Chart of the Day: Changes in the Population Size of Slovak Judges over a Decade

I recently thought about how much of constitutional law is ebb and flow, action and reaction. Which is why today I decided to analyse a graph that I have had in my desk drawer for a while. See the waterfall graph of the Slovak judges’ population size between 2011 and 2025 (Figure 1). The graph visually shows staffing shifts in the court system as increases and decreases from the original value. The initial value in the graph is 0, based on the fact that I could not get the exact number of judges in January 2011, but it could be any value. What is important is the pattern created by adding and subtracting from judges’ population over time, and as you can see ebbs and flows. 

The number of judges in Slovakia is affected yearly by four specific events: the appointment of new judges (which adds to the pool), the resignation of retiring judges, their removal, and death (all of which reduce the population). The Ministry of Justice reports each of these events under the “Change Notices” section on its webpage, and it has done so since 2011. 

I had initially collected the data from the notice section of the MOJ website to create a small dataset to see if I could learn something about the population size of Slovak judges. I was hoping to see if we could, for example, observe growing interest in the judicial office, which would be observable by a gradual, steady increase in judges’ population (subject to the court system’s capacity). Alternatively, I was interested in whether the politicisation of the judiciary resulted in the decline of interest in the job. Finally, I wanted to see if we could see large fluctuations in the size of the population around important parliamentary elections that could spell uncertainty for the judiciary because of new policies aimed at regulating the court system (think background checks for judges, asset declaration, etc). 

What I found after collecting the data was interesting. I then switched to analysing the data inductively (from the data to a hypothesis), although my general understanding of judicial studies and Slovak constitutional politics informed the process.

According to the Ministry, there were 1415 active judges in Slovakia at the time of writing this blog, just 23 more judges than in 2011. The data from the notice registry shows that this population has been remarkably stable, with the largest negative deviation from the mean of over 80 in late 2020 to early 2021 and the largest positive deviation of 60 in early 2019. Over the last 14 years, there has been only a modest net growth. We can observe that the judges’ population experienced two major declines in 2015-2016 and 2020-2021 (highlighted in light red), followed by a gradual return to levels of court staffing matching or exceeding values before the dip. These episodes of decline were rapid and indicate some coordinated behaviour of judges leaving or an external shock. 

Initially, I thought the first episode could have been a delayed response to the implementation of the background checks for judges in October 2015.[1] Adopted in 2014, the background checks were also meant to cover sitting judges. The new screening mechanism could have caused uncertainty, which resulted in some judges deciding to step down to avoid the unnecessary burden of the office. However, the implementation of the background checks for sitting judges was suspended pending the Constitutional Court’s review of the mechanism, so I decided to check for alternative explanations.

Elections could be an alternative explanation and potentially explain the second episode of deep population decline in 2020-2021 as well. General elections were held in Slovakia in 2016 and 2020, which, at least in the latter case, resulted in the most significant government shift in a decade.[2] Not to mention the largest anti-corruption police operations targeting judges that followed shortly.[3] This was a change that could bring about peak uncertainty and result in large population shifts.

To check the validity of this explanation, or the validity of the initial assumption about the cause of population decline being the fear of background checks, I tried to assess what portion of the decline could be attributed to resignations (indicating a choice by the judges) instead of removals from office. Looking at the data more granularly, it became clear that I was wrong.  Most judges in both decline episodes did not leave of their own volition, but were removed from office due to old age. This was still an interesting finding because, assuming a random distribution of retiring judges, there should not be large clusters of retirees concentrated in such short time frames. What happened is that politics did play a role, but it was the internal judicial politics.

In both episodes of decline, the President at the time removed a large number of judges from office due to old age.[4] Prior to a constitutional change in 2021, judges in Slovakia did not leave office automatically upon reaching retirement age; they had to be removed by the head of state based on the proposal by the Judicial Council. In constitutional law, however, there has been disagreement on whether the Council and the President must or can remove judges following their retirement age. The Constitution currently provides in Article 146(2) that a judge’s office ceases on the last day of the month when the judge reaches the age of 67. Before the constitutional reform in 2021, Article 147(2)b set the age at which the President “may” dismiss a judge at 65. This led to irregular removal and claims of discrimination or selective enforcement of judges’ retirement.

In 2016, mid-term, President Kiska expressed his intention to begin actively retiring judges as a part of a push for a generational change in the judiciary. At the time, there was a backlog of over a hundred judges who remained in office despite being over 65.[5] Kiska criticised the other political actors for not addressing the issue of ageing judges, effectively allowing them to remain in office indefinitely, which some viewed as contributing to stagnation and a lack of reform in the judiciary. After the backlog was cleared, President Kiska continued to appoint over a hundred judges over the next two years, pushing their population size to its peak in mid-2019.[6]

Fast-forward four years, the then-head of the Judicial Council, Ján Mazák, criticised again the selective nature of past decisions regarding the dismissal of judges who had reached retirement age and the backlog of judges who had been in office past their retirement age. He argued that failing to propose the dismissal of some judges while not others amounted to discrimination. The Judicial Council adopted the view that it was obligated to submit all cases of judges past their retirement who were overstaying in office to the President, who then could decide whether to dismiss them or not, depending on the circumstances of individual courts (to avoid staff shortage).[7] In the Council’s view, this was the proper constitutional process to ensure regular renewal of the judiciary.

