The Slovak government has introduced a new Code of Conduct for high-ranking public officials.[1] The proposal is not yet effective, but it is nearing the end of the interdepartmental review process, during which various government bodies, NGOs, and the public can provide comments.[2] The government is now considering the submitted comments to determine which ones must be implemented to improve the proposal. If critical comments are impossible to implement, it may even change course by scrapping it altogether.
While the adoption of ethics codes is generally a welcome development in terms of improving the quality of the executive and public service, this particular proposal has attracted criticism for three reasons: it unduly concentrates power under the PM withouth a legal basis, restricts the freedom of association of civil servants and top officials with NGOs, and also highlights the government’s own ethical misgivings. On the last point, as I have written on this blog, it was recently revealed that the Defence Minister in Fico’s Cabinet failed to declare a seaside villa owned by his wife in Croatia, which led to a debate about ethics in government and transparency.[3]
Aside from articulating ethical standards, the proposed Code of Conduct also has a substantive component, by proscribing official conduct with a focus on inclusivity and respect for minorities, but also more curious principles, such as a respect for the “Cyril and Methodius spiritual heritage” and the “history, culture, and traditions” of the Slovak Republic, which the public official ought to commit to and develop while in office. Including these ideological formulations is an interesting choice, but I will not discuss them further in this blog in the interest of space. With that in mind, this post critically examines the proposed Code of Conduct and its key concerns.
Two-Faced Ethics
Ostensibly, the Code represents an attempt by
the government to strengthen public trust in state institutions and make good
on the policy commitments outlined in its 2023-2027 Program Statement, which
identified “prevention of corruption, public sector integrity, and
transparency” as one of the key areas to work on during its mandate.[4]
Trust in institutions in Slovakia has been eroding over the years, so,
understandably, the government would seek to remedy it. [5]
If adopted, the Code would be a government
resolution articulating standards for ethical behaviour, fact-based governance,
and the avoidance of conflict of interest. In its current form, the Code
resembles a soft law or non-binding instrument, as it does not do much to
determine sanctions for breaches. As a result, there is always a risk that the
Code’s provisions may remain purely aspirational without a clear deterrent for
non-compliance.[6]
Relying on moral persuasion alone can be problematic,
especially in a political context where breaches of ethical standards have
historically not been monitored or sanctioned. This dynamic may undercut the
Code’s declared aim of strengthening public trust, as citizens may remain sceptical
when ethics rules are not backed by tangible enforcement mechanisms.
Going back to the case of undeclared assets by
the Minister of Defence, he has, for example, argued that it was in the higher
interest of his family’s privacy not to declare. He may receive a fine for the
nondisclosure, but what is interesting is that he has not been publicly criticised
by the PM or any of the coalition members. On the contrary, the government has
refused suggestions that the Minister’s avoidance of the law may lead by
example and invite members of the public to shirk their legal obligations. The Minister’s
insistence on the justifiability of his action thus reveals a second face of
the government; one that suggests the push to enhance ethics and transparency
of public office is not authentic.
Concentration of Interpretive Authority
A related source of controversy is the Prime Minister’s role in reviewing
compliance with the Code, as “the final arbiter of the standards of conduct
expected of individuals in high executive positions.” Vesting the interpretive
power in the PM might, on one hand, foster high-level political accountability.
On the other hand, this arrangement makes the Code vulnerable to politicisation.
If a high-ranking official appointed by the PM were to face controversy for
ethical lapses, for example, there may be an inherent conflict of interest when
the PM would be charged with reviewing the misconduct.
Additionally, the Code assumes that the
high-ranking official would stay in office, conditional on the PM’s holding trust
in them, which is expressly contrary to the law and the Constitution.[7]
The Code is meant to apply to “persons” in high executive positions, including members
of the government, heads of central state administration bodies, state
secretaries, and even political advisors. The PM already has the authority to
discipline some of these subjects (i.e. cabinet ministers, by proposing their
removal from office under Article 116(4) of the Constitution—Act No 460/1992
Coll.), but the Code would extend his authority without a legal basis to all others,
like the Antimonopoly Office, which is an independent regulatory body of the fourth
branch of government, or even political advisors who should only be accountable
to the recipient of the advice and not the PM.
