New Code of Conduct for High-Ranking Public Officials in Slovakia?

The Slovak government has introduced a new Code of Conduct for high-ranking public officials.[1] The proposal is not yet effective, but it is nearing the end of the interdepartmental review process, during which various government bodies, NGOs, and the public can provide comments.[2] The government is now considering the submitted comments to determine which ones must be implemented to improve the proposal. If critical comments are impossible to implement, it may even change course by scrapping it altogether.

While the adoption of ethics codes is generally a welcome development in terms of improving the quality of the executive and public service, this particular proposal has attracted criticism for three reasons: it unduly concentrates power under the PM withouth a legal basis, restricts the freedom of association of civil servants and top officials with NGOs, and also highlights the government’s own ethical misgivings. On the last point, as I have written on this blog, it was recently revealed that the Defence Minister in Fico’s Cabinet failed to declare a seaside villa owned by his wife in Croatia, which led to a debate about ethics in government and transparency.[3] 

Aside from articulating ethical standards, the proposed Code of Conduct also has a substantive component, by proscribing official conduct with a focus on inclusivity and respect for minorities, but also more curious principles, such as a respect for the “Cyril and Methodius spiritual heritage” and the “history, culture, and traditions” of the Slovak Republic, which the public official ought to commit to and develop while in office. Including these ideological formulations is an interesting choice, but I will not discuss them further in this blog in the interest of space. With that in mind, this post critically examines the proposed Code of Conduct and its key concerns.

Two-Faced Ethics

Ostensibly, the Code represents an attempt by the government to strengthen public trust in state institutions and make good on the policy commitments outlined in its 2023-2027 Program Statement, which identified “prevention of corruption, public sector integrity, and transparency” as one of the key areas to work on during its mandate.[4] Trust in institutions in Slovakia has been eroding over the years, so, understandably, the government would seek to remedy it. [5]

If adopted, the Code would be a government resolution articulating standards for ethical behaviour, fact-based governance, and the avoidance of conflict of interest. In its current form, the Code resembles a soft law or non-binding instrument, as it does not do much to determine sanctions for breaches. As a result, there is always a risk that the Code’s provisions may remain purely aspirational without a clear deterrent for non-compliance.[6]

Relying on moral persuasion alone can be problematic, especially in a political context where breaches of ethical standards have historically not been monitored or sanctioned. This dynamic may undercut the Code’s declared aim of strengthening public trust, as citizens may remain sceptical when ethics rules are not backed by tangible enforcement mechanisms.

Going back to the case of undeclared assets by the Minister of Defence, he has, for example, argued that it was in the higher interest of his family’s privacy not to declare. He may receive a fine for the nondisclosure, but what is interesting is that he has not been publicly criticised by the PM or any of the coalition members. On the contrary, the government has refused suggestions that the Minister’s avoidance of the law may lead by example and invite members of the public to shirk their legal obligations. The Minister’s insistence on the justifiability of his action thus reveals a second face of the government; one that suggests the push to enhance ethics and transparency of public office is not authentic.

Concentration of Interpretive Authority

A related source of controversy is the Prime Minister’s role in reviewing compliance with the Code, as “the final arbiter of the standards of conduct expected of individuals in high executive positions.” Vesting the interpretive power in the PM might, on one hand, foster high-level political accountability. On the other hand, this arrangement makes the Code vulnerable to politicisation. If a high-ranking official appointed by the PM were to face controversy for ethical lapses, for example, there may be an inherent conflict of interest when the PM would be charged with reviewing the misconduct.

Additionally, the Code assumes that the high-ranking official would stay in office, conditional on the PM’s holding trust in them, which is expressly contrary to the law and the Constitution.[7] The Code is meant to apply to “persons” in high executive positions, including members of the government, heads of central state administration bodies, state secretaries, and even political advisors. The PM already has the authority to discipline some of these subjects (i.e. cabinet ministers, by proposing their removal from office under Article 116(4) of the Constitution—Act No 460/1992 Coll.), but the Code would extend his authority without a legal basis to all others, like the Antimonopoly Office, which is an independent regulatory body of the fourth branch of government, or even political advisors who should only be accountable to the recipient of the advice and not the PM.