President-elect Čaputová, like President Kiska before her, exercised the power to remove judges actively, bringing the judges’ population size from its peak to its macro low in early 2021. And then, like her predecessor, President Čaputová appointed over a hundred judges in the next three years of her office to return the population to the level before the dip.

Now, coming back to my initial interest in this chart, the data does not suggest the idea that politicisation has driven lawyers away from judicial office, since the fluctuations were not primarily due to a drop in interest or voluntary resignations. While sharp declines in the judge population did coincide with election years, closer examination shows that if politics affected judges’ population size, it was the internal judicial corps politics of irregularly extending the office of judges post-retirement. And the two big declines were caused by coordinated efforts to enforce age-based retirements in response to the backlog of overdue dismissals. The key drivers of change, then, were not bottom-up shifts in interest or top-down political interference, but the constitutional and administrative practices surrounding judicial retirement. 

What will likely happen now is that the Slovak judges’ population size will either trend to the original value in 2011, which seems to be the equilibrium point, or if there are some changes in the organisation of the judiciary, such as the creation of new courts that need staffing, it should find a new equilibrium. Since the new retirement mechanism does not require the President and the Judicial Council to act, there should be no more backlogs and thus dramatic dips in the number of judges. Instead, the population will gradually renew as some judges retire and new ones are hired.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “Chart of the Day: Changes in the Population Size of Slovak Judges over a Decade” (slovakconlaw, 3 May 2025) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2025/05/httpsslovakconlaw.blogspot.com202505changes-in-population-size-of-slovakjudges.html.html>

---

[1] “New security clearances for judges implemented” (The Slovak Spectator, 2 October 2015) <https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/new-security-clearances-for-judges-implemented>; and Simon Drugda, “Slovak Constitutional Court Strikes Down a Constitutional Amendment—But the Amendment Remains Valid” (I·CONnect, 25 April 2019) <https://www.iconnectblog.com/slovak-constitutional-court-strikes-down-a-constitutional-amendment-but-the-amendment-remains-valid/>

[2] Miroslava German Sirotnikova and Marc Santora, “Governing Party in Slovakia Suffers Decisive Election Defeat” (The New York Times, 1 March 2020) <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/world/europe/slovakia-election.html>

[3] “Miroslava German Sirotnikova, Democracy Digest: Slovakia’s Political and Judicial ‘Storm’” (Balkan Insight – Reporting Democracy, 13 March 2020) <https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/13/democracy-digest-slovakias-political-and-judicial-storm/>

[4] “Prezident odvolal ďalších sudcov” (najprávo.sk, 23 March 2016) <https://www.najpravo.sk/clanky/prezident-odvolal-dalsich-sudcov.html>; “Kiska odvolal 47 sudcov, dosiahli vek 65 rokov” (SME, 13 May 2016) <https://domov.sme.sk/c/20162680/kiska-odvolal-47-sudcov-dosiahli-vek-65-rokov.html>; and “Prezidentka odvolá z funkcie zatiaľ 63 sudcov nad 65 rokov” (aktuality.sk, 30 March 2021) <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/827919/prezidentka-odvola-z-funkcie-zatial-63-sudcov-nad-65-rokov/#google_vignette>

[5] “Prezident SR zaslal odvolací dekrét 14 sudcom” (najprávo.sk, 10 January 2016) <https://www.najpravo.sk/clanky/prezident-sr-zaslal-odvolaci-dekret-14-sudcom.html>

[6] “Prezident Kiska počas svojho mandátu vymenoval stovky sudcov, povýšil tiež desiatky vojakov” (SITA, 14 June 2019) <https://sita.sk/prezident-kiska-pocas-svojho-mandatu-vymenoval-stovky-sudcov-povysil-tiez-desiatky-vojakov/>

[7] “Súdna rada žiada odvolanie všetkých sudcov v dôchodkovom veku” (SME, 22 September 2020) <https://domov.sme.sk/c/22493644/sudna-rada-navrhuje-prezidentke-odvolat-z-funkcie-sudcov-v-dochodkovom-veku.html>

Controversial NGO Law Passes through the Slovak Parliament

In April, the Slovak Parliament passed a controversial piece of legislation meant to curb the work and life of NGOs and other civil society organisations.[1] Ostensibly to make their activity more transparent, but in reality, to show force.[2] The ruling coalition made several moves to limit the influence of NGOs and thus stifle public scrutiny of the executive.

Slovakia has a rich history of social movements and a strong civic sector dating back to the early years of the Republic and even before that, the Velvet Revolution.[3] Last year, it was reported that there were approximately 17,000 different non-governmental organisations and groups active in the country.[4] However, Robert Fico’s governments gradually began to view NGOs and civil society organisations antagonistically as potential sources of illegitimate influence and political opposition. As such, they sought to repress them.

