Friday, July 4, 2025

Updating the Dataset on Presidential Pardon (working paper No Mercy)

I have updated the data on presidential pardons and amnesty decisions in Slovakia, which now covers the entire period from 1993 to 2025. This dataset compiles statistics on pardon applications, granted pardons, amnesty pardons, and amnesties issued by presidents and acting heads of state. It includes a codebook and an individual tab with a presentation of the data for each president. The data is compiled based on reporting by the Office of the President, accessible at: <https://www.prezident.sk/page/milosti-a-amnestie/>.

Constitutionally, the president has the power to grant mercy in Slovakia through individual pardons or amnesties. Both mechanisms serve as discretionary tools for mitigating the legal consequences of a criminal conviction; the harshness of the law. The pardoning power includes the ability to remit or reduce a final sentence, expunge a conviction, or conditionally suspend the execution of punishment, including the temporary deferral or interruption of a sentence during the clemency process. Pardoning is based on a request for pardon and supporting documents prepared by the Minister of Justice. In the event of presidential incapacity, the acting president (PM) may exercise the pardon power.

Thursday, June 19, 2025

Banking on Integrity: Should Slovakia’s Central Bank Governor Stay in Office?

At the end of May, the Special Criminal Court in Slovakia found Peter Kažimír, the current governor of the Slovak National Bank (NBS), guilty of bribery committed during his tenure as Minister of Finance. Kažimír allegedly bribed František Imrecze, then head of the Financial Administration, to expedite tax proceedings concerning VAT refunds for a group of companies. Kažimír was fined 200,000 EUR. The court ruled that he would face a one-year prison sentence should he fail to pay the fine, but the conviction is not yet final.[1]

This decision marks a significant moment in Slovakia’s ongoing struggle with corruption and its institutional implications. Based on Transparency International data, Slovakia is at the tail of the perception of corruption, and the situation has deteriorated since the government of PM Fico returned to power. [2] 

Friday, May 23, 2025

Judicial Vacancies and Political Strategy: Mapping the Future of the Slovak Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court of Slovakia has been working one judge short for over a year, following judge Jana Laššáková’s resignation at the end of September 2023. Questions have been raised now about the motivation of the Parliament to hold the seat open. At the January hearing for the sole nominee to the Constitutional Court (even though legally there should be two candidates put forward for each vacancy) opposition MPs voiced concerns about the selection process, speculating that the delay might be strategic—possibly to reserve the position for General Prosecutor Žilinka should he resign, or even Prime Minister Fico.

Building on my earlier commentary,[1] I now focus on the implications of the ongoing judicial vacancy, the timeline for upcoming appointments, and how the 2021 introduction of staggered terms is reshaping the institutional structure of the Constitutional Court.

Saturday, May 10, 2025

Delays in Appointment to Slovak Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court of Slovakia has been operating without a judge for one year and seven months following Judge Jana Laššáková’s resignation in September 2023.[1] This prolonged vacancy raises concerns about the Court’s ability to operate effectively and uphold its constitutional duties. While the other 12 judges, especially the President of the Court, have been taking on more work to compensate for the vacancy, this situation is unsustainable in the long run.

In Slovakia, the appointment of a new judge to the Constitutional Court is a two-step process: Parliament selects a candidate, and the President makes the final appointment. However, this process has stalled at the initial stage. During this parliamentary term, three selection rounds have taken place—all unsuccessful. In the first round, five candidates were proposed, but none received the required 90 votes (a simple majority in the repeat vote). The second round saw just one candidate, who failed to gain sufficient support. The ruling coalition has yet to explain why it has been unable or unwilling to nominate a suitable candidate.

Saturday, May 3, 2025

Chart of the Day: Changes in the Population Size of Slovak Judges over a Decade

I recently thought about how much of constitutional law is ebb and flow, action and reaction. Which is why today I decided to analyse a graph that I have had in my desk drawer for a while. See the waterfall graph of the Slovak judges’ population size between 2011 and 2025 (Figure 1). The graph visually shows staffing shifts in the court system as increases and decreases from the original value. The initial value in the graph is 0, based on the fact that I could not get the exact number of judges in January 2011, but it could be any value. What is important is the pattern created by adding and subtracting from judges’ population over time, and as you can see ebbs and flows. 

