In April, the Slovak Parliament passed a controversial piece of legislation meant to curb the work and life of NGOs and other civil society organisations.[1] Ostensibly to make their activity more transparent, but in reality, to show force.[2] The ruling coalition made several moves to limit the influence of NGOs and thus stifle public scrutiny of the executive.
Slovakia has a rich history of social movements
and a strong civic sector dating back to the early years of the Republic and
even before that, the Velvet Revolution.[3]
Last year, it was reported that there were approximately 17,000 different
non-governmental organisations and groups active in the country.[4]
However, Robert Fico’s governments gradually began to view NGOs and civil
society organisations antagonistically as potential sources of
illegitimate influence and political opposition. As such, they sought to
repress them.
We could already see early signs of this in 2018, the year in which the large-scale anti-government protests, following the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová, resulted in PM Fico’s resignation and the collapse of his Cabinet. Fico, at the time, suggested that the protests were organised by NGOs controlled by George Soros—a populist right-wing trope that has been recurring in his speeches even today. He floated the idea of curbing the influence of NGOs briefly before resigning in shame.[5] Fico has been back in power since 2023[6] and seems inclined to move Slovakia more to the right, towards the Hungarian model of illiberal democracy.[7]
The Parliament discussed the proposal to amend Act No 213/1997 Coll. on Non-Profit Organisations Providing Generally Beneficial Services (NGO Act) until late at night on April 16, with emotions running high on both sides of the floor.[8] The opposition has tried unsuccessfully to delay the legislative process, but the government coalition majority voted to cut the debate short and finally pass the amendment that has been hanging over civil society like the proverbial sword of Damocles for more than a year into law.
But how did we get here? In this blog, I first
chart the genesis of the amendments to the NGO Act and then critically examine
its main pain points.
Lost in the Shuffle: The Process
Part of the controversy surrounding the changes
to the NGO Act concerns the level of scrutiny afforded to the bill, and by
extension, its quality. The bill amending and supplementing the NGO Act has
been introduced to the Parliament by a group of MPS, and as such, it is a
private member bill, which is excluded from the intergovernmental commentary
and review process that government-initiated bills receive.
Government bills, or sometimes other types
of policy documents, undergo review and comments from other ministries,
relevant state institutions, and civil society before being formally approved and
submitted to Parliament.[9]
The review process helps prevent conflicting rules, clarifies legal and policy
overlaps, and ideally improves both the substance and formal coherence of a legislative
proposal.
Private member bills, on the other hand,
enjoy more direct access to the legislative process, which has both its pros
and cons. Enabling individual members of parliament to propose laws is a key democratic
principle. It prevents the executive branch from having a monopoly on the
legislative agenda and promotes the separation of powers, as well as pluralism
in lawmaking. The individual initiative guarantees the right of MPs to bring
forward legislative proposals that reflect the needs or requests of their
constituents (regional or political), even if they were to conflict with the
government programme.
These bills, however, face relatively less scrutiny, albeit for good reasons. Private member bills still need to pass the review by the relevant parliamentary committee, and their fellow MPs in the Parliament, but not having to consult other relevant stakeholders accelerate the process somewhat and makes it, potentially, alienating to the public because it does not allow civil society to articulate its view on the legislation easily. The director of the prominent rule-of-law Slovak NGO Via Iuris, Katarína Batková, has for example stated that the absence of the intergovernmental review process contributed to the fact that the government coalition and civil society organisations had to debate/spar in legacy and social media, because there was no suitable avenue for them to comment on the proposal instead.[10]
Another problem of the process were the amending motions to the bill, by which it was made and remade almost entirely since its submission to the Parliament. The bill was first introduced to the Parliament in April last year, but after intense public criticism, it was shelved and only recently returned to the legislative process.[11] While the bill has been shelved, its contents have changed dramatically based on an amendment proposal by the Constitutional Committee and then again at the last minute on the day of the second reading after a junior coalition member amended the proposal again just before the Parliament opened for business.[12] Opposition MP Ondrej Dostál has shared an image on social media, visualising how dramatically the text of the bill changed with every iteration: deleted text in red, added text in green, and what remains from the original proposal in light blue.[13]
The lack of prior consultation with stakeholders and the public, as well as sudden changes to the amendment during the legislative process, have limited the participatory nature of the process, which should be a requirement if the intended target of the change is the public’s right to associate freely. In this context, the Venice Commission had previously stated in its Guidelines on Freedom of Association that legal provisions concerning associations should be “adopted through a broad, inclusive and participatory process, to ensure that all parties concerned are committed to their content.”[14]
We The People: Foreign Agents and
Lobbyists
When it comes to the substance, a major
point of contention in the proposal had been the labelling of civil society
organisations that would receive foreign funds above a set threshold as a
“foreign-supported organisation” or “foreign agent” in common parlance.[15]
This problematic designation has changed in the second iteration of the bill to
the label of “lobbyist.”[16]
The amendment was intended to require organisations that directly or indirectly
influence politicians to label themselves as lobbyists. It also foresaw the
adoption of an Act on Lobbying that would later detail what qualified as lobbying
and define the term. Organisations were to self-declare their lobbying, subject
to administrative review, and indicate it on all materials they produce.