The Antimonopoly Office, as a central state administrative body, commented on the proposal during the interdepartmental review process and objected to the government by highlighting the EU Directive 2019/1,[8] which strengthens the powers of national competition authorities. The Directive requires the Antimonopoly Office (and similar bodies) to act independently of political influence. Article 4(3) of the Directive ensures that competition authorities are free from external interference. This rule has also been transposed into domestic law (Act No 187/2021 Coll. on Protection of Competition). The introduction of the Prime Minister’s discretion to somehow remove the head of the Antimonopoly Office would thus violate this requirement under both Slovak and EU law.[9]

Restriction of Political Rights

Finally, in a controversial section, the Code provides that public officials should not associate with NGOs or civil society groups whose aims or activities could “conflict with the Government’s Program Statement” and thereby might be perceived as “illegitimate influence” and undermine the trust “in adherence to the public interest exclusively.” [10]

Discounting the fact that the Code of Conduct views the government Program as the sole and determinative statement of what is in the public interest,[11] the concern with the provision is that it limits individuals’ rights to freely associate and participate in public life. The Code’s provisions could discourage public officials from engaging with civil society. By restricting public officials’ association with groups and organisations that may not align with government priorities, the Code thus undermines the participatory nature of democracy and the public sphere. It could have a chilling effect on the life and work of NGOs.

Slovakia has a rich historical tradition of civil organisation representatives transitioning into (and influencing) politics, and sometimes back again. After the fall of communism in 1989 and certainly in Slovakia’s formative years as an independent republic since 1993, civil society organisations were crucial.[12] They often filled gaps left by weak state institutions and advocated for democracy, transparency, human rights, and liberal values. The current government, however, views NGOs and civil society organisations antagonistically as potential sources of illegitimate influence and seeks to repress their activity. This is evident from some legislative initiatives, such as the recently passed amendment to Act No 213/1997 Coll. on Non-Profit Organisations Providing Generally Beneficial Services (NGO Act), or this Code of Conduct.[13]

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “New Code of Conduct for High-Ranking Public Officials in Slovakia?” (slovakconlaw, 28 April 2025) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2025/04/httpsslovakconlaw.blogspot.com202504new-code-of-conduct-for-top-officials.html.html>

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[1] Nina Janešíková, “Vznikol kódex správania sa verejných funkcionárov, posudzovať ich bude Fico” (Denník N, 27 February 2025) <https://dennikn.sk/4491928/vznikol-kodex-spravania-sa-verejnych-funkcionarov-posudzovat-ich-bude-fico/>

[2] Legislative process No 2025/69, accessible at <https://www.slov-lex.sk/elegislativa/legislativne-procesy/SK/LP/2025/69> accessed 26 March 2025

[3] Šimon Drugda, “Defence Minister’s Missing Asset Declaration” (slovakconlaw, 1 April 2025) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2025/04/defence-ministers-missing-asset.html>

[4] “The Program Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic 2023–2027” accessible at <https://www.vlada.gov.sk/site/assets/files/1694/programove_vyhlasenie_vlady_sr.pdf>

[5] Ministersto Kultúry Slovenskej Republiky, “Spoločenská dôvera” accessible at <https://www.culture.gov.sk/ministerstvo/institut-kulturnej-politiky/ciele-kulturnej-politiky/spolocenska-dovera/>

[6] Although the Code does not exist in a vacuum. It builds on the already available systems of public integrity, including the Constitutional Act No 357/2004 Coll. on the Protection of Public Interest in the Performance of Public Office, Act No 55/2017 Coll. on Civil Service, and the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants, and the Principles of Integrity in Public Administration, adopted by Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No 49 of 31 January 2023, some of which provide sanctions.

[7] Article 3(3)f on the principle of accountability provides that high-ranking official retain their office “only as long as they retain the trust of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic.” However, it is unclear how the official, who has lost the Prime Minister’s confidence, would be removed, as such action does not have a legal basis in all cases, except for cabinet ministers.

[8] Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market [2019] OJ L11/3

[9] According to the Constitution, Art 2(1) states that state authorities may act only based on the Constitution, “within its limits, and in the scope and manner prescribed by law.” This includes the PM, which is why extending his power by a government resolution would be a clear overreach and thus likely to be subject to review and invalidation by the Constitutional Court.