The number of judges in Slovakia is affected yearly by four specific events: the appointment of new judges (which adds to the pool), the resignation of retiring judges, their removal, and death (all of which reduce the population). The Ministry of Justice reports each of these events under the “Change Notices” section on its webpage, and it has done so since 2011. 

Thursday, May 1, 2025

Controversial NGO Law Passes through the Slovak Parliament

In April, the Slovak Parliament passed a controversial piece of legislation meant to curb the work and life of NGOs and other civil society organisations.[1] Ostensibly to make their activity more transparent, but in reality, to show force.[2] The ruling coalition made several moves to limit the influence of NGOs and thus stifle public scrutiny of the executive.

Slovakia has a rich history of social movements and a strong civic sector dating back to the early years of the Republic and even before that, the Velvet Revolution.[3] Last year, it was reported that there were approximately 17,000 different non-governmental organisations and groups active in the country.[4] However, Robert Fico’s governments gradually began to view NGOs and civil society organisations antagonistically as potential sources of illegitimate influence and political opposition. As such, they sought to repress them.

We could already see early signs of this in 2018, the year in which the large-scale anti-government protests, following the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová, resulted in PM Fico’s resignation and the collapse of his Cabinet. Fico, at the time, suggested that the protests were organised by NGOs controlled by George Soros—a populist right-wing trope that has been recurring in his speeches even today. He floated the idea of curbing the influence of NGOs briefly before resigning in shame.[5] Fico has been back in power since 2023[6] and seems inclined to move Slovakia more to the right, towards the Hungarian model of illiberal democracy.[7] 

Monday, April 28, 2025

New Code of Conduct for High-Ranking Public Officials in Slovakia?

The Slovak government has introduced a new Code of Conduct for high-ranking public officials.[1] The proposal is not yet effective, but it is nearing the end of the interdepartmental review process, during which various government bodies, NGOs, and the public can provide comments.[2] The government is now considering the submitted comments to determine which ones must be implemented to improve the proposal. If critical comments are impossible to implement, it may even change course by scrapping it altogether.

While the adoption of ethics codes is generally a welcome development in terms of improving the quality of the executive and public service, this particular proposal has attracted criticism for three reasons: it unduly concentrates power under the PM withouth a legal basis, restricts the freedom of association of civil servants and top officials with NGOs, and also highlights the government’s own ethical misgivings. On the last point, as I have written on this blog, it was recently revealed that the Defence Minister in Fico’s Cabinet failed to declare a seaside villa owned by his wife in Croatia, which led to a debate about ethics in government and transparency.[3] 

Tuesday, April 1, 2025

Defence Minister’s Missing Asset Declaration

On the 13th of March, a Slovak newspaper published an investigative article mapping the holiday homes of politicians, influential figures, and oligarchs in a remote Croatian seaside village. It was revealed that the Defence Minister in Fico’s Cabinet and his right-hand man, Rober Kaliňák, had a villa in the destination. Asked about a specific piece of property, he openly admitted to the journalists: 

More than six years ago, my wife purchased the property in question from an elderly Croatian family for €296,000. In fact, it is not a villa, but two apartments. The property is more than 50 years old, so it has undergone renovation. [1]

The point of the article was not necessarily to question the ownership of Kaliňáks’ holiday home. It is known that Kaliňák is a relatively wealthy politician and business owner, but rather the curious fact that the property neighbours other prominent lawyers and lobbyists. On the same day the story broke, however, it became clear that this was a bigger issue than all of the initially involved expected. Within a few hours of the article being published early in the morning, two opposition parties held a press conference, where opposition MP Veronika Remišová, who is the Chairwoman of the Parliamentary Committee on the Incompatibility of Functions, revealed that the Defence Minister failed to declare the seaside villa owned by his wife in Croatia.[2] Within a day, the controversy escalated into a full-blown scandal. 