The suspected inspiration for the original
proposal was the Hungarian 2017 law on foreign-funded NGOs.[17]
Which was repealed four years later, in 2021, after the EU issued a formal
notice against the country, for failing to fulfil its obligations under the
Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, for discriminating donations
from abroad to civil society organisations, as well as the freedom of
association and the right to private life.[18]
The Court of Justice of the European Union
found the law lacking a legitimate justification and infringing on Article 12
of the EU Charter, freedom of association, and Articles 7 and 8 on the right to
private life and protection of personal data because the law forces public
disclosure of donors’ identities without sufficient safeguards. The Court also
held that the law breached Article 63 TFEU by treating cross‑border donations differently from domestic ones, deterring foreign
donors and creating a climate of distrust toward affected NGOs. Such
differential treatment violated Article 63 on free movement of capital.[19]
The original Slovak proposal to amend the
NGO Act mirrored the Hungarian law by requiring NGOs that received foreign
donor funding to register and add the label “foreign-supported organisation” to
all their publications, websites, and press materials, while also providing
officials with detailed donor data. However, this changed again on the day of
the second reading, as the bill’s final version and the one that was ultimately adopted no longer included the lobbyist or foreign agent labels. It is
likely that the parliamentarians were made aware of the potential conflict with
EU law and changed course to avoid open confrontation with the Commission.
The scope character of the changes to the
NGO Act during the legislative process indicates that the government coalition
has not adequately considered the potential conflict with EU law or the
European Convention on Human Rights. Only when alerted did it decide to remove
the clear breaches, such as the labelling requirement for “political” NGOs as foreign
agents or lobbyists. There is a risk that the haste with which the amendment
has been formulated and reformulated in the last sprint could have also resulted
in other conflicts or simply errors that are less obvious and might not have
been flagged. Legislation affecting freedom of association should be well crafted,
“clear, precise and certain.”[20]
Donor Lists, Democracy, and Distrust
The second contentious element of the
legislation has been the requirement of extensive financial disclosures by NGOs
and other civil society organisations. These organisations must list all their
contributions above a certain threshold, depending on the organisation type,
and income in annual reports, including donor identities. Specifically, the
details include the full name of private donors whose total contributions exceed
€5,000 within a calendar year. And for legal entities, information including their
business name, identification number, and registered office address, regardless
of the donation amount, must always be disclosed. This can pose privacy and
security issues for donors who may be reluctant to see their names publicly
linked to particular causes, thus contributing to the chilling effect of the
law on civil society and the right to associate.
The chilling effect refers to the
phenomenon where rights holders refrain from exercising their rights due to
fear of legal sanctions, state surveillance, disproportionate regulation, or other
indirect pressure. NGO representatives have articulated a concern that the publication
of donor lists might decrease the ability of civil society organisations that
rely on private donations, membership fees and other self-financing to fund
their activity at a time when the state is cutting costs on grants and aid. Donors
might fear surveillance or reputational harm in this charged political climate and
thus forgo donating to NGOs.