[10] Article 3(3)a of the Code of Conduct on the principle of promoting public interest.

[11] Not to mention that in another section (principle 3(3) a-b), the Code extends the observance of the policy program to independent administrative bodies. Any reference to the government program statement or political objectives in the Code essentially introduces political bias in evaluating public officials’ behaviour.

[12] Specifically, the civic movement Public Against Violence (Občianske hnutie Verejnosť proti násiliu), commonly referred to by its abbreviation VPN. In recent times, one prominent member of civic society who ascended to the highest executive office was former President Zuzana Čaputová.

[13] Chiara Bachels, “Slovakia passes law on NGOs amid criticism” (DW, 17 April 2025) <https://www.dw.com/en/slovakia-passes-law-on-ngos-amid-criticism/a-72268853>

Defence Minister’s Missing Asset Declaration

On the 13th of March, a Slovak newspaper published an investigative article mapping the holiday homes of politicians, influential figures, and oligarchs in a remote Croatian seaside village. It was revealed that the Defence Minister in Fico’s Cabinet and his right-hand man, Rober Kaliňák, had a villa in the destination. Asked about a specific piece of property, he openly admitted to the journalists: 

More than six years ago, my wife purchased the property in question from an elderly Croatian family for €296,000. In fact, it is not a villa, but two apartments. The property is more than 50 years old, so it has undergone renovation. [1]

The point of the article was not necessarily to question the ownership of Kaliňáks’ holiday home. It is known that Kaliňák is a relatively wealthy politician and business owner, but rather the curious fact that the property neighbours other prominent lawyers and lobbyists. On the same day the story broke, however, it became clear that this was a bigger issue than all of the initially involved expected. Within a few hours of the article being published early in the morning, two opposition parties held a press conference, where opposition MP Veronika Remišová, who is the Chairwoman of the Parliamentary Committee on the Incompatibility of Functions, revealed that the Defence Minister failed to declare the seaside villa owned by his wife in Croatia.[2] Within a day, the controversy escalated into a full-blown scandal. 

Both the Defence Minister and the Chairwoman accuse each other of breaking the law and the Constitution, and at least one of them is likely to lose their office and face a significant fine. In this blog, I will examine the case to understand the legal obligations of the parties involved and explore the broader implications.

Who Declares What, When, and How?

The declaration of financial assets by public officials in Slovakia is governed by Constitutional Act No 357/2004 Coll. on the Protection of Public Interest in the Performance of Public Office.[3] The Act sets out rules that govern, manage, and ideally help prevent conflicts of interest among public officials, who are required to disclose their assets, income, debts, and business engagements annually upon assuming office (Art 7(1)).

The annual submission of these asset and interest declarations reduces the monitoring costs of the oversight bodies and enables easier identification and scrutiny of any potential sources of undue influence. Crucially, oversight bodies are empowered to discipline public officials in case of non-compliance, and violations can result in penalties ranging from financial sanctions to removal from office.[4] Through these provisions, the Act endeavours to protect the public interest and maintain trust in government institutions by encouraging transparency and accountability throughout the public sector.

When public officials declare their interest, they provide information, through a standardised form, about, among other things, their income,[5] property and assets held by their spouse and minor children living with them in the same household, including personal data (Art 7(1)e). However, unlike the part of the declaration relating to the public official, the immediate family’s information is confidential and kept off the public record. Yet it is this part that has been contested in Kaliňák’s case, because, as the Minister himself admitted, the property was purchased by his wife, not him.

When Chairwoman Remišová then revealed that the Defence Minister failed to declare the property in question, it was alleged that she infringed on the right to privacy of the Minister’s wife and family. The Minister and his party have now filed a complaint to have the Chairwoman removed and fined over €80,000, equivalent to 12 months’ salary.[6] The Minister himself faces a fine of three months’ salary for failing to declare his assets.

Now, let me unpack this case. The allegation that Chairwoman Remišová infringed on the privacy of Minister Kaliňák’s family seems unsubstantiated. One only has to recall that the Chairwoman did not make public the information about the ownership of the seaside villa. It was the Minister who first confirmed it with the media. The Chairwoman did step outside of the law, but the breach lies elsewhere.

