Dataset on constitutional change in Slovakia 1993-2020

This dataset is the first comprehensive resource in English and one of the first two resources on constitutional change in Slovakia in any language. The dataset records all successful changes to the Slovak constitutional system (n=42) adopted in the period 1993-2020. Feel free to use this resource with proper citation (also accessible under 

The dataset contains information about the duration of the amendment process for each amendment, support/opposition to the amendment, sponsor of the bill and other data. Indirect constitutional amendments contain code labels indicating their subject matter. The dataset also includes a codebook, explanatory sheet and links to the source material. The dataset will be updated over time. 

The constitutional system of the Slovak Republic is polytextual because it consists of direct and indirect amendments. Direct amendments change the master-text Constitution. There have been 19 direct amendments to the master-text Constitution in total. Indirect amendments are all other stand-alone constitutional acts. There have been 23 indirect constitutional amendments adopted since the founding of the independent Slovakia in 1993.

The other dataset on constitutional change was created at the same time by a team of academics under the leadership of Prof Orosz. We have been in contact about potential collaboration since our initiatives overlap. 

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Constitutional change in Slovakia 1993-2020 (n=42)" (slovakconlaw, 28 October 2021) <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1SE65B1Mo_DzCYfax2RKzidhHPIK1-yQtnrE2ydwTWF8/edit#gid=2114259969>

Presidential Incapacity in Slovakia

While the political reaction to the hospitalisation[1] of the Czech head of state reaches a dramatic crescendo, observers at home might wonder, what happens in case of presidential incapacity in Slovakia? Who acts instead of the president if she is unable to assume duties of her office.

The Slovak Constitution codifies a relatively comprehensive set of rules governing presidential incapacity and the interim presidency. Likely because of the overreach by former acting president Vladimír Mečiar, who almost singlehandedly appointed the whole Constitutional Court in 1993, despite protest from the opposition and later abused the pardon and amnesty powers to protect his cronies from prosecution for the forceful disappearance of Michal Kováč Jr in 1998.

A prime minister acting as an interim president today would not be able to do either of those things. The pardon and amnesty power became non-transferable in 2001, even in the case of presidential incapacity or death, and the power to appoint constitutional court judges would pass to the speaker of the parliament instead of the prime minister. Slovak constitutional law has often developed in response to a transgression or breach of political morality. To paraphrase the American judge Oliver Wendel Holmes, the life of the law is experience, bad or good.

Divided Powers

Be that as it may, Article 105 of the Constitution provides, among other things, that if the office of the president is vacant, or the president is unable to discharge her office for serious reasons (chiefly illness), the whole of presidential powers is divided and passed temporarily to the government and the speaker of the parliament.

Under the terms of the Constitution, whenever the president is incapacitated, the government assumes representative powers and the authority to negotiate, ratify, and litigate international treaties, the power to appoint and recall diplomats, call a referendum, and veto legislation. The government can exercise all or some of these powers collectively or delegate their exercise to the prime minister. The prime minister, however, assumes the sole command of armed forces.

The speaker of the parliament, on the other hand, assumes the power to convene the opening session of the parliament, appoint and remove members of the cabinet, other officials, and senior judges, the power to declare war and mobilise the military. This division operates a delicate balance. It will perform best under the conditions of a coalition or minority government when the PM and the parliament speaker can meaningfully check one another. But if both of these actors belong to a single-party government, the division largely loses its meaning.

Aside from these powers, a portion of presidential powers remains with the head of state, even if she is unable to discharge them in the interim. These powers are colloquially known as non-transferable powers and include, for example, the power to dissolve the parliament, award state honours, pardon and amnesty powers. Even if the head of state dies, these powers remain unattended until the president-elect assumes office.

Seamless Transfer of Power?

For how long will these important powers remain unattended (discounting death)? That depends on the condition of the head of state. For example, suppose the president comes down with a severe case of Covid-19, has to be intubated and potentially induced into a coma. In this scenario, the president cannot discharge her powers "due to serious reasons" under Article 105 of the Constitution, at least while in a coma, potentially longer. Her powers consequently pass down to the government and speaker of the parliament by default.  