In the case of the Hungarian 2017 law on
foreign-funded NGOs, the CJEU considered the law’s impact on donors to the
targeted civil society organisations. The Court primarily examined the issue in
the context of discrimination against foreign donors, who were also the original
target in the case of the amendment to the NGO Act in Slovakia, but the
rationale can be generalised and applied to donors irrespective of their domicile.[21]
CJEU held that the publication requirement
on received gifts may have a deterrent effect on the participation of donors in
the financing of civil society organisations and
is of such nature “of such a nature as to create a generalised climate of
mistrust vis-à-vis the associations and foundations […] and to stigmatise them.”[22]
In articulating this opinion, the Court referred to the opinion of the Advocate
General, who went even further:
[M]ay deter potential donors, with the consequent reduction in their gifts to associations. No matter how small it may be, that effect can still be significant as regards the finances of civil society organisations which tend to rely on donations from their members and supporters (some of these organisations also turn the refusal of all public funding into a point of principle, in order to retain their independence).[23]
The Court did qualify this statement by
noting that some civil society organisations have a significant influence on
public life and debate, and as such, transparency in “respect of the financial
support granted to such organisations may also constitute an overriding reason
in the public interest.” Although the Court primarily noted this in the context
of donations from third-party states.[24]
Administrative Burden and Available Alternatives
This brings us to the third and final point
of criticism: Why increase the administrative burden on civil society
organisations when they already have to pass annual audits? The Parliament has
articulated throughout this episode that it is acting in the interest of
transparency. But civil society organisations already had, prior to this
change, the obligation to publish their accounts in an annual report under
Article 33 of the NGO Act.
And provided they had either received
income from public funds or income from tax deductions exceeding 200,000 EUR,
or their income overall, including self-financing, exceeded half a million euros.
In such cases, the accounts had to be audited under Article 33(3) of the NGO
Act. These obligations remain, but according to the new rules, NGOs must also
produce an additional statement. These additional declarations rules increase
the burden, especially on small organisations, not to mention that the amendment
to the Act also steeply increased penalties for delay and breaches of the
publication requirements, both of the annual accounts and the newly introduced
donor statement.
Which brings us to fines. According the
prior rules, civil society organisations with the obligation to submit audited accounts
under Article 33(3) could be fined for up to 1,000 EUR, but even in those cases
the regulator had the discretion to adjust the fine to consider “seriousness,
duration, and consequence” (Article 34(a)) of the breach of the statutory duty.
The new NGO Act has extended these fines to almost all CSOs that fail to comply with
the publication and disclosure requirements, not only the civil society
organisations with an income exceeding 200,000 EUR.
Moreover, the Act also provides a fine for
failing to submit the new “donor statements.” A fine that starts with a one-time
charge of up to 1,000 EUR, but if the violation is not remedied within 30 days
after the fine becomes enforceable, an additional fine may be imposed
repeatedly, each time up to ten times the original maximum amount, with a
minimum fine of 5,000 EUR from the third instance onwards. On top of that, if
the submitted statement is erroneous or missing requisite data, an NGO can
again face sanctions. If the NGO fails to correct the issues, it can again be
fined up to 1,000 EUR, and an additional fine may again be imposed, each time
up to ten times the original maximum amount, with a statutory minimum set at 5,000
EUR from the third instance onwards.
The regulator still retains the discretion
to assess the size of the fine within the statutory maximum and minimum. Still,
the steep ramping up of sanctions compared to the earlier fine structure is
worrying. Where before there was a single fine for high-income organisations,
there are now three distinct fines for failure to publish annual accounts, a donor
statement and for submitting an erroneous statement. While the base sanctions
are not necessarily high, if we were to assess them by the methodology used by
the ECtHR in Ecodefence, namely the assessment of the fine in comparison
to the minimum monthly salary,[25]
the increase in complexity and magnitude could also invite review in terms of
proportionality.
What next?
The opposition parties have already
signalled their intention to challenge the change to the NGO Act, provided that
the President does not veto it first.[26]
The largest opposition party, Progressive Slovakia,[27]
currently leading polls, challenges the main government party, SMER, on all
fronts and is ready to capitalise on any weakness.[28]
This is good for Slovak constitutional politics because the current President
is a former SMER politician and thus shares much of the party’s persuasions,
even though he has recently challenged Fico on several occasions.[29]
The amendment, or some of its various iterations, have also been criticised by
the Ombudsman and EU institutions.[30]
But even if the new NGO Act is likely to be
reviewed by the Constitutional Court, the real intention behind the law might
not be to actually effect the change but to distract civil society from
effective government scrutiny. And if that is the case, the law might have
already achieved its purpose. Many NGOs are now, understandably, focused on changes
to the NGO Act and have to allocate resources to fighting it.
To conclude, the passage of Slovakia’s
amended NGO Act represents a textbook case of how procedural irregularities,
substantive overreach, and political intent converge to test the limits of
liberal constitutionalism in a democratic system. Substantively, while the
Slovak government has retreated from overtly labelling NGOs as “foreign
agents,” the administrative burden and potential sanctions imposed by the Act remain
capable of chilling civic engagement.
