state weddings, funeral ceremonies and baptism without restriction on the number of churchgoers. Likewise, people can still attend mass sporting events, such as football, hockey, and basketball. The exemptions for worship services and sporting events contradict the limitations imposed on the freedom of assembly.

Executive Underreach?

Although the government’s response to the first pandemic wave in early 2020 was successful, its more recent attempts to tackle the subsequent waves mostly failed due to indecisiveness, coalition in-fighting, and preference for populist measures over science-based policy. Take, for example, the vaccination lottery that was supposed to incentivise senior citizens. The government spent 27mil EUR to increase the low vaccination rate, especially among vulnerable groups, but with little to no effect.[7] Instead, more than half of the population remains unvaccinated, despite the lottery or proposed financial incentives.[8]

Why has been the government failing? The conventional understanding in the field is that the executive might use the uncertainty and moral panic conditioned by emergencies to overreach – e.g. unduly limit the citizens’ rights, curb checking institutions and stack the deck against their political opponent. However, in a select few cases, we can observe the opposite tendency. David Pozen and Kim Lane Scheppelle term this behaviour an “underreach,” which they define as the “executive’s willful failure to address a significant public problem that the executive is legally and functionally equipped (though not necessarily legally required) to address.”[9] More specifically, they argue that the concept best describes situations where the political actors “sees a significant threat coming, has access to information about what might mitigate or avert the threat along with the power to set a potentially effective plan in motion,” but does not act.[10]

Slovakia arguably fits the description of an executive underreach. Political actors had access to information about the pandemic and a recent experience with the negative effects of slow response to the onset of the pandemic.[11] Yet, despite this, the government again shows passivity and unwillingness to introduce restrictive measures due to a fear of alienating their constituencies. The risk is that if the situation does not improve, the public health sector might collapse due to a shortage of hospital beds and ventilators.[12] The government’s failure to adequately respond to the crisis in 2020 ultimately led to the resignation of the PM and a cabinet reshuffle.[13] It remains to be seen if the current government survives its lacklustre response to the pandemic.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, Softlocking Slovakia: New Pandemic Lockdown and State of Emergency (slovakconlaw, 4 December 2021) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2021/12/softlocking-slovakia-new-lockdown.html>

[1] Government Resolution no. 695, on the Declaration of the State of Emergency no. 428/2021 Coll. <https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2021/428/20211125>

[2] Constitutional Act on State Security in the Time of War, State of War, State of Emergency, and Crisis No. 227/2002 Coll. <https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2002/227/20201229>

[3] The option to extend the state of emergency applies only to pandemic emergencies to the exclusion of all other emergencies caused by natural disasters, catastrophes, industrial or nuclear accidents, which is a peculiar choice. The amendment to the CA on the state of emergency and other crises, adopted in late December 2020, was supposed to bring the legal framework in line with expert knowledge on the nature of emergencies, which can take longer than the constitutionally permitted maximum of 90 days. The response to the nuclear disaster in Japan, for example, took the better part of a year, during which the state of emergency remained in place in the prefecture. Sarah Fecht, “1 Year Later: A Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Timeline” (Scientific American, 8 March 2012) <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/one-year-later-fukushima-nuclear-disaster/>

[4] “State of Emergency in Slovakia to Be Extended by Another 40 Days” (TASR, 5 February 2021) <https://newsnow.tasr.sk/policy/state-of-emergency-in-slovakia-to-be-extended-by-another-40-days/>

[5] Michal Hudec, “Lockdown on the horizon for Slovakia after president’s emotional appeal” (Euractive, 24 November 2021) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/lockdown-on-the-horizon-for-slovakia-after-presidents-emotional-appeal/>

[6] “Slovakia becomes the second European country to go into lockdown as COVID cases surge” (Euronews, 24 November 2021) <https://www.euronews.com/2021/11/24/slovakia-becomes-the-second-european-country-to-go-into-lockdown-as-covid-cases-surge>

[7] Michal Katuška, “Lottery worth €27 million did not help. It should have persuaded the elderly but lured the youth” (The Slovak Spectator, 3 November 2021) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22776193/lottery-worth-27-million-did-not-help-it-should-have-persuaded-the-elderly-but-lured-the-youth.html>