Thursday, June 16, 2022

Unamendability Preserved in Slovakia, but only as a Last Resort

On January 30, 2019, the Slovak Constitutional Court invalidated a constitutional amendment for breaking the implicit material core of the Constitution. It was a historic first, not only for Slovakia but also for the broader region, as no other European court had previously established the doctrine of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment without textual support in the constitution. This is a critical distinction, because the stickiness of the unamendability doctrine, or any new doctrinal development, depends on domestic normative sources justifying such a development as well as the power of the court, its popular support and the acquiescence of the losing party (often the legislature or executive).

The amending actors in Slovakia did not acquiesce, however, nor did they hesitate to adopt a new constitutional amendment rejecting judicial review of constitutional change in retaliation. The opposition challenged this action, arguing that a judicially enforced doctrine of unamendability is a necessary component of a modern-day liberal democracy.

Then, at the end of May 2022, the Constitutional Court finally had its say. The Court opted for a passive-aggressive approach, issuing what is colloquially known as a quasi-meritorious judgment. The court rejected the petition in a procedural ruling but supplied it with the reasoning that would fit better with a meritorious decision. A quasi-meritorious decision indicates that the Court wants to speak on the subject but cannot for whatever reason. In this case, the Court rejected the petition because the amendment it was supposed to review prevented it from reviewing constitutional amendments.

In the decision, the Courts confirmed its previous position that the Constitution, or at least its core, is unamendable and those core principles may, in the extreme, require judicial protection. The Court continues to maintain that the amending actors are not the absolute sovereign and are, in fact, limited in the exercise of great power by the basic constitutional framework delimited by The People at the moment of founding.

In the view of the Court, the Constitution is not value-neutral: "Although every legal norm is fundamentally changeable and revocable, from the point of view of the Constitution adopted in 1992, the basic principles of a democratic and rule of law (even without such explicit wording) are immutable." These values express the essence of the constitutional law posited by the sovereign (but identified by the Court through its case law), which can be further articulated by the amending actors to the extent that the values are not broken.

The Court held that with the adoption of the constitution, the "unlimited sovereignty of the citizens was transformed into the sovereignty of the state on its territory, exercised by a system of delegated powers." The three delegated powers are limited in competence and ought to be exercised to, among other things, protect democracy from retrogression. So the amending actors can do wrong, but the Court will generally exercise restraint when it comes to constitutional change. The Court accepted that the Court itself is also a limited power, which means that it cannot, in the time of ordinary politics, review a constitutional amendment.

The Court essentially found that, absent extraordinary circumstances, functional judicial review of constitutional change is not part of the material core. In extreme cases, however, of a core violation that has the intensity to change the character of the Slovak Republic as a democratic state based on the principle of the rule of law, the Court must intervene as the "constitutional guardian." If the amending actors were to overreach, the interpretation of the Constitutional Court's own competences would have to be extensively adapted to it to ensure the integrity of the founding document.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “Unamendability Preserved in Slovakia, but only as a Last Resort” (slovakconlaw, 16 June 2022) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2022/06/unamendability-preserved-in-slovakia.html>

Tuesday, May 3, 2022

Three-times Slovak PM Charged in a Criminal Case

It has been more than three years since former PM Robert Fico tried to get appointed to the Constitutional Court,[1] thinking he would be able to either bargain[2] or force his way onto the CC.[3] At the time, he did not seek just to become a rank-and-file constitutional judge. Instead, Fico wanted to be the Court President because he believed that his experience and political capital as a former three-time PM qualified him for the position of leadership in his next career.[4] 

Fico was ultimately forced to withdraw his application[5] due to a controversy over his CV and broad political opposition to his nomination.[6] However, if he did not, we could have been in a situation where the CC President faced criminal prosecution.[7] That is because Robert Fico and his close colleague, former Minister of Interior Robert Kalíňak, were charged last week, and the latter was also detained, for leading an organised crime gang. The police claim that Fico and his co-defendants used their power to discredit opponents, illegally accessing private police and tax records.[8]