That is the theory. In practice, the transfer of powers does not have to be quite so seamless. Presidential incapacity involves legal as well as ethical considerations. As Zuzana Vikárska observed in the case of Czechia, when the health and life of the head of state are at stake, "everyone seems to be very respectful of this delicate situation."[2] The designated actors may hesitate to assume presidential powers in order not to appear too forceful. The relative support of the president vis-a-vis the government and the speaker of the house might also play a role.

Thus, when President Schuster was in critical condition after surgery and had to be put into an induced coma in 2000, the government hesitated and did not assume presidential powers until three weeks after Schuster first fell ill. The government's slow response received criticism from domestic observers and led to delays in the legislative process.[3] One reason for the delayed response might have been the fact that there was no formal procedure for the transfer of powers from the president in the event of incapacity. As a result, the prime minister and the house speaker improvised an act to signify the transfer of presidential powers into their hands, opting for a co-signed emergency declaration.^[4]

Removal from Office

While the initial transfer of presidential powers relies on the government's initiative, the Constitution sets a clear time limit to the president's incapacity. Originally, the Constitution provided that the incapacity of the head of state cannot last more than a year. An amendment to the Constitution in 1999 reduced this time limit to a maximum of six months. Therefore, if the head of state cannot assume the powers of her office within six months of first falling ill, the Constitutional Court has the power to "declare that the post of president has become vacant."

It is unclear how would be this limit calculated if the president had short lucid moments during a prolonged incapacity or if the president was incapacitated for six months but regained total capacity during the case for her removal from office. Either way, if the Court finds grounds for removal, the president's office is terminated, and a new election is called shortly (within 67 days at the latest).

The proceedings to remove the president are based on medical records and require non-judicial expertise. Some comparative constitutions, like the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda (Article 105), require that the decision to remove the head of state be certified by a panel of medical experts rather than judges. Even if that is not the case of the Slovak Constitution, the Court could ask doctors for their opinion through the vehicle of an amicus curiae brief if such a case ever makes it into its docket.

---

[1] Robert Tait, "Czech hospital angered by unauthorised visit to see ailing president" (The Guardian, 15 October 2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/15/czech-hospital-unauthorised-visit-see-ailing-president-milos-zeman>

[2] Vikarská, Zuzana, "Post-Electoral Changes in Czechia with a Hospitalised Head of State" (VerfBlog, 11 October 2021) <https://verfassungsblog.de/post-electoral-changes-in-czechia-with-a-hospitalised-head-of-state/>

[3] Daniel Domanovský, "Minister quits after Schuster fiasco" (The Slovak Spectator, 10 July 2000) <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20008398/minister-quits-after-schuster-fiasco.html>

[4] See generally, A Political Chronology of Europe (Routledge 2003) 233

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Presidential Incapacity in Slovakia" (slovakconlaw, 22 October 2021) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/07/key-policies-from-slovak-govt-manifesto.html>

Extended Curfew and Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia

After a successful pilot in four hotspots in the North of the country, the Slovak government greenlighted plans for the nationwide Covid-19 testing. The pilot took place on October 23-26, with a total turnout of nearly 141000 people, which represents roughly 91 percent of the expected participation estimated by the Ministry of Defense. According to the official data, 5500 people tested positive. 

The testing was conducted using antigen test kits administered by health professionals, military and volunteers. Antigen tests are faster but ostensibly less reliable than alternative means. Citizens also had the option to purchase testing in a private clinic at their own costs. Private clinics and testing labs usually use PCR tests, which are more reliable but are not free, unlike the government-administered tests.

The nationwide testing was confirmed for the weekend of October 31-November 1. It will be carried out with the assistance of the military under the code name "Shared Responsibility." On October 28, the government modified the curfew order so that citizens in the whole country are generally required to stay at home until November 8.[1] A negative result from the nationwide testing, however, will enable citizens to enjoy their freedom of movement without restrictions. Although, they still must wear a facemask when travelling in public transport, in the interior and even outside if they find themselves close to other people (5m), and most public events, cultural institutions, and other establishments continue to be closed. Those who test positive will be required to isolate for 10 days and inform their contacts of the test result.

