Updating the Dataset on Presidential Pardon (working paper No Mercy)

I have updated the data on presidential pardons and amnesty decisions in Slovakia, which now covers the entire period from 1993 to 2025. This dataset compiles statistics on pardon applications, granted pardons, amnesty pardons, and amnesties issued by presidents and acting heads of state. It includes a codebook and an individual tab with a presentation of the data for each president. The data is compiled based on reporting by the Office of the President, accessible at: <https://www.prezident.sk/page/milosti-a-amnestie/>.

Constitutionally, the president has the power to grant mercy in Slovakia through individual pardons or amnesties. Both mechanisms serve as discretionary tools for mitigating the legal consequences of a criminal conviction; the harshness of the law. The pardoning power includes the ability to remit or reduce a final sentence, expunge a conviction, or conditionally suspend the execution of punishment, including the temporary deferral or interruption of a sentence during the clemency process. Pardoning is based on a request for pardon and supporting documents prepared by the Minister of Justice. In the event of presidential incapacity, the acting president (PM) may exercise the pardon power.

Banking on Integrity: Should Slovakia’s Central Bank Governor Stay in Office?

At the end of May, the Special Criminal Court in Slovakia found Peter Kažimír, the current governor of the Slovak National Bank (NBS), guilty of bribery committed during his tenure as Minister of Finance. Kažimír allegedly bribed František Imrecze, then head of the Financial Administration, to expedite tax proceedings concerning VAT refunds for a group of companies. Kažimír was fined 200,000 EUR. The court ruled that he would face a one-year prison sentence should he fail to pay the fine, but the conviction is not yet final.[1]

This decision marks a significant moment in Slovakia’s ongoing struggle with corruption and its institutional implications. Based on Transparency International data, Slovakia is at the tail of the perception of corruption, and the situation has deteriorated since the government of PM Fico returned to power. [2] 

Judicial Vacancies and Political Strategy: Mapping the Future of the Slovak Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court of Slovakia has been working one judge short for over a year, following judge Jana Laššáková’s resignation at the end of September 2023. Questions have been raised now about the motivation of the Parliament to hold the seat open. At the January hearing for the sole nominee to the Constitutional Court (even though legally there should be two candidates put forward for each vacancy) opposition MPs voiced concerns about the selection process, speculating that the delay might be strategic—possibly to reserve the position for General Prosecutor Žilinka should he resign, or even Prime Minister Fico.

Building on my earlier commentary,[1] I now focus on the implications of the ongoing judicial vacancy, the timeline for upcoming appointments, and how the 2021 introduction of staggered terms is reshaping the institutional structure of the Constitutional Court.

Delays in Appointment to Slovak Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court of Slovakia has been operating without a judge for one year and seven months following Judge Jana Laššáková’s resignation in September 2023.[1] This prolonged vacancy raises concerns about the Court’s ability to operate effectively and uphold its constitutional duties. While the other 12 judges, especially the President of the Court, have been taking on more work to compensate for the vacancy, this situation is unsustainable in the long run.

In Slovakia, the appointment of a new judge to the Constitutional Court is a two-step process: Parliament selects a candidate, and the President makes the final appointment. However, this process has stalled at the initial stage. During this parliamentary term, three selection rounds have taken place—all unsuccessful. In the first round, five candidates were proposed, but none received the required 90 votes (a simple majority in the repeat vote). The second round saw just one candidate, who failed to gain sufficient support. The ruling coalition has yet to explain why it has been unable or unwilling to nominate a suitable candidate.

Chart of the Day: Changes in the Population Size of Slovak Judges over a Decade

I recently thought about how much of constitutional law is ebb and flow, action and reaction. Which is why today I decided to analyse a graph that I have had in my desk drawer for a while. See the waterfall graph of the Slovak judges’ population size between 2011 and 2025 (Figure 1). The graph visually shows staffing shifts in the court system as increases and decreases from the original value. The initial value in the graph is 0, based on the fact that I could not get the exact number of judges in January 2011, but it could be any value. What is important is the pattern created by adding and subtracting from judges’ population over time, and as you can see ebbs and flows. 