We could already see early signs of this in 2018, the year in which the large-scale anti-government protests, following the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová, resulted in PM Fico’s resignation and the collapse of his Cabinet. Fico, at the time, suggested that the protests were organised by NGOs controlled by George Soros—a populist right-wing trope that has been recurring in his speeches even today. He floated the idea of curbing the influence of NGOs briefly before resigning in shame.[5] Fico has been back in power since 2023[6] and seems inclined to move Slovakia more to the right, towards the Hungarian model of illiberal democracy.[7] 

The Parliament discussed the proposal to amend Act No 213/1997 Coll. on Non-Profit Organisations Providing Generally Beneficial Services (NGO Act) until late at night on April 16, with emotions running high on both sides of the floor.[8] The opposition has tried unsuccessfully to delay the legislative process, but the government coalition majority voted to cut the debate short and finally pass the amendment that has been hanging over civil society like the proverbial sword of Damocles for more than a year into law.

But how did we get here? In this blog, I first chart the genesis of the amendments to the NGO Act and then critically examine its main pain points.

Lost in the Shuffle: The Process

Part of the controversy surrounding the changes to the NGO Act concerns the level of scrutiny afforded to the bill, and by extension, its quality. The bill amending and supplementing the NGO Act has been introduced to the Parliament by a group of MPS, and as such, it is a private member bill, which is excluded from the intergovernmental commentary and review process that government-initiated bills receive.

Government bills, or sometimes other types of policy documents, undergo review and comments from other ministries, relevant state institutions, and civil society before being formally approved and submitted to Parliament.[9] The review process helps prevent conflicting rules, clarifies legal and policy overlaps, and ideally improves both the substance and formal coherence of a legislative proposal.

Private member bills, on the other hand, enjoy more direct access to the legislative process, which has both its pros and cons. Enabling individual members of parliament to propose laws is a key democratic principle. It prevents the executive branch from having a monopoly on the legislative agenda and promotes the separation of powers, as well as pluralism in lawmaking. The individual initiative guarantees the right of MPs to bring forward legislative proposals that reflect the needs or requests of their constituents (regional or political), even if they were to conflict with the government programme.

These bills, however, face relatively less scrutiny, albeit for good reasons. Private member bills still need to pass the review by the relevant parliamentary committee, and their fellow MPs in the Parliament, but not having to consult other relevant stakeholders accelerate the process somewhat and makes it, potentially, alienating to the public because it does not allow civil society to articulate its view on the legislation easily. The director of the prominent rule-of-law Slovak NGO Via Iuris, Katarína Batková, has for example stated that the absence of the intergovernmental review process contributed to the fact that the government coalition and civil society organisations had to debate/spar in legacy and social media, because there was no suitable avenue for them to comment on the proposal instead.[10]

Another problem of the process were the amending motions to the bill, by which it was made and remade almost entirely since its submission to the Parliament. The bill was first introduced to the Parliament in April last year, but after intense public criticism, it was shelved and only recently returned to the legislative process.[11] While the bill has been shelved, its contents have changed dramatically based on an amendment proposal by the Constitutional Committee and then again at the last minute on the day of the second reading after a junior coalition member amended the proposal again just before the Parliament opened for business.[12] Opposition MP Ondrej Dostál has shared an image on social media, visualising how dramatically the text of the bill changed with every iteration: deleted text in red, added text in green, and what remains from the original proposal in light blue.[13]

The lack of prior consultation with stakeholders and the public, as well as sudden changes to the amendment during the legislative process, have limited the participatory nature of the process, which should be a requirement if the intended target of the change is the public’s right to associate freely. In this context, the Venice Commission had previously stated in its Guidelines on Freedom of Association that legal provisions concerning associations should be “adopted through a broad, inclusive and participatory process, to ensure that all parties concerned are committed to their content.”[14]

We The People: Foreign Agents and Lobbyists

When it comes to the substance, a major point of contention in the proposal had been the labelling of civil society organisations that would receive foreign funds above a set threshold as a “foreign-supported organisation” or “foreign agent” in common parlance.[15] This problematic designation has changed in the second iteration of the bill to the label of “lobbyist.”[16] The amendment was intended to require organisations that directly or indirectly influence politicians to label themselves as lobbyists. It also foresaw the adoption of an Act on Lobbying that would later detail what qualified as lobbying and define the term. Organisations were to self-declare their lobbying, subject to administrative review, and indicate it on all materials they produce.

The suspected inspiration for the original proposal was the Hungarian 2017 law on foreign-funded NGOs.[17] Which was repealed four years later, in 2021, after the EU issued a formal notice against the country, for failing to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, for discriminating donations from abroad to civil society organisations, as well as the freedom of association and the right to private life.[18]

The Court of Justice of the European Union found the law lacking a legitimate justification and infringing on Article 12 of the EU Charter, freedom of association, and Articles 7 and 8 on the right to private life and protection of personal data because the law forces public disclosure of donors’ identities without sufficient safeguards. The Court also held that the law breached Article 63 TFEU by treating cross‑border donations differently from domestic ones, deterring foreign donors and creating a climate of distrust toward affected NGOs. Such differential treatment violated Article 63 on free movement of capital.[19]

The original Slovak proposal to amend the NGO Act mirrored the Hungarian law by requiring NGOs that received foreign donor funding to register and add the label “foreign-supported organisation” to all their publications, websites, and press materials, while also providing officials with detailed donor data. However, this changed again on the day of the second reading, as the bill’s final version and the one that was ultimately adopted no longer included the lobbyist or foreign agent labels. It is likely that the parliamentarians were made aware of the potential conflict with EU law and changed course to avoid open confrontation with the Commission.