If one refuses or is unable to take part in the nationwide testing, there are few other exceptions: travel to shop for basic necessities; to get a medical examination; attend a funeral, marriage or baptism; care for a dependent; take a pet out for a daily walk or care of livestock; take children to and from school. In addition to these activities, select groups of citizens are also exempt from the curfew without the need to have proof of a negative test: children under 10 years of age; severely sick (such as cancer patients) and mentally challenged individuals; and people who recovered from Covid-19 within three months before the testing. Citizens who refuse testing will be, therefore, unable to travel to work and have to either work in the home office regime or take sick leave. In addition, employers have the authority to require their employees to document that they had been tested negative.

Even though the government seems to be dead set on the nationwide testing, there remain questions if the country has the collective capacity to successfully carry out the exercise. The President has asked the PM to reconsider strict curfew for people who do not test it risks further dividing society. 

---

[1] The curfew applies during the daytime, so citizens are technically free to leave their residence between 1-5 AM. Because these are early morning hours, however, the ability of citizens to enjoy their freedom of movement outside of curfew is severely limited.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Extended Curfew and Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia" (slovakconlaw, 30 October 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/10/extended-curfew-and-nationwide-covid-19.html> 

Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia: Government Response to the 2nd Wave of the Pandemic

The PM of Slovakia last week floated the idea of nationwide testing for the coronavirus over two weekends in November. The testing should be voluntary and carried out with the assistance of the military because few municipalities have the capacity to organise the testing on their own. The Government has acquired three million antigen-testing kits in preparation for the testing and requested the Ministry of Defence to supply as many as 8000 soldiers so that the exercise runs smoothly. A pilot testing will take place in four regions in the North of the country, which are virus hotspots, on October 23-25, before it is extended to the whole of the country. The success of the project will ultimately depend on the turnout for the pilot.

In his latest public appearance, however, the PM also spoke about the possibility of a forced stay of 10 days for citizens who refuse to test. There are at least two problems with the suggestion. First, the testing cannot be meaningfully described as “voluntary” if it is backed with a sanction. The introduction of a sanction to the equation means, to quote HLA Hart, “that certain kinds of human conduct are no longer optional, but in some sense obligatory” [emphasis in the original]. Understandably, the government wishes for a high turnout because the utility of the exercise would decrease if a critical number of citizens refused to test. Forcing people to participate, however, runs the risk of a further decrease in the trust of the government, which is a crucial determinant in the management of the Covid-19 crisis response. Researchers have found that “high-trust regions decrease their mobility-related to non-necessary activities significantly more than low-trust regions,” based on comparing location data and surveys on trust in politicians in the country.[1] A high trust may reduce the monitoring costs of a government and the necessity for sanctions. Whereas low trust in government is likely to contribute to the opposite. 

The Slovak government had shortly benefited from the high trust on the back of a landslide in general elections in March 2020. Most recent opinion polls, however, show that the PM and key representatives of the government are rapidly losing trust due to personal scandals. Diminishing trust in the government will undermine its effectivity, and lead to non-compliance with its measures. A similar intuition was voiced by the Ombudswoman, who noted that “if we resort to sanctions, aversion to measures increases.”

Second, there is a consensus among lawyers that the government lacks powers to sanction citizens who refuse to test with a forced stay. The Government declared a state of emergency on October 1, 2020, for the second time this year. The state of emergency is to last for 45 days,[2] based on the Constitutional Act No. 227/2002 Coll., on State Security at the Time of War, State of War, State of Emergency and State of Crisis (Act on State Security), which regulates state response these four types of extraordinary situations. Thus, for the next month and a half, the government received access to extensive powers unavailable under conditions of normal politics. But even in an emergency, there are restrictions on the government exercise of power. 