[8] “Coronavirus in Slovakia: 15,278 new cases confirmed (graphs)” (The Slovak Spectator, 3 December 2021) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22365153/coronavirus-in-slovakia-statistics-and-graphs.html>

[9] David E. Pozen and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Executive Underreach, in Pandemics and Otherwise” (2020) 114 American Journal of International Law 4, 609

[10] Ibid., 10

[11] Keno Verseck, “COVID-19: Slovakia mired in chaos” (Deutsche Welle, 1 March 2021) <https://www.dw.com/en/covid-19-slovakia-mired-in-chaos/a-56740390>

[12] Michal Hudec, “Slovak government finally takes action as hospitals verging on collapse” (Euractive, 17 November 2021) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/slovak-government-finally-takes-action-as-hospitals-verging-on-collapse/>

[13] Matthew Holroyd, “Slovakia’s prime minister steps down amid Sputnik V vaccine scandal” (Euronews, 30 March 2021) <https://www.euronews.com/2021/03/28/slovakia-s-prime-minister-to-step-down-amid-sputnik-v-vaccine-scandal>

Wednesday, November 3, 2021

Dataset on the use of presidential pardon and amnesty powers in Slovakia 1993-2021

This dataset compiles the statistic recording pardon applications, granted pardons, amnesty-pardons, and amnesties issued by presidents and acting heads of state in Slovakia between 1993-2021. The dataset includes a codebook and individual tab with a presentation of the data for each president.

This data shows a gradual decline in the use of the presidential pardon and amnesty power in Slovakia. This fascinating discovery served as an inspiration for the paper that I am currently writing under the provisional title "No Mercy: Disuetude of Presidential Pardon and Amnesty Power in Slovakia."




Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Use of presidential pardon and amnesty powers in Slovakia 1993-2021" (slovakconlaw, 3 November 2021) <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1OOQotAu7ySN0LwjimMOU8UWZz6pR2cgpNRuIyxJR5p8/edit?usp=sharing>

Thursday, October 28, 2021

Dataset on constitutional change in Slovakia 1993-2020

This dataset is the first comprehensive resource in English and one of the first two resources on constitutional change in Slovakia in any language. The dataset records all successful changes to the Slovak constitutional system (n=42) adopted in the period 1993-2020. Feel free to use this resource with proper citation (also accessible under 

The dataset contains information about the duration of the amendment process for each amendment, support/opposition to the amendment, sponsor of the bill and other data. Indirect constitutional amendments contain code labels indicating their subject matter. The dataset also includes a codebook, explanatory sheet and links to the source material. The dataset will be updated over time. 

The constitutional system of the Slovak Republic is polytextual because it consists of direct and indirect amendments. Direct amendments change the master-text Constitution. There have been 19 direct amendments to the master-text Constitution in total. Indirect amendments are all other stand-alone constitutional acts. There have been 23 indirect constitutional amendments adopted since the founding of the independent Slovakia in 1993.


The other dataset on constitutional change was created at the same time by a team of academics under the leadership of Prof Orosz. We have been in contact about potential collaboration since our initiatives overlap. 

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Constitutional change in Slovakia 1993-2020 (n=42)" (slovakconlaw, 28 October 2021) <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1SE65B1Mo_DzCYfax2RKzidhHPIK1-yQtnrE2ydwTWF8/edit#gid=2114259969>

Friday, October 22, 2021

Presidential Incapacity in Slovakia

While the political reaction to the hospitalisation[1] of the Czech head of state reaches a dramatic crescendo, observers at home might wonder, what happens in case of presidential incapacity in Slovakia? Who acts instead of the president if she is unable to assume duties of her office.

The Slovak Constitution codifies a relatively comprehensive set of rules governing presidential incapacity and the interim presidency. Likely because of the overreach by former acting president Vladimír Mečiar, who almost singlehandedly appointed the whole Constitutional Court in 1993, despite protest from the opposition and later abused the pardon and amnesty powers to protect his cronies from prosecution for the forceful disappearance of Michal Kováč Jr in 1998.