The scope character of the changes to the NGO Act during the legislative process indicates that the government coalition has not adequately considered the potential conflict with EU law or the European Convention on Human Rights. Only when alerted did it decide to remove the clear breaches, such as the labelling requirement for “political” NGOs as foreign agents or lobbyists. There is a risk that the haste with which the amendment has been formulated and reformulated in the last sprint could have also resulted in other conflicts or simply errors that are less obvious and might not have been flagged. Legislation affecting freedom of association should be well crafted, “clear, precise and certain.”[20]

Donor Lists, Democracy, and Distrust

The second contentious element of the legislation has been the requirement of extensive financial disclosures by NGOs and other civil society organisations. These organisations must list all their contributions above a certain threshold, depending on the organisation type, and income in annual reports, including donor identities. Specifically, the details include the full name of private donors whose total contributions exceed €5,000 within a calendar year. And for legal entities, information including their business name, identification number, and registered office address, regardless of the donation amount, must always be disclosed. This can pose privacy and security issues for donors who may be reluctant to see their names publicly linked to particular causes, thus contributing to the chilling effect of the law on civil society and the right to associate.

The chilling effect refers to the phenomenon where rights holders refrain from exercising their rights due to fear of legal sanctions, state surveillance, disproportionate regulation, or other indirect pressure. NGO representatives have articulated a concern that the publication of donor lists might decrease the ability of civil society organisations that rely on private donations, membership fees and other self-financing to fund their activity at a time when the state is cutting costs on grants and aid. Donors might fear surveillance or reputational harm in this charged political climate and thus forgo donating to NGOs.

In the case of the Hungarian 2017 law on foreign-funded NGOs, the CJEU considered the law’s impact on donors to the targeted civil society organisations. The Court primarily examined the issue in the context of discrimination against foreign donors, who were also the original target in the case of the amendment to the NGO Act in Slovakia, but the rationale can be generalised and applied to donors irrespective of their domicile.[21]

CJEU held that the publication requirement on received gifts may have a deterrent effect on the participation of donors in the financing of civil society organisations and is of such nature “of such a nature as to create a generalised climate of mistrust vis-à-vis the associations and foundations […] and to stigmatise them.”[22] In articulating this opinion, the Court referred to the opinion of the Advocate General, who went even further:

[M]ay deter potential donors, with the consequent reduction in their gifts to associations. No matter how small it may be, that effect can still be significant as regards the finances of civil society organisations which tend to rely on donations from their members and supporters (some of these organisations also turn the refusal of all public funding into a point of principle, in order to retain their independence).[23]

The Court did qualify this statement by noting that some civil society organisations have a significant influence on public life and debate, and as such, transparency in “respect of the financial support granted to such organisations may also constitute an overriding reason in the public interest.” Although the Court primarily noted this in the context of donations from third-party states.[24]

Administrative Burden and Available Alternatives

This brings us to the third and final point of criticism: Why increase the administrative burden on civil society organisations when they already have to pass annual audits? The Parliament has articulated throughout this episode that it is acting in the interest of transparency. But civil society organisations already had, prior to this change, the obligation to publish their accounts in an annual report under Article 33 of the NGO Act.

And provided they had either received income from public funds or income from tax deductions exceeding 200,000 EUR, or their income overall, including self-financing, exceeded half a million euros. In such cases, the accounts had to be audited under Article 33(3) of the NGO Act. These obligations remain, but according to the new rules, NGOs must also produce an additional statement. These additional declarations rules increase the burden, especially on small organisations, not to mention that the amendment to the Act also steeply increased penalties for delay and breaches of the publication requirements, both of the annual accounts and the newly introduced donor statement.

Which brings us to fines. According the prior rules, civil society organisations with the obligation to submit audited accounts under Article 33(3) could be fined for up to 1,000 EUR, but even in those cases the regulator had the discretion to adjust the fine to consider “seriousness, duration, and consequence” (Article 34(a)) of the breach of the statutory duty. The new NGO Act has extended these fines to almost all CSOs that fail to comply with the publication and disclosure requirements, not only the civil society organisations with an income exceeding 200,000 EUR.

Moreover, the Act also provides a fine for failing to submit the new “donor statements.” A fine that starts with a one-time charge of up to 1,000 EUR, but if the violation is not remedied within 30 days after the fine becomes enforceable, an additional fine may be imposed repeatedly, each time up to ten times the original maximum amount, with a minimum fine of 5,000 EUR from the third instance onwards. On top of that, if the submitted statement is erroneous or missing requisite data, an NGO can again face sanctions. If the NGO fails to correct the issues, it can again be fined up to 1,000 EUR, and an additional fine may again be imposed, each time up to ten times the original maximum amount, with a statutory minimum set at 5,000 EUR from the third instance onwards.