Thes framework for crisis management allows the government to respond to emergencies through means proportional to the perceived level of threat. The permissible level of government restriction on human rights increases in proportion to the gravity of the situation. This is also the case of a curfew or a forced stay.

Under the declaration of emergency, the government may prohibit entry to an area or limit freedom of movement and residence through a curfew order, but the curfew must have limited duration and location (Article 5.3g of the Constitutional Act on State Security). Consider the following example. A permissible limitation on the right of freedom of movement would be a curfew between 4pm in the afternoon and 7am on the morning of the next day. Such a tailored restriction enables citizens, who work alone, so the risk of them spreading the infection is low, to travel to their place of work or go shopping for essentials during the daytime. The restriction, however, decreases the circulation of citizens in the city during the nighttime and effectively results in the closure of cafes and social establishments during curfew hours.

Unlike curfew, which is limited in duration, a forced stay order applies generally. Citizens are expected to stay at the place of their residence and may not leave unless exceptional circumstance occurs. Only in a state of crisis can the government limit the freedom of movement through a forced stay (Article 4.4a of the Constitutional Act on State Security). A ten-day continuous prohibition to leave one’s residence, as suggested by the PM, amounts to a forced stay. Such a measure is not available to the government during the state of emergency.

Suppose the government decides to impose forced stay against a portion of the population that does not wish to participate in nationwide testing. In that case, it is highly probable that the measure will be challenged in the Constitutional Court. The Court had already an opportunity to review the state of emergency declaration in a first-of-its-kind decision on the constitutionality of state of emergency. However, the proposed sanctions against individuals who refuse to participate in the nationwide testing are a significant change in the facts of the case.

---

[1] Olivier Bargain and Ulugbek Aminjonov, Trust and Compliance to Public Health Policies in Times of Covid-19, Bordeaux Economics Working Papers, 3-5

[2] The Constitutional Act on State Security limits the duration of the state of emergency to a maximum of 90 days, without the possibility of extension. Unlike in response to the first domestic outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in Slovakia, this time, the government declared the emergency for a limited duration, seemingly learning from the previous experience. For an account of the government response to the first wave of the pandemic see, Slavomíra Henčeková and Šimon Drugda, Slovakia: Change of Government under COVID-19 Emergency, VerfassungsBlog

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Nationwide Covid-19 Testing in Slovakia: Government Response to the 2nd Wave of the Pandemic" (slovakconlaw, 26 October 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/10/nationwide-covid-19-testing-in-slovakia.html>

Draft Constitutional Amendment on Slovak Judiciary Made Public

On July 13, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) of the Slovak Republic submitted a draft constitutional amendment on judicial reform into the interdepartmental review. The bill is an attempt at a comprehensive reform of the general and constitutional judiciary that implements the main theses of the 2020-24 govt proclamation programme. 

The interdepartmental review restricts pathways to legislative and constitutional change by the executive. Unlike MPs, who are legally exempt from the prepublication, the Cabinet and Ministries must first submit every proposed change of the law on the books into the interdepartmental process (under Act No. 400/2015 Coll. on Lawmaking and the Collection of Laws). The process allows the general and professional public, as well as anyone interested, to comment on the bill before it is presented to Parliament. The prepublication of a piece of legislation allows the public to control the exercise of lawmaking and even constitution-making powers. The author of the bill ought to consider the comments and either agree or disagree with the changes or make alternative proposals.

The MoJ seemingly consulted the constitutional amendment bill on judicial reform widely, including the Judicial Council, the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic and other stakeholders. It remains to be seen if the proposed reforms will be received well by the general and constitutional judiciary. The bill focuses on these critical items:

• reform of the composition of the Judicial Council;

• review of the property and declared assets of judges;

• reform of the Constitutional Court;

• constitutional review of legislation in complaint proceedings;

• introduction of retirement age for lower court and Constitutional Court judges; and

• the establishment of the Supreme Administrative Court.