A prime minister acting as an interim president today would not be able to do either of those things. The pardon and amnesty power became non-transferable in 2001, even in the case of presidential incapacity or death, and the power to appoint constitutional court judges would pass to the speaker of the parliament instead of the prime minister. Slovak constitutional law has often developed in response to a transgression or breach of political morality. To paraphrase the American judge Oliver Wendel Holmes, the life of the law is experience, bad or good.

Divided Powers

Be that as it may, Article 105 of the Constitution provides, among other things, that if the office of the president is vacant, or the president is unable to discharge her office for serious reasons (chiefly illness), the whole of presidential powers is divided and passed temporarily to the government and the speaker of the parliament.

Under the terms of the Constitution, whenever the president is incapacitated, the government assumes representative powers and the authority to negotiate, ratify, and litigate international treaties, the power to appoint and recall diplomats, call a referendum, and veto legislation. The government can exercise all or some of these powers collectively or delegate their exercise to the prime minister. The prime minister, however, assumes the sole command of armed forces.

The speaker of the parliament, on the other hand, assumes the power to convene the opening session of the parliament, appoint and remove members of the cabinet, other officials, and senior judges, the power to declare war and mobilise the military. This division operates a delicate balance. It will perform best under the conditions of a coalition or minority government when the PM and the parliament speaker can meaningfully check one another. But if both of these actors belong to a single-party government, the division largely loses its meaning.

Aside from these powers, a portion of presidential powers remains with the head of state, even if she is unable to discharge them in the interim. These powers are colloquially known as non-transferable powers and include, for example, the power to dissolve the parliament, award state honours, pardon and amnesty powers. Even if the head of state dies, these powers remain unattended until the president-elect assumes office.

Seamless Transfer of Power?

For how long will these important powers remain unattended (discounting death)? That depends on the condition of the head of state. For example, suppose the president comes down with a severe case of Covid-19, has to be intubated and potentially induced into a coma. In this scenario, the president cannot discharge her powers "due to serious reasons" under Article 105 of the Constitution, at least while in a coma, potentially longer. Her powers consequently pass down to the government and speaker of the parliament by default.  

That is the theory. In practice, the transfer of powers does not have to be quite so seamless. Presidential incapacity involves legal as well as ethical considerations. As Zuzana Vikárska observed in the case of Czechia, when the health and life of the head of state are at stake, "everyone seems to be very respectful of this delicate situation."[2] The designated actors may hesitate to assume presidential powers in order not to appear too forceful. The relative support of the president vis-a-vis the government and the speaker of the house might also play a role.

Thus, when President Schuster was in critical condition after surgery and had to be put into an induced coma in 2000, the government hesitated and did not assume presidential powers until three weeks after Schuster first fell ill. The government's slow response received criticism from domestic observers and led to delays in the legislative process.[3] One reason for the delayed response might have been the fact that there was no formal procedure for the transfer of powers from the president in the event of incapacity. As a result, the prime minister and the house speaker improvised an act to signify the transfer of presidential powers into their hands, opting for a co-signed emergency declaration.[4]

Removal from Office

While the initial transfer of presidential powers relies on the government's initiative, the Constitution sets a clear time limit to the president's incapacity. Originally, the Constitution provided that the incapacity of the head of state cannot last more than a year. An amendment to the Constitution in 1999 reduced this time limit to a maximum of six months. Therefore, if the head of state cannot assume the powers of her office within six months of first falling ill, the Constitutional Court has the power to "declare that the post of president has become vacant."

It is unclear how would be this limit calculated if the president had short lucid moments during a prolonged incapacity or if the president was incapacitated for six months but regained total capacity during the case for her removal from office. Either way, if the Court finds grounds for removal, the president's office is terminated, and a new election is called shortly (within 67 days at the latest).

The proceedings to remove the president are based on medical records and require non-judicial expertise. Some comparative constitutions, like the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda (Article 105), require that the decision to remove the head of state be certified by a panel of medical experts rather than judges. Even if that is not the case of the Slovak Constitution, the Court could ask doctors for their opinion through the vehicle of an amicus curiae brief if such a case ever makes it into its docket.