Fico has not been yet arrested because he is an MP. Members of Parliament enjoy robust protections and privileges to ensure the free exercise of the political office. For example, MPs cannot be prosecuted for voting on drafts, bills, motions, or any act or speech uttered in Parliament. Moreover, according to Article 78(2) of the Constitution, MPs cannot be taken into custody without the consent of the Parliament. The only exception is if an MP has been caught redhanded while committing a crime. Historically, the Parliament needed to consent also the prosecution of an MP, but a constitutional amendment in 2012[9] changed this only to necessitate parliamentary approval for criminal detention.[10]

 

Consequently, the Parliament should soon vote to either allow Fico's criminal detention or deny the motion, in which case he will be prosecuted without being taken into custody. The parliamentary Mandate and Immunity committee has recommended that MPs approve the prosecution's application for consent with the detention of an MP. However, the committee's opinions are not binding on the Parliament.[11] Even if the MPs vote to approve the application, a court will have finally to determine if the detention of an MP is justified. Whatever the outcome, the criminal prosecution of the former three-times PM will be one of the defining legal cases in the history of the Slovak republic.[12] 


Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “ Three-times Slovak PM Charged in a Criminal Case” (slovakconlaw, 3 May 2022) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2022/05/three-times-slovak-prime-m-charged.html>



[1] "Ex-PM Fico wants to be a Constitutional Court judge" (The Slovak Spectator, 7 January 2019) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22023186/ex-pm-fico-wants-to-be-a-constitutional-court-judge.html>; and

[2] "Constitutional Court hearings: The vote is a political affair, Fico says" (The Slovak Spectator, 23 January 2019) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22036335/constitutional-court-hearings-the-vote-is-a-political-affair-fico-says.html>

[3] "President Kiska: Fico wanted to blackmail me" (The Slovak Spectator, 25 February 2019) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22061262/president-kiska-fico-wanted-to-blackmail-me.html>

[4] TA3, "Ako prebiehalo vypočúvania Fica - kandidáta na ústavného sudcu" (Televízia TA3 YouTube, 12 February 2019) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpGOwjptkUA&ab_channel=TelevíziaTA3>

[5] "Slovakia: Robert Fico renounces bid for Constitutional Court job" (Kafkadesk, 13 February 2019) <https://kafkadesk.org/2019/02/13/slovakia-robert-fico-renounces-bid-for-constitutional-court-job/>

[6] Constitutional Committee, "Živé vysielanie TV NR SR - Vypočutie kandidátov na sudcov Ústavného súdu Slovenskej republiky" (TV NR SR - press live YouTube, 7 February 2019) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fpb1POX_t8w&ab_channel=TVNRSR-presslive>

[7] Two other candidates for CC judges from 2019 have already been prosecuted for corruption. Retrospectively, it seems that the position attracted some in bad faith.

[8] William Nattrass, "Is Slovakia a mafia state?" (The Spectator, 26 April 2022) <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/is-slovakia-a-mafia-state->

[9] Constitutional Act No 232/2012 Coll. Accessible at: <https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2012/232/20120901.html>

[10] Beata Balogová, "Parties agree to end MPs' immunity" (21 May 2012) (The Slovak Spectator, 21 May 2012) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20043457/parties-agree-to-end-mps-immunity.html>

[11] Nina Hrabovská Francelová, "Even with Fico in custody, Smer may retain popular support" (The Slovak Spectator, 28 April 2022) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22896574/parliament-debates-whether-to-allow-ficos-arrest.html>

[12] There is a precedent for the vote of the Parlaiemnt to allow the criminal, at the time, prosecution of an MP. In 1998, the Parliament consented to the prosecution of Ivan Lexa, who was implicated in the abduction of Michal Kováč Jr., the son of the former Slovak President. For context, see Ľuba Lesná, "Lexa wins case in Human Rights Court" (The Slovak Spectator, 29 September 2009) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20030535/lexa-wins-case-in-human-rights-court.html>