The regulator still retains the discretion to assess the size of the fine within the statutory maximum and minimum. Still, the steep ramping up of sanctions compared to the earlier fine structure is worrying. Where before there was a single fine for high-income organisations, there are now three distinct fines for failure to publish annual accounts, a donor statement and for submitting an erroneous statement. While the base sanctions are not necessarily high, if we were to assess them by the methodology used by the ECtHR in Ecodefence, namely the assessment of the fine in comparison to the minimum monthly salary,[25] the increase in complexity and magnitude could also invite review in terms of proportionality.

What next?

The opposition parties have already signalled their intention to challenge the change to the NGO Act, provided that the President does not veto it first.[26] The largest opposition party, Progressive Slovakia,[27] currently leading polls, challenges the main government party, SMER, on all fronts and is ready to capitalise on any weakness.[28] This is good for Slovak constitutional politics because the current President is a former SMER politician and thus shares much of the party’s persuasions, even though he has recently challenged Fico on several occasions.[29] The amendment, or some of its various iterations, have also been criticised by the Ombudsman and EU institutions.[30]

But even if the new NGO Act is likely to be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, the real intention behind the law might not be to actually effect the change but to distract civil society from effective government scrutiny. And if that is the case, the law might have already achieved its purpose. Many NGOs are now, understandably, focused on changes to the NGO Act and have to allocate resources to fighting it.

To conclude, the passage of Slovakia’s amended NGO Act represents a textbook case of how procedural irregularities, substantive overreach, and political intent converge to test the limits of liberal constitutionalism in a democratic system. Substantively, while the Slovak government has retreated from overtly labelling NGOs as “foreign agents,” the administrative burden and potential sanctions imposed by the Act remain capable of chilling civic engagement.

Moreover, this new NGO Act is not the cause of the worry, or at least not only. In my view, it is a symptom—part of a broader pattern of what could be called “democratic backsliding,” or using the tools of law and procedure not to protect democracy but to chip away at it slowly. The concern with the new NGO Act is not only its immediate impact but also the normalisation of adversarial governance toward civil society and the precedent it sets for sidelining democratic safeguards.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “Slovakia’s Controversial NGO Law Passes through the Parliament” (slovakconlaw, 1 May 2025) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2025/05/httpsslovakconlaw.blogspot.com202505controversial-slovak-ngo-law-passes.html.html>

---

[1] Nina Janešíková, “Zákon o mimovládkach prešiel, jeho obsah nik nevysvetlil. 'Geniálne, pomohli ste nám,' reagujú združenia kritické voči vláde” (Denník N, 16 April 2025) <https://dennikn.sk/4587683/zakon-o-mimovladkach-presiel-jeho-obsah-nik-nevysvetlil-genialne-pomohli-ste-nam-reaguju-zdruzenia-kriticke-voci-vlade/>; and Chiara Bachels, “Slovakia passes law on NGOs amid criticism” (DW, 17 April 2025) <https://www.dw.com/en/slovakia-passes-law-on-ngos-amid-criticism/a-72268853>

[2] For example, the government took away the right of NGOs to select their representatives to monitor EU funds under the “partnership principle” that requires the involvement of all relevant stakeholders, including NGOs, in decisions about Union funding. Marián Koreň and Natália Silenská, “Slovakia to change rules on NGO involvement in monitoring EU funds” (EURACTIVE.sk, 21 August 2024) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/slovakia-to-change-rules-on-ngo-involvement-in-monitoring-eu-funds/>

[3] Following the Fall of Communism, the civic sector experienced rapid growth with almost 6,000 registered non-governmental organisations in 1993, some 9,800 groups and organisations in 1994, and “by year 1996 there were already more than 12,000 NGOs.” See generally, Boris Strečanský, “Civil Society in Slovakia” in Christian Schreier (ed) 25 Years After. Mapping Civil Society in the Visegrád Countries (Lucius Verlagsgesselschaft mbH 2015) <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299453233_Civil_Society_in_Slovakia>; and Gabriela Vaceková and Mária Svidroňová, “The Non-Government Organizations in Slovakia and Austria and the Current State of Their Self-Financing” (2013) Working Paper KVE–06/2013, 7

[4] “Na Slovensku pôsobí 17 tisíc mimovládnych organizácií” (SME, 7 October 2002) <https://domov.sme.sk/c/687747/na-slovensku-posobi-17-tisic-mimovladnych-organizacii.html>

[5] Radoslav Tomek and Peter Laca, “Slovak Premier Sees Soros Behind Plan to Topple His Government” (Bloomberg, 6 March 2018) <https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2018-03-06/slovak-premier-sees-soros-behind-plan-to-topple-his-government>; and “News digest: Fico sees coup plot behind protests, but Slovaks take to the streets anyway” (The Slovak Spectator, 23 January 2025) <https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/news-digest-fico-sees-coup-plot-behind-protests-but-slovaks-take-to-the-streets-anyway>