[1] Robert Tait, "Czech hospital angered by unauthorised visit to see ailing president" (The Guardian, 15 October 2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/15/czech-hospital-unauthorised-visit-see-ailing-president-milos-zeman>

[2] Vikarská, Zuzana, "Post-Electoral Changes in Czechia with a Hospitalised Head of State" (VerfBlog, 11 October 2021) <https://verfassungsblog.de/post-electoral-changes-in-czechia-with-a-hospitalised-head-of-state/>

[3] Daniel Domanovský, "Minister quits after Schuster fiasco" (The Slovak Spectator, 10 July 2000) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20008398/minister-quits-after-schuster-fiasco.html>

[4] See generally, A Political Chronology of Europe (Routledge 2003) 233


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Presidential Incapacity in Slovakia" (slovakconlaw, 22 October 2021) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/07/key-policies-from-slovak-govt-manifesto.html>

Friday, October 30, 2020

Extended Curfew and Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia

After a successful pilot in four hotspots in the North of the country, the Slovak government greenlighted plans for the nationwide Covid-19 testing. The pilot took place on October 23-26, with a total turnout of nearly 141000 people, which represents roughly 91 percent of the expected participation estimated by the Ministry of Defense. According to the official data, 5500 people tested positive. 

The testing was conducted using antigen test kits administered by health professionals, military and volunteers. Antigen tests are faster but ostensibly less reliable than alternative means. Citizens also had the option to purchase testing in a private clinic at their own costs. Private clinics and testing labs usually use PCR tests, which are more reliable but are not free, unlike the government-administered tests.

The nationwide testing was confirmed for the weekend of October 31-November 1. It will be carried out with the assistance of the military under the code name "Shared Responsibility." On October 28, the government modified the curfew order so that citizens in the whole country are generally required to stay at home until November 8.[1] A negative result from the nationwide testing, however, will enable citizens to enjoy their freedom of movement without restrictions. Although, they still must wear a facemask when travelling in public transport, in the interior and even outside if they find themselves close to other people (5m), and most public events, cultural institutions, and other establishments continue to be closed. Those who test positive will be required to isolate for 10 days and inform their contacts of the test result.

If one refuses or is unable to take part in the nationwide testing, there are few other exceptions: travel to shop for basic necessities; to get a medical examination; attend a funeral, marriage or baptism; care for a dependent; take a pet out for a daily walk or care of livestock; take children to and from school. In addition to these activities, select groups of citizens are also exempt from the curfew without the need to have proof of a negative test: children under 10 years of age; severely sick (such as cancer patients) and mentally challenged individuals; and people who recovered from Covid-19 within three months before the testing. Citizens who refuse testing will be, therefore, unable to travel to work and have to either work in the home office regime or take sick leave. In addition, employers have the authority to require their employees to document that they had been tested negative.

Even though the government seems to be dead set on the nationwide testing, there remain questions if the country has the collective capacity to successfully carry out the exercise. The President has asked the PM to reconsider strict curfew for people who do not test it risks further dividing society. 



[1] The curfew applies during the daytime, so citizens are technically free to leave their residence between 1-5 AM. Because these are early morning hours, however, the ability of citizens to enjoy their freedom of movement outside of curfew is severely limited.


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Extended Curfew and Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia" (slovakconlaw, 30 October 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/10/extended-curfew-and-nationwide-covid-19.html> 

Monday, October 26, 2020

Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia: Government Response to the 2nd Wave of the Pandemic

The PM of Slovakia last week floated the idea of nationwide testing for the coronavirus over two weekends in November. The testing should be voluntary and carried out with the assistance of the military because few municipalities have the capacity to organise the testing on their own. The Government has acquired three million antigen-testing kits in preparation for the testing and requested the Ministry of Defence to supply as many as 8000 soldiers so that the exercise runs smoothly. A pilot testing will take place in four regions in the North of the country, which are virus hotspots, on October 23-25, before it is extended to the whole of the country. The success of the project will ultimately depend on the turnout for the pilot.