According to the explanatory note to the bill, the MoJ has the following opinion of a constitutional amendment: 

A sensible and prudent constitution-maker implements more extensive changes to the text of the Constitution either (i) due to "tectonic" societal change and the consequent need to adapt the text of the Constitution to the new social contract (in which case the amendment is remaking the Constitution to reflect the new identity of the community), or (ii) due to a change of paradigm of understanding and out views on the optimal design of a specific constitutional mechanism, design of govt power or the function of a constitutional body (in which case the amendment corrects specific elements of the constitutional identity of the community). From this point of view, the proposed constitutional amendment falls within the second category of changes to the master-text Constitution [...] 

Let us return to this reform after some time and judge whether the proposed reforms better specific points of constitutional design or instead negatively impact the document's identity.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Draft Constitutional Amendment on Slovak Judiciary Made Public" (slovakconlaw, 26 July 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/07/draft-constitutional-amendment-on.html> 

Key judicial reform policies from Slovak govt manifesto 2020-24

The general election in Slovakia took place on February 29, 2020, just before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The election resulted in the most significant change in the executive in the last decade when the party of the three-time PM Robert Fico (SMER-SD) lost to the opposition party OĽANO. After the election, the President, based on a constitutional convention, entrusted the leader of the political party that won the election with the task of forming the government. 

A new government has to draft and submit its Programme Proclamation for a vote in the Parliament (within 30 days of receiving the mandate from the President). The Programme Proclamation is a crucial document for govt coalitions, which delimits the policy agenda of the new govt for the next four years and points of shared interest. Contentious issues and campaign promises are often omitted from the Proclamation in favour of building consensus.

If the majority of the MPs vote in support of the Programme Proclamation, the govt has received the confidence of the Parliament. However, the initial vote of confidence is often a mere formality since the executive and legislature in Slovakia are intimately suffused.

This short post highlights salient constitutional questions in the 2020-24 govt Programme Proclamation, mainly related to the reorganisation of the Constitutional Court and the reintroduction of vetting of lower court judges.

The government will initiate a constitutional and legislative change of the organisation of the judiciary, namely:

Judicial Council

• A reform of the composition of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic to provide for regional representation of judges on the Council. The Slovak Judicial Council consists of non-judges appointed by the executive and the legislature, and members elected by judges from their ranks. This latter group of councillors has been perceived as geographically unrepresentative because most elected judges come from two or three high-profile courts.

• A new practice that the legislative and executive power should always nominate non-judges to the Judicial Council. This proposal sought to balance non-judicial and judicial representation on the Council. However, the govt immediately went against its own proposal when a junior member of the govt coalition nominated a judge for the position on the Council against the opposition of the Minister of Justice.

• A proposal that the legislature will appoint members of the Judicial Council through a transparent selection process.

• Govt response to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic in matters of dismissal of members of the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic, which has been perceived as ultra vires. This controversial decision of the ConCourt denied the executive and legislature the ability to remove their appointments to the Judicial Council before the expiry of their terms of office. The decision effectively erased the provision in the Constitution, which explicit grants the removal power to the legislate and executive in respect of their appointees to the Council.

Vetting of Lower Court Judges

• Reintroduction of judicial vetting by the Judicial Council of lower court judges. The government proposed to reintroduce, in some form, the constitutional amendment on background checks for judges, which had been invalidated by the Constitutional Court in 2019. 

The specific design of the vetting scheme has not been made public yet. However, it seems that the Council will first conduct a thorough review of the financial declarations of all lower court judges, including the property of close family members. The Council holds an annual review of financial statements of judges, but the reliability of the review has been questioned, based on recent revelations after Operation Storm. If the Council finds discrepancies in a judge's declared income and expenses, the judge may need to be vetted.

Constitutional Court 

• A reform of the composition of the Constitutional Court that would prevent delays in the appointment of judges and introduce a staggered term of office to avoid the concentration power due to selection of a majority of judges by one party of govt coalition.

• Abolition of the practice of secret ballot for the appointment of ConCourt judges.