The Antimonopoly Office, as a central state administrative body, commented on the proposal
during the interdepartmental review process and objected to the government by highlighting
the EU Directive 2019/1,[8]
which strengthens the powers of national competition authorities. The Directive
requires the Antimonopoly Office (and similar bodies) to act independently of
political influence. Article 4(3) of the Directive ensures that competition
authorities are free from external interference. This rule has also been
transposed into domestic law (Act No 187/2021 Coll. on Protection of
Competition). The introduction of the Prime Minister’s discretion to somehow remove the head of the Antimonopoly Office would thus violate this requirement under both
Slovak and EU law.[9]
Restriction of Political Rights
Finally, in a controversial section, the Code
provides that public officials should not associate with NGOs or civil society groups
whose aims or activities could “conflict with the Government’s Program Statement”
and thereby might be perceived as “illegitimate influence” and undermine the
trust “in adherence to the public interest exclusively.” [10]
Discounting the fact that the Code of Conduct views
the government Program as the sole and determinative statement of what is in the
public interest,[11] the
concern with the provision is that it limits individuals’ rights to freely
associate and participate in public life. The Code’s provisions could
discourage public officials from engaging with civil society. By restricting
public officials’ association with groups and organisations that may not align
with government priorities, the Code thus undermines the participatory nature
of democracy and the public sphere. It could have a chilling effect on the life
and work of NGOs.
Slovakia has a rich historical tradition of civil organisation representatives transitioning into (and influencing) politics, and sometimes back again. After the fall of communism in 1989 and certainly in Slovakia’s formative years as an independent republic since 1993, civil society organisations were crucial.[12] They often filled gaps left by weak state institutions and advocated for democracy, transparency, human rights, and liberal values. The current government, however, views NGOs and civil society organisations antagonistically as potential sources of illegitimate influence and seeks to repress their activity. This is evident from some legislative initiatives, such as the recently passed amendment to Act No 213/1997 Coll. on Non-Profit Organisations Providing Generally Beneficial Services (NGO Act), or this Code of Conduct.[13]
[1] Nina Janešíková, “Vznikol kódex
správania sa verejných funkcionárov, posudzovať ich bude Fico” (Denník N,
27 February 2025) <https://dennikn.sk/4491928/vznikol-kodex-spravania-sa-verejnych-funkcionarov-posudzovat-ich-bude-fico/>
[2] Legislative process No 2025/69, accessible
at
<https://www.slov-lex.sk/elegislativa/legislativne-procesy/SK/LP/2025/69>
accessed 26 March 2025
[3] Šimon Drugda, “Defence Minister’s
Missing Asset Declaration” (slovakconlaw, 1 April 2025)
<https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2025/04/defence-ministers-missing-asset.html>
[4] “The Program Statement of the
Government of the Slovak Republic 2023–2027” accessible at <https://www.vlada.gov.sk/site/assets/files/1694/programove_vyhlasenie_vlady_sr.pdf>
[5] Ministersto Kultúry Slovenskej Republiky, “Spoločenská dôvera” accessible at <https://www.culture.gov.sk/ministerstvo/institut-kulturnej-politiky/ciele-kulturnej-politiky/spolocenska-dovera/>
[6] Although the Code does not exist in
a vacuum. It builds on the already available systems of public integrity,
including the Constitutional Act No 357/2004 Coll. on the Protection of Public
Interest in the Performance of Public Office, Act No 55/2017 Coll. on Civil
Service, and the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants, and the Principles of
Integrity in Public Administration, adopted by Resolution of the Government of
the Slovak Republic No 49 of 31 January 2023, some of which provide sanctions.
[7] Article 3(3)f on the principle of accountability
provides that high-ranking official retain their office “only as long as they
retain the trust of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic.” However, it is unclear how the official, who has lost the Prime Minister’s confidence, would be removed, as such action does not have a legal basis in all cases, except for cabinet ministers.
[8] Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and
to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market [2019] OJ L11/3
[9] According to the Constitution, Art
2(1) states that state authorities may act only based on the Constitution,
“within its limits, and in the scope and manner prescribed by law.” This
includes the PM, which is why extending his power by a government resolution would
be a clear overreach and thus likely to be subject to review and invalidation
by the Constitutional Court.
[10] Article 3(3)a of the Code of
Conduct on the principle of promoting public interest.
[11] Not to mention that in another section
(principle 3(3) a-b), the Code extends the observance of the policy program to
independent administrative bodies. Any reference to the government program
statement or political objectives in the Code essentially introduces political
bias in evaluating public officials’ behaviour.
[12] Specifically, the civic movement
Public Against Violence (Občianske hnutie Verejnosť proti násiliu), commonly referred to by its abbreviation VPN. In recent times, one prominent member of civic society who ascended to the highest executive office was former President
Zuzana Čaputová.
[13] Chiara Bachels, “Slovakia passes law on NGOs amid criticism” (DW, 17 April 2025) <https://www.dw.com/en/slovakia-passes-law-on-ngos-amid-criticism/a-72268853>