In his latest public appearance, however, the PM also spoke about the possibility of a forced stay of 10 days for citizens who refuse to test. There are at least two problems with the suggestion. First, the testing cannot be meaningfully described as “voluntary” if it is backed with a sanction. The introduction of a sanction to the equation means, to quote HLA Hart, “that certain kinds of human conduct are no longer optional, but in some sense obligatory” [emphasis in the original]. Understandably, the government wishes for a high turnout because the utility of the exercise would decrease if a critical number of citizens refused to test. Forcing people to participate, however, runs the risk of a further decrease in the trust of the government, which is a crucial determinant in the management of the Covid-19 crisis response. Researchers have found that “high-trust regions decrease their mobility-related to non-necessary activities significantly more than low-trust regions,” based on comparing location data and surveys on trust in politicians in the country.[1] A high trust may reduce the monitoring costs of a government and the necessity for sanctions. Whereas low trust in government is likely to contribute to the opposite. 

The Slovak government had shortly benefited from the high trust on the back of a landslide in general elections in March 2020. Most recent opinion polls, however, show that the PM and key representatives of the government are rapidly losing trust due to personal scandals. Diminishing trust in the government will undermine its effectivity, and lead to non-compliance with its measures. A similar intuition was voiced by the Ombudswoman, who noted that “if we resort to sanctions, aversion to measures increases.”

Second, there is a consensus among lawyers that the government lacks powers to sanction citizens who refuse to test with a forced stay. The Government declared a state of emergency on October 1, 2020, for the second time this year. The state of emergency is to last for 45 days,[2] based on the Constitutional Act No. 227/2002 Coll., on State Security at the Time of War, State of War, State of Emergency and State of Crisis (Act on State Security), which regulates state response these four types of extraordinary situations. Thus, for the next month and a half, the government received access to extensive powers unavailable under conditions of normal politics. But even in an emergency, there are restrictions on the government exercise of power. 

Thes framework for crisis management allows the government to respond to emergencies through means proportional to the perceived level of threat. The permissible level of government restriction on human rights increases in proportion to the gravity of the situation. This is also the case of a curfew or a forced stay.

Under the declaration of emergency, the government may prohibit entry to an area or limit freedom of movement and residence through a curfew order, but the curfew must have limited duration and location (Article 5.3g of the Constitutional Act on State Security). Consider the following example. A permissible limitation on the right of freedom of movement would be a curfew between 4pm in the afternoon and 7am on the morning of the next day. Such a tailored restriction enables citizens, who work alone, so the risk of them spreading the infection is low, to travel to their place of work or go shopping for essentials during the daytime. The restriction, however, decreases the circulation of citizens in the city during the nighttime and effectively results in the closure of cafes and social establishments during curfew hours.

Unlike curfew, which is limited in duration, a forced stay order applies generally. Citizens are expected to stay at the place of their residence and may not leave unless exceptional circumstance occurs. Only in a state of crisis can the government limit the freedom of movement through a forced stay (Article 4.4a of the Constitutional Act on State Security). A ten-day continuous prohibition to leave one’s residence, as suggested by the PM, amounts to a forced stay. Such a measure is not available to the government during the state of emergency.

Suppose the government decides to impose forced stay against a portion of the population that does not wish to participate in nationwide testing. In that case, it is highly probable that the measure will be challenged in the Constitutional Court. The Court had already an opportunity to review the state of emergency declaration in a first-of-its-kind decision on the constitutionality of state of emergency. However, the proposed sanctions against individuals who refuse to participate in the nationwide testing are a significant change in the facts of the case.


[1] Olivier Bargain and Ulugbek Aminjonov, Trust and Compliance to Public Health Policies in Times of Covid-19, Bordeaux Economics Working Papers, 3-5

[2] The Constitutional Act on State Security limits the duration of the state of emergency to a maximum of 90 days, without the possibility of extension. Unlike in response to the first domestic outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in Slovakia, this time, the government declared the emergency for a limited duration, seemingly learning from the previous experience. For an account of the government response to the first wave of the pandemic see, Slavomíra Henčeková and Šimon Drugda, Slovakia: Change of Government under COVID-19 Emergency, VerfassungsBlog


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia: Government Response to the 2nd Wave of the Pandemic" (slovakconlaw, 26 October 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/10/nationwide-covid-19-testing-in-slovakia.html>