The number of judges in Slovakia is affected yearly by four specific events: the appointment of new judges (which adds to the pool), the resignation of retiring judges, their removal, and death (all of which reduce the population). The Ministry of Justice reports each of these events under the “Change Notices” section on its webpage, and it has done so since 2011. 

Controversial NGO Law Passes through the Slovak Parliament

In April, the Slovak Parliament passed a controversial piece of legislation meant to curb the work and life of NGOs and other civil society organisations.[1] Ostensibly to make their activity more transparent, but in reality, to show force.[2] The ruling coalition made several moves to limit the influence of NGOs and thus stifle public scrutiny of the executive.

Slovakia has a rich history of social movements and a strong civic sector dating back to the early years of the Republic and even before that, the Velvet Revolution.[3] Last year, it was reported that there were approximately 17,000 different non-governmental organisations and groups active in the country.[4] However, Robert Fico’s governments gradually began to view NGOs and civil society organisations antagonistically as potential sources of illegitimate influence and political opposition. As such, they sought to repress them.

We could already see early signs of this in 2018, the year in which the large-scale anti-government protests, following the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová, resulted in PM Fico’s resignation and the collapse of his Cabinet. Fico, at the time, suggested that the protests were organised by NGOs controlled by George Soros—a populist right-wing trope that has been recurring in his speeches even today. He floated the idea of curbing the influence of NGOs briefly before resigning in shame.[5] Fico has been back in power since 2023[6] and seems inclined to move Slovakia more to the right, towards the Hungarian model of illiberal democracy.[7] 

New Code of Conduct for High-Ranking Public Officials in Slovakia?

The Slovak government has introduced a new Code of Conduct for high-ranking public officials.[1] The proposal is not yet effective, but it is nearing the end of the interdepartmental review process, during which various government bodies, NGOs, and the public can provide comments.[2] The government is now considering the submitted comments to determine which ones must be implemented to improve the proposal. If critical comments are impossible to implement, it may even change course by scrapping it altogether.

While the adoption of ethics codes is generally a welcome development in terms of improving the quality of the executive and public service, this particular proposal has attracted criticism for three reasons: it unduly concentrates power under the PM withouth a legal basis, restricts the freedom of association of civil servants and top officials with NGOs, and also highlights the government’s own ethical misgivings. On the last point, as I have written on this blog, it was recently revealed that the Defence Minister in Fico’s Cabinet failed to declare a seaside villa owned by his wife in Croatia, which led to a debate about ethics in government and transparency.[3] 

Defence Minister’s Missing Asset Declaration

On the 13th of March, a Slovak newspaper published an investigative article mapping the holiday homes of politicians, influential figures, and oligarchs in a remote Croatian seaside village. It was revealed that the Defence Minister in Fico’s Cabinet and his right-hand man, Rober Kaliňák, had a villa in the destination. Asked about a specific piece of property, he openly admitted to the journalists: 

More than six years ago, my wife purchased the property in question from an elderly Croatian family for €296,000. In fact, it is not a villa, but two apartments. The property is more than 50 years old, so it has undergone renovation. [1]

The point of the article was not necessarily to question the ownership of Kaliňáks’ holiday home. It is known that Kaliňák is a relatively wealthy politician and business owner, but rather the curious fact that the property neighbours other prominent lawyers and lobbyists. On the same day the story broke, however, it became clear that this was a bigger issue than all of the initially involved expected. Within a few hours of the article being published early in the morning, two opposition parties held a press conference, where opposition MP Veronika Remišová, who is the Chairwoman of the Parliamentary Committee on the Incompatibility of Functions, revealed that the Defence Minister failed to declare the seaside villa owned by his wife in Croatia.[2] Within a day, the controversy escalated into a full-blown scandal.