• To curb the power of the Constitutional Court to deny/approve detention of a judge and a prosecutor general. The govt also proposes to remove the decision-making immunity of judges.

• The introduction of age limit for the office of lower court (65 years) and constitutional (70 years) court judges. There are currently three judges of the Constitutional Court who will serve beyond their age cap.

• Additionally, the govt stated that it would examine the possibility of an extension to the power of the ConCourt to review the constitutionality of statutes in constitutional complaint cases as well as ex-ante.

New Supreme Administrative Court

• The establishment of the Supreme Administrative Court, which will also function as a disciplinary court for judges, prosecutors, executors, notaries, administrators and, where appropriate, for other legal professions. The introduction of another specialised court should also ease the workload of the ConCourt.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, "Key judicial reform policies from Slovak govt manifesto 2020-24" (slovakconlaw, 9 July 2020) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2020/07/key-policies-from-slovak-govt-manifesto.html> 

Running list of new scholarship on Slovak constitutional law

Books

• Carol Leff, The Czech And Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State (Routledge 2018)
• David Kosař, Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies (CUP 2016)
• Paul Blokker, New Democracies in Crisis?: A Comparative Constitutional Study of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Routledge 2013)
• Michal Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (OUP 2013) Chapter 9
• Nadya Nedelsky, Defining the Sovereign Community: The Czech and Slovak Republics (University of Pennsylvania Press 2012) 
• Radoslav Procházka, Mission Accomplished: On Founding Constitutional Adjudication in Central Europe (Central European University Press 2002)
• Eric Stein, Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (University of Michigan Press 2000)
• Michael Kraus and Allison Stanger, Irreconcilable Differences?: Explaining Czechoslovakia's Dissolution (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2000)