[6] Jean-Baptiste Chastand, “Result of Slovakia's presidential election asserts the country's pro-Russian shift” (Le Monde, 8 April 2023) <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/04/08/slovakia-peter-pellegrini-s-presidential-victory-affirms-government-s-pro-russian-shift_6667684_4.html>

[7] On Hungary see generally, András L Pap, Democratic Decline in Hungary Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy (2018 Routledge)

[8] Including personal insults, conspiracy theories about Slovak NGOs being controlled by George Soros, and otherwise charged language. The proceedings of the parliamentary session can be viewed online on the Parliament’s official website, accessible at: <https://tv.nrsr.sk/archiv/schodza/9/33?id=341732>

[9] Under Act No 400/2015 Coll. on the Drafting of Legislation and on the Collection of Laws of the Slovak Republic

[10] “Batková z Via Iuris: Vláda chce zastrašiť aktívnych občanov, aby ju nekritizovali” (Denník N YouTube, 8 April 2025) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=psi5cMxwJJM&ab_channel=DenníkN>

[11] "Slovakia: Anti-NGO law a full-frontal assault on civil society" (Amnesty International, 30 April 2025) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/slovakia-anti-ngo-law-a-full-frontal-assault-on-civil-society/>; and "The Hidden Agenda: How Slovakia’s Anti-NGO Law Seeks to Silence Civil Society" (Slovak Media Monitor, 27 Nvoember 2024) <https://slovakmonitor.com/the-hidden-agenda-how-slovakias-anti-ngo-law-seeks-to-silence-civil-society/>

[12] The legislative proposal with amendments and explanatory memorandum can be accessed at: <https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Default.aspx?sid=zakony/zakon&MasterID=9699>

[13] "Prehľadný vizuál: ako koalícia úplne prekopala zákon o mimovládkach" (Denník N, 16 April 2025) <https://dennikn.sk/minuta/4587967/?ref=mpm>

[14] European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), Joint Guidelines on Freedom of Association (CDL-AD(2014)046, Study no 706/2012, adopted at 101st Plenary Session, 12–13 December 2014) para 22

[15] Agapi Antonaki, “SLOVAKIA: NGO draft law stigmatises CSOs, mirroring Hungary’s path” (Civic Space Watch, 13 June 2024) <https://civicspacewatch.eu/slovakia-ngo-draft-law-stigmatises-csos-mirroring-hungarys-path/>

[16] Iryna Uias, “News digest: SNS switches from 'foreign-funded' label for NGOs to lobbying regulation” (The Slovak Spectator, 22 November 2024) <https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/news-digest-sns-switches-from-foreign-funded-label-for-ngos-to-lobbying-regulation>

[17] Although laws with similar subject matter have been spreading across the region. Natika Kantaria, “Spread of 'foreign agent' laws in Central, Eastern Europe a growing threat to civil society” (International Service for Human Rights, 26 February 2025) <https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/spread-of-foreign-agent-laws-in-eastern-europe-pose-increasing-threats-to-civil-society/>

[18] “INFRINGEMENTS - Hungary: Commission launches infringement procedure for law on foreign-funded NGOs” (European Commission, 13 July 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_17_1982>; and “Infringements -European Commission refers Hungary to the Court of Justice for its NGO Law” (European Commission, 7 December 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_17_5003>

[19] Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations) (Case C‑78/18) EU:C:2020:476 (Grand Chamber, 18 June 2020); Court of Justice of the European Union, “The restrictions imposed by Hungary on the financing of civil organisations by persons established outside that Member State do not comply with EU law” Press Release No 73/20 (18 June 2020) <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_3078308/en/>

[20] Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR, Joint Guidelines on Freedom of Association (n14) para 22.

[21] With the caveat that foreign donors have limited means to engage in politics other than donations. For domestic donors, there will obviously be other avenues of political expression, so the constraint diminishes somewhat.

[22] Commission v Hungary (C-78/18), para 118

[23] Case C-78/18 Commission v Hungary EU:C:2020:14, Opinion of AG Sánchez-Bordona, para 121

[24] Commission v Hungary (C-78/18), paras 79-80

[25] While the base sanctions are not necessarily high, if we were to assess them by the methodology used by the ECtHR in Ecodefence and Others v Russia (2022) App nos 9988/13 and 60 others, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2022:0614JUD000998813, Judgment of 14 June 2022, para 181.

[26] “Newsletter: Bič na mimovládky pošleme na ústavný súd, ponúkame hlasy na zrušenie hlúpej dane” (Progresívne Slovensko, 22 April 2025) <https://progresivne.sk/newsletter-bic-na-mimovladky-posleme-na-ustavny-sud-ponukame-hlasy-na-zrusenie-hlupej-dane/>

[27] Earlier versions of the amendment to the NGO Act have been also criticize by Christian Democrats, who also expressed intent to challenge the legislation in court. “KDH ostro kritizuje zákon o mimovládkach” (Denník N, 8 April 2025) <https://dennikn.sk/minuta/4571199/?ref=mpm>

[28] “Fico in trouble? Smer losing its most loyal voters, polls reveal” (The Slovak Spectotor, 10 February 2025) <https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/fico-in-trouble-smer-losing-its-most-loyal-voters-polls-reveal>