Do Not Rush the Process

If the oversight body doubts the completeness or accuracy of a public official’s asset declaration, it can request an additional explanation. For example, to determine whether the declared value of a real estate or movable property matches the official’s known income. If the supplied explanation is deemed unsatisfactory, the oversight body can then initiate review proceedings against the official, either on its own authority or based on a qualified petition (Art 9(2)). The official against whom the proceedings are conducted can comment on the proceedings and, if the oversight body finds them to be in breach of their duty to declare assets and interests, appeal the decision to the Constitutional Court.

Applying this to the Minister’s scandal, without the Committee’s decision, even if the facts of the case were clear, the Chairwoman or any individual member of the Committee should not have commented on the proceedings. It is, of course, possible that the Chairwoman doubted the likelihood of the Committee, which is government-controlled, finding against its own Minister, even in such a clear case.[7] One could argue that she acted in the public interest by breaking the law to protect the people’s right to know, especially in a political context where breaches of ethical standards have historically gone unmonitored and unsanctioned. The bottom line is, however, that the process was not followed. Kaliňák was not given the right to speak to the Committee before the Chairwoman made her public statement, even though he did comment to the media.

The government is now trying to remove Remišová from the Committee and fine her €80,000, but it is unclear on what grounds. Her removal from the position of the Chairwoman is perhaps up to the political discretion of the Parliament, but the fine is not. The Constitutional Act on the Protection of Public Interest allows the Committee to fine an MP up to 12 months’ salary for breaching the obligations and powers stemming from the Act; however, neither of the fact situations that warrant such a fine appears to apply to the conduct of the Chairwoman.[8] It remains to be seen what case the government will present, as the complaint against the Chairwoman has already been filed by the Minister and is likely to be decided soon. Remišová declared her intent to litigate the fine.

Defence Minister’s Defence

Curiously, Minister Kaliňák has argued that he did not fail to declare the holiday home; he purposefully left it out of the declaration, thereby breaking the law and the Constitution, to protect his family from the “hate” spread by the opposition.[9] In a video shared on social media, the Minister stated he anticipated the Chairwoman, or other opposition Committee members, would not respect the confidentiality of his asset declaration (admittedly based on prior experience)[10] and has therefore chosen to protect the public interest in the right to privacy by not disclosing his wife’s property.[11]

This is an interesting argument, not only because it invites others to follow by example and shirk their legal obligations for similar reasons, but it seems misplaced nonetheless. It is true that the public has an interest in the protection of privacy, in general; however, the declaration of assets of a public official is a specific mechanism that, by design, infringes on this right in the interest of transparency and the public’s right to know.

From a legal-theoretical standpoint, the idea that holders of public office must act primarily in public rather than in their own private interest is a foundational principle that underscores the fiduciary nature of public power. Public office is a public trust, and withholding information from the public, thereby limiting its ability to hold the elected representative accountable, is a breach of this trust. What the Minister sought to protect, if we were to take his defence at face value, was the personal interest of himself and his family.

Case law on this topic in our geographical space includes Wypych v Poland, decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).[12] In that case, a Polish local politician argued that broad mandatory public declarations of assets violated his right to privacy and refused to make them.[13] However, the Court held that such disclosure pursued a legitimate aim of preventing corruption and was not disproportionate. Furhtermore, the Court found that the online publication of asset declarations, including information about family members,[14] constituted an infringement on the applicant’s private life, but that it was justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention to achieve one or more of the legitimate aims “necessary in a democratic society” and it was based on law.[15]

The decision to stand for election to Parliament is voluntary, and Minister Kaliňák, as a career politician, must have been aware of both the privileges but also the requirements of the office when accepting it. As the ECtHR stated in Wypych, the issue of the “financial situation of persons holding such office is one of legitimate public interest and concern,” and while politicians also have a legitimate expectation for privacy, due to the nature of the elected office, this expectation is not necessarily a conclusive factor.[16]

The opposition seeks to dismiss the Minister, but it is unlikely to succeed, as it lacks the majority even to call the extraordinary session of parliament to initiate a vote of no confidence.[17] It will be interesting to observe how the government will discipline the two main actors involved in this case, and whether the sanction for the misconduct will be proportionate for both.