Papers

• David Kosař and Samuel Spáč, Post-communist Chief Justices in Slovakia: From Transmission Belts to Semi-autonomous Actors? (2021) 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 1
• Lucia Berdisová, Zuzana Dlugošová and Ján Mazúr, Coping with Threema: How do Lawyers Perceive Their Biggest Corruption Scandal? (2020) 103 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Peter Čuroš, On the Missing Discourse Concerning Legal Professions (2020) 103 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Andrej Démuth and Slávka Démuthová, Confidence in Justice as a Moral Emotion and Five Mechanisms That Support Its Renewal or Enhancement (2020) 103 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Samuel Spáč, The Illusion of Merit-Based Judicial Selection in Post-Communist Judiciary: Evidence from Slovakia (2020) Problems of Post-Communism
• Michal Ovádek, “Popular tribunes” and their agendas: topic modelling Slovak presidents’ speeches 1993–2020 (2020) 37 East European Politics 2
• Marek Domin, More votes, but fewer parliamentary seats: Slovak consequences of Delayed Brexit (2020) 10 The Lawyer Quarterly 3
• Šimon Drugda, Changes to Selection and Appointment of Constitutional Court Judges in Slovakia (2019) 102 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Max Steuer, The Guardians and the Watchdogs: The framing of politics, partisanship and qualification by selected newspapers during the 2018–2019 Slovak Constitutional Court appointment process (2019) 102 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Marek Káčer, Judicial Self-restraint and the Super-repealing Power of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic (2019) 102 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Samuel Spáč, Katarína Šipulová and Marína Urbániková, Capturing the Judiciary from Inside: The Story of Judicial Self-Governance in Slovakia (2019) 19 German Law Review 7
• Max Steuer, Militant Democracy on the Rise: Consequences of Legal Restrictions on Extreme Speech in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (2019) 44 Review of Central and East European Law 2
• Max Steuer, Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic (2019) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law
• James E. Moliterno, Lucia Berdisová, Peter Čuroš, and Ján Mazúr, Independence Without Accountability: The Harmful Consequences of EU Policy Toward Central and Eastern European Entrants (2018) 42 Fordham International Law Journal 2
• Štefan Siskovič and Miriam Laclavíková, Formation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia (2018) 8 The Lawyer Quarterly 3
• Max Steuer, Constitutional Pluralism and the Slovak Constitutional Court: The Challenge of European Union Law (2018) 8 The Lawyer Quarterly 2
• Ján Mazák and Ladislav Orosz, Quashing the decisions on amnesty in the constitutional system of the Slovak Republic: Opening or closing Pandora's box? (2018) 8 The Lawyer Quarterly 1 
• David Kosař and Samuel Spáč, Conceptualizations of Judicial Accountability and Judicial Independence ENCJ (2018) 9 International Journal for Court Administration 3
• Peter Colotka, Towards Breaking up of Czecho-Slovakia 1939: Within the Light of Memorandum by Hans Kelsen (2018) 101 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Tomáš Gábriš, Establishment of legal system of the Czechoslovak Republic (1918) (2018) 101 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Oľga Ovečková, Importance of foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic for the origin and development of Slovak legal science (2018) 101 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Jozef Vozár, Slovak legal science before 1918 (2018) 101 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Lucia Berdisová, International Human Rights Law before Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic (2017) 100 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Barbora Králičková, 25 Years of the Independent Slovak Republic and 13 Years in the European Union – Lucky Numbers for the Slovak Competition Law (2017) 100 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Jozef Vozár, Some considerations on compensation for non-material loss in protection of personality (2017) 100 Právny obzor, Special issue
• Marián Sekerák, Same-Sex Marriages (or Civil Unions/Registered Partnerships) in Slovak Constitutional Law: Challenges and possibilities (2017) 13 Utrecht Law Review 1
• Samuel Spáč, Better Safe than Sorry: Czech and Slovak Paths to Secure Independent Judiciaries (2015)
• Samuel Spáč, Judging the Judges: Measuring Performance of District Court Judges in Slovakia (2015) 
• Max Steuer, A Subordinate Issue? An Analysis of Parliamentary Discourse on Freedom of Speech in Slovakia (2015) 1 Czech Journal of Political Science
• Max Steuer, Searching for the Fair Balance? The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Slovak Freedom of Speech Cases (2015) Międzynarodowa ochrona praw człowieka – współczesne problemy na świecie
• Max Steuer, The Influence of the ECtHR on Slovak Courts: The Case of Freedom of Expression (2015) Bratislava Legal Forum: Conference Proceeding
• Daniel Krošlák, The Referendum on the So-Called Traditional Family in the Slovak Republic (2015) 1 Central and Eastern European Legal Studies
• Erik Láštic, Office as an Opportunity: Presidents in Slovakia 1993-2013 (2015)
• Samuel Spáč, Judiciary development after the breakdown of communism in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (2014) 9 CEU Political Science Journal 3-4
• Elżbieta Kużelewska, Referendum in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (2014) 21 Annales UMCS Politologia 1
• Max Steuer, Country Specifics of a Universal Right? Freedom of political speech in the Slovak Republic (2014) 25 Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science
• Erik Láštic, Opposition's Labour's Lost? Minority Rights in Slovakia, 1994-2012 (2012)
• Erik Láštic, Get the Balance Right: Institutional Change in Slovakia during EU Accession and Membership (2006) 38 Slovak Sociological Review 6
• Marián Belko and Lubomír Kopeček, Referendum in theory and practice: the history of the Slovak referendums and their consequences (2003) 5 Central European Political Studies Review 2-3
• Darina Malová and Marek Rybář, The Troubled Institutionalization of Parliamentary Democracy in Slovakia (2000) 37 Politička misao: časopis za politologiju 5