[29] “President Vetoes Life Annuity for PG, Wants It Scrapped or Adjusted” (TASR, 16 April 2025) <https://etasr.sk/article/21956628>; and “President Pellegrini vetoes bill on so-called COVID amnesties” (STVR, 28 April 2025) <https://enrsi.stvr.sk/articles/news/400400/president-pellegrini-vetoes-bill-on-so-called-covid-amnesties>

[30] “Verejný ochranca práv listom vyzval poslancov, aby neprijali zákon o mimovládkach v súčasnej podobe” (Denník N, 14 April 2025) <https://dennikn.sk/minuta/4582410/?ref=mpm>; and Tom Nicholson, “Slovakia chided for ‘chilling effect’ of changes to NGO, public media laws” (Politico, 14 May 2024) <https://www.politico.eu/article/commissioner-upbraids-slovakia-on-changes-to-ngo-public-media-laws-robert-fico/>

New Code of Conduct for High-Ranking Public Officials in Slovakia?

The Slovak government has introduced a new Code of Conduct for high-ranking public officials.[1] The proposal is not yet effective, but it is nearing the end of the interdepartmental review process, during which various government bodies, NGOs, and the public can provide comments.[2] The government is now considering the submitted comments to determine which ones must be implemented to improve the proposal. If critical comments are impossible to implement, it may even change course by scrapping it altogether.

While the adoption of ethics codes is generally a welcome development in terms of improving the quality of the executive and public service, this particular proposal has attracted criticism for three reasons: it unduly concentrates power under the PM withouth a legal basis, restricts the freedom of association of civil servants and top officials with NGOs, and also highlights the government’s own ethical misgivings. On the last point, as I have written on this blog, it was recently revealed that the Defence Minister in Fico’s Cabinet failed to declare a seaside villa owned by his wife in Croatia, which led to a debate about ethics in government and transparency.[3] 

Aside from articulating ethical standards, the proposed Code of Conduct also has a substantive component, by proscribing official conduct with a focus on inclusivity and respect for minorities, but also more curious principles, such as a respect for the “Cyril and Methodius spiritual heritage” and the “history, culture, and traditions” of the Slovak Republic, which the public official ought to commit to and develop while in office. Including these ideological formulations is an interesting choice, but I will not discuss them further in this blog in the interest of space. With that in mind, this post critically examines the proposed Code of Conduct and its key concerns.

Two-Faced Ethics

Ostensibly, the Code represents an attempt by the government to strengthen public trust in state institutions and make good on the policy commitments outlined in its 2023-2027 Program Statement, which identified “prevention of corruption, public sector integrity, and transparency” as one of the key areas to work on during its mandate.[4] Trust in institutions in Slovakia has been eroding over the years, so, understandably, the government would seek to remedy it. [5]

If adopted, the Code would be a government resolution articulating standards for ethical behaviour, fact-based governance, and the avoidance of conflict of interest. In its current form, the Code resembles a soft law or non-binding instrument, as it does not do much to determine sanctions for breaches. As a result, there is always a risk that the Code’s provisions may remain purely aspirational without a clear deterrent for non-compliance.[6]

Relying on moral persuasion alone can be problematic, especially in a political context where breaches of ethical standards have historically not been monitored or sanctioned. This dynamic may undercut the Code’s declared aim of strengthening public trust, as citizens may remain sceptical when ethics rules are not backed by tangible enforcement mechanisms.

Going back to the case of undeclared assets by the Minister of Defence, he has, for example, argued that it was in the higher interest of his family’s privacy not to declare. He may receive a fine for the nondisclosure, but what is interesting is that he has not been publicly criticised by the PM or any of the coalition members. On the contrary, the government has refused suggestions that the Minister’s avoidance of the law may lead by example and invite members of the public to shirk their legal obligations. The Minister’s insistence on the justifiability of his action thus reveals a second face of the government; one that suggests the push to enhance ethics and transparency of public office is not authentic.

Concentration of Interpretive Authority

A related source of controversy is the Prime Minister’s role in reviewing compliance with the Code, as “the final arbiter of the standards of conduct expected of individuals in high executive positions.” Vesting the interpretive power in the PM might, on one hand, foster high-level political accountability. On the other hand, this arrangement makes the Code vulnerable to politicisation. If a high-ranking official appointed by the PM were to face controversy for ethical lapses, for example, there may be an inherent conflict of interest when the PM would be charged with reviewing the misconduct.

Additionally, the Code assumes that the high-ranking official would stay in office, conditional on the PM’s holding trust in them, which is expressly contrary to the law and the Constitution.[7] The Code is meant to apply to “persons” in high executive positions, including members of the government, heads of central state administration bodies, state secretaries, and even political advisors. The PM already has the authority to discipline some of these subjects (i.e. cabinet ministers, by proposing their removal from office under Article 116(4) of the Constitution—Act No 460/1992 Coll.), but the Code would extend his authority without a legal basis to all others, like the Antimonopoly Office, which is an independent regulatory body of the fourth branch of government, or even political advisors who should only be accountable to the recipient of the advice and not the PM.