Suggested citation: Šimon Drugda, “Defence Minister’s Missing Asset Declaration” (slovakconlaw, 1 April 2025) <https://slovakconlaw.blogspot.com/2025/04/defence-ministers-missing-asset.html>

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[1] Peter Sabo and Martin Turček, “Minister Kaliňák priznal vilu v Chorvátsku. Neďaleko má zaujímavých susedov” (aktuality.sk, 13 March 2025) <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/iEaEa68/minister-kalinak-priznal-vilu-v-chorvatsku-nedaleko-ma-zaujimavych-susedov/>

[2] Hnutie Slovensko, “O majetkových priznaniach Roberta Kaliňáka” (YouTube, 13 March 2025) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZW6e700uFfs&ab_channel=HnutieSLOVENSKO>

[3] The Act applies to a wide range of officials, including elected representatives, government members, senior civil servants, Constitutional Court judges and others entrusted with public authority (Art 2(1)).

[4] The oversight body varies according to the office; for example, in the case of a university rector’s financial declaration, the body vested with the power to review the assets and potentially discipline them is the university’s academic senate. However, in the case of a public official, the oversight body will primarily be the Parliamentary Committee on the Incompatibility of Functions (Art 9(1)).

[5] By supplying their income tax return, or another document issued for tax purposes, containing the amount of income that a public official received for the previous calendar year. (Art 7(2)).

[6] Peter Dlhopolec, “Slovak MP Veronika Remišová faces 80,000 fine after exposing Minister Robert Kaliňák’s undeclared Croatian villa” (The Slovak Spectator, 25 March 2025) <https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/slovak-mp-veronika-remisova-faces-80000-fine-after-exposing-minister-robert-kalinaks-undeclared-croatian-villa>

[7] The government could have also stalled as the statutory period for review proceedings is up to 180 days under Art 9(5) of the Constitutional Act on the Protection of Public Interest in the Performance of Public Office. Alternatively, it could have refused to initiate or decide the review proceeding. To find against a public official, the Committee needs to decide by a three-fifths majority of the members present, and the government coalition controls eight out of 14 seats.

[8] The misconduct that could trigger the highest fine generally involves using a public office for personal gain, soliciting gifts, using one’s personal likeness for advertising, and similar conduct (Art 4(2)).

[9] “Minister obrany Kaliňák hovorí, že rodinnú nehnuteľnosť v Chorvátsku nepriznal z dôvodu hejtu” (dennik.n, 30 March 2025) <https://dennikn.sk/minuta/4553683/> accessed on 1 April 2025

[10] “Court sentenced MP’s assistant for hacking account of former interior minister” (The Slovak Spectator, 25 September 2018) <https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-society/c/court-sentenced-mps-assistant-for-hacking-account-of-former-interior-minister>

[11] Rober Kaliňák, “A few words of explanation…” (Facebook, 14 March 2025) <https://www.facebook.com/smersd/videos/9523057091049518/>

[12] Wypych v. Poland, App. No 2428/05 (25 October 2005)

[13] As a town councillor, Wypych was required to make a wide asset declaration, which he alleged infringed on the “right to respect for his private and family life has been breached by public access to unreasonably extensive and detailed information about his financial resources and his and his family’s property.” ibid

[14] Such a declaration was intended to “discourage attempts to conceal assets simply by acquiring them using the name of [one’s] spouse.” ibid

[15] Tilman Hoppe “To hide or not to hide? Disclosing finances and interests” (UNODC.org) <https://www.unodc.org/dohadeclaration/en/news/2021/29/to-hide-or-not-to-hide_disclosing-finances-and-interests.html> accessed 1 April 2025

[16] Wypych v. Poland, App. No 2428/05 (25 October 2005)

[17] Natália Jabůrková, “Koalícia ignoruje národnú radu, tvrdí Šimečka po neúspešnom odvolávaní ministra” (aktuality.sk, 1 April 2025) <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/fNvgq0t/koalicia-ignoruje-narodnu-radu-tvrdi-simecka-po-neuspesnom-odvolavani-ministra/>