Contributions to edited books

• Kamil Baraník, Slovakia, in Daniel Moeckli, Anna Forgács and Henri Ibi (eds), The Legal Limits of Direct Democracy A Comparative Analysis of Referendums and Initiatives across Europe (Edward Elgar 2021)
• Ján Štiavnický and Max Steuer, The Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic: The many faces of law-making by a constitutional court with extensive review powers, in Monika Florczak-Wątor (ed), Judicial Law-Making in European Constitutional Courts (Routledge 2020) 
• Tomáš Ľalík, Human Dignity in Slovakia, in Paolo Becchi and Klaus Mathis, Handbook of Human Dignity in Europe (Springer 2019)
• Katarína Šipulová, Jozef Janovský and Hubert Smekal, Ideology and International Human Rights Commitments in Post-Communist Regimes: The Cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in Marlene Wind (ed), International Courts and Domestic Politics (CUP 2018)
• Erik Láštic and Max Steuer, The Slovak Constitutional Court: The Third Legislator?, in Kálmán Pócza (ed), Constitutional Politics and the Judiciary (Routledge 2018)
• Barbora Moorman-Kimáková, Slovakia, in Anna Fruhstorfer and Michael Hein (eds), Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: From Post-Socialist Transition to the Reform of Political Systems (Springer 2016)
• Katarína Staroňová and Erik Láštic, Into the labyrinth: the rewards for high public office in Slovakia, in Marleen Brans and B. Guy Peters (eds), Rewards for High Public Office in Europe and North America (Routledge 2012)
• Erik Láštic, If It Works, Fine, If Not, So What? Initiatives in Slovakia, Maija Setälä and Theo Schiller (eds), Citizens’ Initiatives in Europe Procedures and Consequences of Agenda-Setting by Citizens (Springer 2012)
• Erik Láštic, Slovakia – restricted direct democracy in local politics, in Theo Schiller (ed), Local Direct Democracy in Europe (Springer 2011)
• Ján Svák and Lucia Berdisová, Slovak Republic, in Allan R. Brewer-Carías (ed), Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators A Comparative Law Study (CUP 2011)
• Michal Bobek and David Kosař, The Application of European Union Law and the Law of the European Convention of Human Rights in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: An Overview, in Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino (eds), National Judges and Supranational Law: On the Effective Application of EU Law and the ECHR (Europa Law Publishing 2010)
• Erik Láštic, Referendum experience in Slovakia: a long and winding road, in Zoltán Tibor Pállinger, Bruno Kaufmann, Wilfried Marxer, Theo Schiller (eds), Direct Democracy in Europe: Developments and Prospects (Springer 2007)

Case Notes

• Tomáš Ľalík, The Slovak Constitutional Court on Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment (PL. ÚS 21/2014) (2020) 16 European Constitutional Law Review 2
• Lucia Mokrá, Slovak Constitutional Court: Citizenship Law in the European Context (Judgment of 24 October 2012, No PL ÚS 11/2012) (2015) 9 ICL Journal 3
• Tomáš Ľalík, Slovak Constitutional Court: Tax and Delegated Legislation from a Constitutional Perspective (Judgment of 22 January 2014, PL ÚS 5/2012) (2014) 8 ICL Journal 4
• Michaela Chládeková, Slovak Constitutional Court: Deprivation of Legal Capacity due to Mental Illness – a legacy of the past? (Judgment of 28 November 2012, I. ÚS 313/2012-52) (2013) 7 ICL Journal 4
• Lucia Mokrá, Slovak Constitutional Court: Interpretation of the Constitutionestablished a new gap in the constitutional system (Judgment of 24 October 2012, No PL ÚS 4/2012) (2013) 7 ICL Journal 3

Blogs 2021

• Tomáš Ľalík, Leaving the Rule of Law Behind: How Slovakia is fighting against COVID-19 without Legality, I·CONnect
• Simon Drugda, The People v Their Representatives: The Slovak Constitutional Court Blocks Referendum on Early Election, Verfassungsblog
• Marek Domin, Can People Ask for Early Elections? Slovak Constitutional Court Says No, IACL-IADC Blog
• Michal Ovádek, General Prosecutor, the Supreme Leader of the Slovak Republic?, Verfassungsblog
• Michal Ovádek, The Impossible Art of Populist Government, Verfassungsblog
• Max Steuer, Slovakia’s Democracy and the COVID-19 Pandemic: When Executive Communication Fails, Verfassungsblog

2020