Moreover, this new NGO Act is not the cause
of the worry, or at least not only. In my view, it is a symptom—part of a
broader pattern of what could be called “democratic backsliding,” or using the
tools of law and procedure not to protect democracy but to chip away at it
slowly. The concern with the new NGO Act is not only its immediate impact but
also the normalisation of adversarial governance toward civil society and the
precedent it sets for sidelining democratic safeguards.
[1] Nina Janešíková, “Zákon o mimovládkach prešiel, jeho obsah nik
nevysvetlil. 'Geniálne, pomohli ste nám,' reagujú združenia kritické voči vláde”
(Denník N, 16 April 2025)
<https://dennikn.sk/4587683/zakon-o-mimovladkach-presiel-jeho-obsah-nik-nevysvetlil-genialne-pomohli-ste-nam-reaguju-zdruzenia-kriticke-voci-vlade/>;
and Chiara Bachels, “Slovakia passes law on NGOs amid criticism” (DW, 17
April 2025)
<https://www.dw.com/en/slovakia-passes-law-on-ngos-amid-criticism/a-72268853>
[2] For
example, the government took away the right of NGOs to select their
representatives to monitor EU funds under the “partnership principle” that
requires the involvement of all relevant stakeholders, including NGOs, in
decisions about Union funding. Marián Koreň and Natália Silenská, “Slovakia to
change rules on NGO involvement in monitoring EU funds” (EURACTIVE.sk,
21 August 2024)
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/slovakia-to-change-rules-on-ngo-involvement-in-monitoring-eu-funds/>
[3] Following the Fall of Communism, the civic sector experienced rapid growth with almost 6,000 registered non-governmental organisations in 1993, some 9,800 groups and organisations in 1994, and “by year 1996 there were already more than 12,000 NGOs.” See generally, Boris Strečanský, “Civil Society in Slovakia” in Christian Schreier (ed) 25 Years After. Mapping Civil Society in the Visegrád Countries (Lucius Verlagsgesselschaft mbH 2015) <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299453233_Civil_Society_in_Slovakia>; and Gabriela Vaceková and Mária Svidroňová, “The Non-Government Organizations in Slovakia and Austria and the Current State of Their Self-Financing” (2013) Working Paper KVE–06/2013, 7
[4] “Na Slovensku pôsobí 17 tisíc mimovládnych organizácií” (SME,
7 October 2002)
<https://domov.sme.sk/c/687747/na-slovensku-posobi-17-tisic-mimovladnych-organizacii.html>
[5] Radoslav Tomek and Peter Laca, “Slovak Premier Sees Soros Behind
Plan to Topple His Government” (Bloomberg, 6 March 2018)
<https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2018-03-06/slovak-premier-sees-soros-behind-plan-to-topple-his-government>;
and “News digest: Fico sees coup plot behind protests, but Slovaks take to the
streets anyway” (The Slovak Spectator, 23 January 2025)
<https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/news-digest-fico-sees-coup-plot-behind-protests-but-slovaks-take-to-the-streets-anyway>
[6] Jean-Baptiste Chastand, “Result of Slovakia's presidential election
asserts the country's pro-Russian shift” (Le Monde, 8 April 2023)
<https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/04/08/slovakia-peter-pellegrini-s-presidential-victory-affirms-government-s-pro-russian-shift_6667684_4.html>
[7] On Hungary see generally, András L Pap, Democratic Decline in
Hungary Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy (2018 Routledge)
[8] Including personal insults, conspiracy theories about Slovak NGOs
being controlled by George Soros, and otherwise charged language. The
proceedings of the parliamentary session can be viewed online on the
Parliament’s official website, accessible at: <https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/9/33?id=341732>
[9] Under Act
No 400/2015 Coll. on the Drafting of Legislation and on the Collection of Laws
of the Slovak Republic
[10] “Batková z Via Iuris: Vláda chce zastrašiť aktívnych občanov, aby
ju nekritizovali” (Denník N YouTube, 8 April 2025)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=psi5cMxwJJM&ab_channel=DenníkN>
[11] "Slovakia: Anti-NGO law a full-frontal assault on civil
society" (Amnesty International, 30 April 2025) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/slovakia-anti-ngo-law-a-full-frontal-assault-on-civil-society/>;
and "The Hidden Agenda: How Slovakia’s Anti-NGO Law Seeks to Silence Civil
Society" (Slovak Media Monitor, 27 Nvoember 2024)
<https://slovakmonitor.com/the-hidden-agenda-how-slovakias-anti-ngo-law-seeks-to-silence-civil-society/>