The Antimonopoly Office, as a central state administrative body, commented on the proposal during the interdepartmental review process and objected to the government by highlighting the EU Directive 2019/1,[8] which strengthens the powers of national competition authorities. The Directive requires the Antimonopoly Office (and similar bodies) to act independently of political influence. Article 4(3) of the Directive ensures that competition authorities are free from external interference. This rule has also been transposed into domestic law (Act No 187/2021 Coll. on Protection of Competition). The introduction of the Prime Minister’s discretion to somehow remove the head of the Antimonopoly Office would thus violate this requirement under both Slovak and EU law.[9]

Restriction of Political Rights

Finally, in a controversial section, the Code provides that public officials should not associate with NGOs or civil society groups whose aims or activities could “conflict with the Government’s Program Statement” and thereby might be perceived as “illegitimate influence” and undermine the trust “in adherence to the public interest exclusively.” [10]

Discounting the fact that the Code of Conduct views the government Program as the sole and determinative statement of what is in the public interest,[11] the concern with the provision is that it limits individuals’ rights to freely associate and participate in public life. The Code’s provisions could discourage public officials from engaging with civil society. By restricting public officials’ association with groups and organisations that may not align with government priorities, the Code thus undermines the participatory nature of democracy and the public sphere. It could have a chilling effect on the life and work of NGOs.

Slovakia has a rich historical tradition of civil organisation representatives transitioning into (and influencing) politics, and sometimes back again. After the fall of communism in 1989 and certainly in Slovakia’s formative years as an independent republic since 1993, civil society organisations were crucial.[12] They often filled gaps left by weak state institutions and advocated for democracy, transparency, human rights, and liberal values. The current government, however, views NGOs and civil society organisations antagonistically as potential sources of illegitimate influence and seeks to repress their activity. This is evident from some legislative initiatives, such as the recently passed amendment to Act No 213/1997 Coll. on Non-Profit Organisations Providing Generally Beneficial Services (NGO Act), or this Code of Conduct.[13]

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “New Code of Conduct for High-Ranking Public Officials in Slovakia?” (slovakconlaw, 28 April 2025) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2025/04/httpsslovakconlaw.blogspot.com202504new-code-of-conduct-for-top-officials.html.html>

---

[1] Nina Janešíková, “Vznikol kódex správania sa verejných funkcionárov, posudzovať ich bude Fico” (Denník N, 27 February 2025) <https://dennikn.sk/4491928/vznikol-kodex-spravania-sa-verejnych-funkcionarov-posudzovat-ich-bude-fico/>

[2] Legislative process No 2025/69, accessible at <https://www.slov-lex.sk/elegislativa/legislativne-procesy/SK/LP/2025/69> accessed 26 March 2025

[3] Šimon Drugda, “Defence Minister’s Missing Asset Declaration” (slovakconlaw, 1 April 2025) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2025/04/defence-ministers-missing-asset.html>

[4] “The Program Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic 2023–2027” accessible at <https://www.vlada.gov.sk/site/assets/files/1694/programove_vyhlasenie_vlady_sr.pdf>

[5] Ministersto Kultúry Slovenskej Republiky, “Spoločenská dôvera” accessible at <https://www.culture.gov.sk/ministerstvo/institut-kulturnej-politiky/ciele-kulturnej-politiky/spolocenska-dovera/>

[6] Although the Code does not exist in a vacuum. It builds on the already available systems of public integrity, including the Constitutional Act No 357/2004 Coll. on the Protection of Public Interest in the Performance of Public Office, Act No 55/2017 Coll. on Civil Service, and the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants, and the Principles of Integrity in Public Administration, adopted by Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No 49 of 31 January 2023, some of which provide sanctions.

[7] Article 3(3)f on the principle of accountability provides that high-ranking official retain their office “only as long as they retain the trust of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic.” However, it is unclear how the official, who has lost the Prime Minister’s confidence, would be removed, as such action does not have a legal basis in all cases, except for cabinet ministers.

[8] Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market [2019] OJ L11/3

[9] According to the Constitution, Art 2(1) states that state authorities may act only based on the Constitution, “within its limits, and in the scope and manner prescribed by law.” This includes the PM, which is why extending his power by a government resolution would be a clear overreach and thus likely to be subject to review and invalidation by the Constitutional Court.

[10] Article 3(3)a of the Code of Conduct on the principle of promoting public interest.

[11] Not to mention that in another section (principle 3(3) a-b), the Code extends the observance of the policy program to independent administrative bodies. Any reference to the government program statement or political objectives in the Code essentially introduces political bias in evaluating public officials’ behaviour.

[12] Specifically, the civic movement Public Against Violence (Občianske hnutie Verejnosť proti násiliu), commonly referred to by its abbreviation VPN. In recent times, one prominent member of civic society who ascended to the highest executive office was former President Zuzana Čaputová.

[13] Chiara Bachels, “Slovakia passes law on NGOs amid criticism” (DW, 17 April 2025) <https://www.dw.com/en/slovakia-passes-law-on-ngos-amid-criticism/a-72268853>