[12] The legislative proposal with amendments and explanatory memorandum
can be accessed at: <https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Default.aspx?sid=zakony/zakon&MasterID=9699>
[13] "Prehľadný vizuál: ako koalícia úplne prekopala zákon o
mimovládkach" (Denník N, 16 April 2025)
<https://dennikn.sk/minuta/4587967/?ref=mpm>
[14] European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), Joint
Guidelines on Freedom of Association (CDL-AD(2014)046, Study no 706/2012,
adopted at 101st Plenary Session, 12–13 December 2014) para 22
[15] Agapi Antonaki, “SLOVAKIA: NGO draft law stigmatises CSOs, mirroring Hungary’s path”
(Civic Space Watch, 13 June 2024)
<https://civicspacewatch.eu/slovakia-ngo-draft-law-stigmatises-csos-mirroring-hungarys-path/>
[16] Iryna Uias, “News digest: SNS switches from 'foreign-funded' label
for NGOs to lobbying regulation” (The Slovak Spectator, 22 November 2024)
<https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/news-digest-sns-switches-from-foreign-funded-label-for-ngos-to-lobbying-regulation>
[17] Although laws with similar subject matter have been spreading
across the region. Natika Kantaria, “Spread of 'foreign agent' laws in Central,
Eastern Europe a growing threat to civil society” (International Service for
Human Rights, 26 February 2025) <https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/spread-of-foreign-agent-laws-in-eastern-europe-pose-increasing-threats-to-civil-society/>
[18] “INFRINGEMENTS - Hungary: Commission launches infringement
procedure for law on foreign-funded NGOs” (European Commission, 13 July
2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_1982>;
and “Infringements -European Commission refers Hungary to the Court of Justice
for its NGO Law” (European Commission, 7 December 2017)
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_17_5003>
[19] Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations)
(Case C‑78/18) EU:C:2020:476 (Grand Chamber, 18 June 2020);
Court of Justice of the European Union, “The restrictions imposed by Hungary on
the financing of civil organisations by persons established outside that Member
State do not comply with EU law” Press Release No 73/20
(18 June 2020) <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_3078308/en/>
[20] Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, Joint Guidelines on Freedom of
Association (n14) para 22.
[21] With the
caveat that foreign donors have limited means to engage in politics other than donations.
For domestic donors, there will obviously be other avenues of political expression,
so the constraint diminishes somewhat.
[22] Commission v Hungary (C-78/18), para 118
[23] Case C-78/18 Commission v Hungary EU:C:2020:14, Opinion of AG Sánchez-Bordona,
para 121
[24] Commission v Hungary (C-78/18), paras 79-80
[25] While the base sanctions are not necessarily high, if we were to
assess them by the methodology used by the ECtHR in Ecodefence and Others v
Russia (2022) App nos 9988/13 and 60 others, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2022:0614JUD000998813,
Judgment of 14 June 2022, para 181.
[26] “Newsletter: Bič na mimovládky pošleme na ústavný súd, ponúkame
hlasy na zrušenie hlúpej dane” (Progresívne Slovensko, 22 April 2025)
<https://progresivne.sk/newsletter-bic-na-mimovladky-posleme-na-ustavny-sud-ponukame-hlasy-na-zrusenie-hlupej-dane/>
[27] Earlier versions
of the amendment to the NGO Act have been also criticize by Christian Democrats,
who also expressed intent to challenge the legislation in court. “KDH ostro
kritizuje zákon o mimovládkach” (Denník N, 8 April 2025)
<https://dennikn.sk/minuta/4571199/?ref=mpm>
[28] “Fico in trouble? Smer losing its most loyal voters, polls reveal” (The
Slovak Spectotor, 10 February 2025)
<https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/fico-in-trouble-smer-losing-its-most-loyal-voters-polls-reveal>
[29] “President Vetoes Life Annuity for PG, Wants It Scrapped or
Adjusted” (TASR, 16 April 2025) <https://etasr.sk/article/21956628>;
and “President Pellegrini vetoes bill on so-called COVID amnesties” (STVR,
28 April 2025)
<https://enrsi.stvr.sk/articles/news/400400/president-pellegrini-vetoes-bill-on-so-called-covid-amnesties>
[30] “Verejný ochranca práv listom vyzval poslancov, aby neprijali zákon
o mimovládkach v súčasnej podobe” (Denník N, 14 April 2025)
<https://dennikn.sk/minuta/4582410/?ref=mpm>; and
